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ABSTRACT

Christian theology, in its many and varied forms, and to the detriment of both the
church and the world, is often built upon a shaky epistemological foundation. In this
dissertation, I describe this shaky foundation by the term ‘insular universalism’. The
oxymoronic nature of the term is both intentional and telling. A theology which strives for,
or unwittingly arrives at, a position which is here being called ‘insular universalism’
achieves neither while rejecting or misunderstanding the complexity of both. When
considered theologically, insular universalism could be simplistically described as the idea
that “one cultural expression of the religion is exclusive for expressing the fullness of the
gospel.”
In order to show the unsure theological footing of ‘insular universalism’, and in
order to point to what I believe to be a better way forward, I turn to the theology of Jürgen
Moltmann. Although Moltmann’s theology has been influential and therefore carefully
dissected and frequently interpreted, there also exists a deeply Hegelian background that
has not been carefully examined. Looking at questions of ontology and epistemology, as
well as notions of system, the Absolute, and the possibility of beginnings and endings, this
dissertation demonstrates a deeply Hegelian line of thought running throughout
Moltmann’s theology. Yet, it is not the case that Moltmann is thoroughly and unabashedly
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‘Hegelian’, but rather that Moltmann takes particular Hegelian themes, as those noted
above, and subtly shifts them, perhaps riffs on them, to further his theological project.
After having described these Hegelian themes, and pointing to the variety of ways
in which they are influential on Moltmann’s theological journeys, this dissertation turns to
its own practice of constructive theology. Just as Moltmann riffs on Hegel, this constructive
practice is a riffing on Moltmann – not thoroughly apologetic, but rooted in the tradition.
It is argued that from Moltmann can be developed a theory of ‘tragic creation’, and from
this theory Christian theology can balance the quests for both redemption and
understanding. In finding this balance, it is argued, ‘insular universalism’ can be overcome
with theological practices which are rooted in both epistemic humility and the need to
address explicitly the socio-political realities of the world which cry out for redemption.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction: The Cries of a Broken World ........................................................................ 1
What is Wrong With Theology? ............................................................................. 6
Why Does Theology Matter?...................................................................................9
What is Wrong With the World?...........................................................................13
Chapter One: Why Hegel? Why Moltmann? Why Now? ................................................. 21
Why Moltmann? .................................................................................................. 25
Why Hegel and Why Now? ................................................................................... 42
Chapter Two: A Moltmonstrous Hegel ............................................................................ 45
The Becoming of Geist ........................................................................................ 53
On Being an I ....................................................................................................... 63
Can Hegel be Saved? ........................................................................................... 66
The System of Philosophy ................................................................................... 72
In Summation ....................................................................................................... 84
Chapter Three: Dialectic and History .............................................................................. 90
On Being Situated ................................................................................................ 93
The Hope of Crucifixion ...................................................................................... 95
Sublation: The Moving Force of History ...........................................................100
The Crisis and Promise of History..................................................................... 105
Hegel on History ................................................................................................ 110
The God Who Promises ..................................................................................... 118
Chapter Four: Trinitarian Creation - Everything Old is New Again ............................. 121
The Tragic Politics of Creation .......................................................................... 125
Trinitarian Love ................................................................................................. 141
Creation3: Originalis, Continua, Nova .............................................................. 158
Eschatology in Hegel ......................................................................................... 164
Eschatology and Systemic (In)Breaking ........................................................... 166
Chapter Five: A Creative Community of Hope ............................................................. 182
Tragic Creation .................................................................................................. 191
Creation for the Imago Dei ................................................................................ 202
A Trinitarian Church .......................................................................................... 210
Identities of Otherness ....................................................................................... 220
Hope for the Future ............................................................................................ 230
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 234

iv

INTRODUCTION – THE CRIES OF A BROKEN WORLD
"Doing theology ought to be a way of participating in God's redemptive work.
Theology is not only about understanding the world; it is about mending the world."1 –
Miroslav Volf
What does it mean to ‘do theology’? Ought theology to be understood as
descriptive, prescriptive, liturgical, or some combination thereof? Even outside of any
possible definition, one might also question the function of theology. Is the proper role of
theology to bring people into an individual salvific relationship with a Risen Christ? Is the
role of theology to structure and offer guidance to the Christian church(es) through which
salvation is worked out? Can second-order explorations of Christian thought accurately be
described as ‘theology’ outside of an intentional relationship to the church? Each of these
are questions that are fairly and importantly asked of the theological endeavor. The term
‘theology’ is both helpful and difficult because it incorporates and allows a wide variety of
definitions and interpretations without being fully encapsulated within any of them. Yet, it
will here be argued that theology cannot be adequately constrained to the level of
discourse.2

1

Tim Stafford, "The New Theologians: Miroslav Volf: Speaking Truth to the World," Christianity Today,
February 8, 1999, 36-37.
Katherine Tanner pointed to the difficulty of practicing ‘academic’ theology as a response to, and ideally
in dialogue with, what has sometimes been termed ‘first-order’ theology, which she describes as the place
“where affirmations are made and life is actually experienced in Christian terms.” The difficulty lies in trying
to bridge the gap between these two disparate practices. According to Tanner, “Every academic theologian
is therefore producing his or her account of the way the theology of practice should be understood and
arranged, and every such account is in potential competition with a host of others. Indeed... the academic
2
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Even if one accepts the importance of seeking salvation through being 'born-again'
or through the liturgies of the Church, any Christian theology which does not seek to
address the realities of the present physical world is bound for failure.3 Miroslav Volf
offered a helpful description of the several facets which must be balanced when one
engages with the theological endeavor. Theology is, at one level, about understanding the
world. Yet, a theological understanding of the world is not merely empirical, even if
empiricism is an important tool for practicing theology well. The world which theology
seeks to understand is a world that is recognized as sacred. Because theology makes this
sort of value judgment about the world, its task can never be one of mere observation.
Rather, as Volf argued, the proper task of theology is to seek to understand the world in
order to join in the very redemption of that world.4 The heart of Christian theology is this

theologian’s construal is in potential competition with many nonspecialists’ understandings of Christian
beliefs and values and of how they hang together.” Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997), 73-74. The intent behind this dissertation is to inhabit this
difficult space: to offer an academic commentary on both first-order and second-order theological
proclamations. Even as academic, this dialogue takes place from the midst of a confessional community with
the goal of both examining and helping to shape the praxis that develops within. Yet, because it is academic,
there remains a role for critique even of ‘first-order’ beliefs. In making an argument for the importance of
academic theology as rooted in the university system, Delwin Brown argued that theology “is not, and should
not be, grounded in a genial openness to all interesting and serious perspectives on life… The fact that all
inquiries are contextual and interested does not entail that all contextual and interested inquiries belong.”
Delwin Brown, “Academic Theology in the University or Why an Ex-Queen’s Heir Should Be Made a
Subject,” in Linell E. Cady and Delwin Brown, eds., Religious Studies, Theology, and the University (Albany:
SUNY Press, 2002), 135.
In trying to define the task of theology, I follow Dwight Hopkins in proclaiming that theology “is a dynamic
that is bounded by… [the realities of] the cultural, political, and economic dimensions of religion and the
religious dimensions of culture, politics, and economics.” Dwight N. Hopkins, “Introduction,” in Sheila
Davaney and Dwight N. Hopkins, eds., Changing Conversations: Cultural Analysis and Religious Reflection
(New York: Routledge, 1996), 2.
3

This language will, for many, immediately bring to mind Anselm’s famous dictum, fides quarens
intellectum. Karl Barth described Anselm’s methodology in this way, “For Anselm, ‘to believe’ does not
mean simply a striving of the human will towards God but a striving of the human will into God and so a
participation (albeit in a manner limited by creatureliness) in God’s mode of Being and so a similar
participation in God’s aseity, in the matchless glory of his very Self.” Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quarens
Intellectum: Anselm’s Proof of the Existence of God in the Context of His Theological Scheme (Eugene, OR:
4
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very (re)enactment of redemption. The theological task cannot merely be one of longing,
but must be one of deep struggle.5
This part of the theological task, to the detriment of the Christian church, and to the
detriment of the world as well, can be easily overlooked, neglected, or summarily rejected.
On the other hand, when this redemptive role of theology is acknowledged, the redemptive
impulse can just as easily be twisted in such a way that the actions which it instigates
privilege self-interest over the redemption of the world writ large. When theology is thus
warped, it becomes insular and self-referential. An insular theology cannot allow religious
practices which have redemption at their core, for the danger to the community is much
too high. Throughout the history of Christianity this theological movement from
redemption to safety is repeatedly evident.6 Theology, as a practice of both seeking
understanding and enacting redemption, holds within itself this very conflict at all times.

Pickwick, 2009), 17. This description of Anselm’s methodology is helpful for the theological task that will
here be undertaken. To seek understanding of the world is not undertaken for the purpose of apologetics, but
rather, as Anselm described, credo ut intelligam – “It is my very faith itself that summons me to knowledge.”
Ibid.
Hopkins described the importance of this struggle by contrasting what he called ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’
approaches to theology. “Both the conservative and liberal approaches leave the status quo, broken humanity,
in place – the conservative by placing religious reflection ‘above’ systemic realities and the liberal by seeking
theological implications (oftentimes unintentionally) from the perspective of society’s structural status quo.”
To avoid this pitfall, Hopkins deploys “a posture explicitly and consistently committed to the poor, the
marginalized, and other disenfranchised experiences and communities in theology.” Changing
Conversations, 2.
5

6

E.g. even while recognizing that sincere and thoughtful Christians could hold such a position, H. Richard
Neibuhr noted, “Half-baked and muddle-headed men abound in the anticultural movement… doubtless
hypocrisy flourishes here too.” H. Richard Neibuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: HarperCollins, 2001),
73. Even more critically and more recently, Willie James Jennings has claimed, “Christianity marks the sport
where, if noble dream joins hands with God-inspired hope and presses with great impatience against the
insularities of life, for example, national, cultural, ethnic, economic, sexual, and racial, seeking the deeper
ground upon which to seed a new way of belonging and living together, then we will find together not simply
a new ground, not simply a new seed, but a life already prepared and offered to us.” Willie James Jennings,
The Christian Imagination: Theology and the Origins of Race (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010),
11.

3

To practice theology is to find balance between building up the self (i.e.
understanding) and giving of the self (i.e. enacting redemption). The enactment of
redemption should always be accompanied by a parallel quest for understanding, as each
speaks to and enlivens the other. Because these two elements are so deeply intertwined in
theological practice, one can also see that when one element is neglected, the other also
falls by the wayside. The balance between these elements is not that of a balance scale in
which precisely equal amounts must always be kept on each side to maintain equilibrium.
Rather, the balance between these two elements would be better equated with developing
a recipe for baking a loaf of bread. In theology, as in baking, when one element is neglected
or the ratio of elements reaches a certain level of unacceptability, the whole project fails.
However, there is room for great creativity insofar as a skilled baker can produce many
varieties of bread, even without being given a specific recipe. Likewise, the skilled
practitioner of theology, who certainly does not need to be a classically trained academic,
can seek new ways to bring together the quest for understanding with the enactment of
redemption.
Through this dissertation I will seek to address what I see to be imbalances in the
practice of theology: moments and movements in which the seeking of redemption appears
to be less highly valued than the quest for understanding. I will examine several broad
manifestations of this imbalance in the lives of Christians and in the life of the church:
gender and racial/ethnic violence, Christian imperialism, and theological/ecclesial
contribution to a politics of ecological ruin. These three imbalances will be described as
separate, but they will also be described as stemming from the same root cause, what I will
call ‘insular universalism’.
4

Although academic in nature, the impetus behind my writing is to encourage a
shifting in the ways that the church sees itself and its place in the world. Such shifts will
be incremental and slow, but are nevertheless possible with a theological change of focus.
I will argue that just such a change of focus has been offered in the theology of Jürgen
Moltmann. Although Moltmann is not the only or the final answer to the theological
imbalances toward which I will point, his work is well-suited to help initiate a shifting
focus with relation to these three categories of imbalance. In particular, Moltmann’s
doctrine of the Social Trinity will be explored as a way to reconsider questions of
anthropological and societal identity and difference, his doctrine of eschatology will be
explored as a means to help redescribe a telos of Christian life and death, and his doctrine
of creation will be explored in order to reconsider God’s relationship with and role in the
world. In order to adequately point to the value that I see in Moltmann’s work, however, it
will first be necessary to understand how his work is rooted in and moves through Hegel’s
philosophy. Although Moltmann’s theology is often explored without this additional step,
it will be demonstrated that Hegel holds an influential role in both the content and form of
Moltmann’s theology, and, as such, ought not to be ignored in seeking to interpret
Moltmann. Finally, after having described the promise of Moltmann’s theology in terms of
its Hegelian influence, I will conclude by describing a point at which I see Moltmann’s
fidelity to Hegel’s inspiration causing inconsistencies in Moltmann’s work, and will
propose a way beyond these inconsistencies through a doctrine of ‘tragic creation’. Before
moving into that constructive work, however, a description of the root of the three
theological imbalances to which I have pointed is in order.

5

What Is Wrong With Theology?
Christian theology, as a wide-ranging conversation of many diverse voices, can be
a powerful discipline. Christianity, throughout the world, looks and sounds very differently
in a wide variety of contexts.7 One could never point to the entirety of the Christian
tradition and say, “This one thing is the problem with Christianity.” A primary theological
problem that will be explored here is the experience of ‘insular universalism’.8 There are
many symptoms that arise and demonstrate this problem. A number such symptoms will
be addressed here, but first it would be helpful to show what an insular universalism
actually looks like in practice. On a broader level, insular universalism could be defined as
the rejection of a meaningful world outside of one’s own personal experiences.9 It is insular
insofar as it non-critically privileges personal experience(s) as the determining

Even the notion of ‘context’ itself comes as already laden with baggage. “Context is not passive but comes
preloaded with its own biases, ready to contest whatever claims it encounters. Contexts, after all, are
constructed strategies.” Lamin Sanneh, Whose Religion is Christianity? The Gospel Beyond the West (Grand
Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 5.
7

8

This terminology sounds oxymoronic: how can that which is insular be also universal? Likewise, in reverse,
how can something that is universal be also insular? This oxymoronic nature of the term is both intentional
and telling. A theology which strives for, or unwittingly arrives at, a position which is here being called
‘insular universalism’ achieves neither while rejecting or misunderstanding the complexity of both. Though
this terminology will be explored in greater depth moving forward, when considered theologically, insular
universalism could be simplistically described as the idea that “one cultural expression of the religion is
exclusive for expressing the fullness of the gospel.” Lamin Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary
Impact On Culture (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2009), 74.
Although this movement has tended to go hand-in-hand with a philosophical ‘modernism’, it is rarely
intentionally grounded with a strong philosophical position. As this dissertation will soon turn to Hegel as a
philosophical guide it is worth noting that he spoke mostly positively about Descartes’ grounding of
knowledge in the cogito, even contrasting this favorably to Kant’s contention for the separation of knowledge
and being. See G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy Vol. 3, trans. E.S. Haldane (Lincoln:
University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 221. One might come to a position like ‘insular universalism’ through
a critical reading of modernist philosophy. Such a position would not entirely transcend the critiques which
will be offered here, but it would be significantly more defensible both philosophically and theologically than
a position that remains unmoored. See Elizabeth A. Pritchard, Religion in Public: Locke’s Political Theology
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) for an example of a theological defense of Lockean liberalism.
9
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characteristic of the external world.10 The term ‘universalism’ is open to a great deal more
confusion. Insular universalism is not truly universalism in any traditional way. It is only
universal insofar as it is an attempt to narrowly define the universe from within the
insularity. Insular universalism is the attempted universalizing of one’s insular worldview,
rather than an acceptance that one’s own worldview comes from viewing the universe from
an infinitesimally limited vantage point.11 Problematically, the mindset of ‘insular
universalism’ is the attempt to sacralize and absolutize truth for the purpose, or with the
result, that one maintains a position of power over others. To critique the wide-ranging
problem of insular universalism in Christian theology will necessarily involve a certain

10

The key point here is the non-criticality of the privileging of personal experience. Many varieties of
theology have described the importance of personal experiences, but have done so thoughtfully and critically.
Kelly Brown Douglas, for instance, in describing what she calls ‘crossroads theology’ described the
importance of bodily experience. “Crossroads theology privileges experience – particularly that of the blues
bodies. To reiterate, these are bodies that experience multiple realities of oppression because of their multiple
identities. Crossroads theology, therefore, encourages blues women and men to allow their own experiences
to shape their consciousness of themselves and the world. Essentially, crossroads theology regards the
experience of blues bodies as embodied knowledge.” Kelly Brown Douglas, Black Bodies and the Black
Church: A Blues Slant (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 132. Similarly, Wonhee Anne Joh wrote of
“trauma that privileges the individual experience of something ‘outside the range of the ordinary’ breaking
into the everyday.” Wonhee Anne Joh, “Postcolonial Loss: Collective Grief in the Ruins of Militarized
Terror,” in Critical Theology Against US Militarism in Asia: Decolonization and Deimperialization, eds.
Nami Kim and Wonhee Anne Joh (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 9. The additional element of
‘insular universalism to which these two theologians point is ‘power’. Many theologies – black, womanist,
feminist, liberation, mujerista, and post/anticolonial among them – have argued for the privileging of the
experience of the powerless. Such examples would generally avoid the trap of ‘insular universalism’ insofar
as the personal experiences of the powerful have already forcibly been made manifest in their lives.
11

John Caputo described what it means to be limited by a specific religious vantage point while also desiring
to move beyond that point, “We are social and historical beings, concretely situated in one historical, cultural,
and linguistic tradition or another, formed and forged by one religious tradition or another. Our religious
aspirations have been given one determinate form or another by the traditions to which we belong and by
which we have been nourished, by the way the name of God has been given flesh and substance for us… But
I want these determinate forms of religious life to be inwardly disturbed by the secret that springs forth from
their historical contingency… of the equally religious confession that we do not know who we are or what
we love when we love our God.” John D. Caputo, On Religion (New York: Routledge, 2001), 34. One might
also point to Lyotard’s description of ‘postmodernity’ as “incredulity toward metanarratives” to emphasize
the inherently narratival nature of Christian theology as an explanation of necessarily limited worldviews.
See, Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington
and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

7

level of generalization; this cannot be helped. Unless such an argument were to be entirely
autobiographical, generalization is a necessary tool. Yet, it is important to name the
generalization that is happening as such in order to avoid the very sort of ‘insular
universalism’ that is being here critiqued.
Of course, defining a religion, or the particular religiosity of an individual, is rarely
as simple as merely ticking off the box representing any given belief system.12 Religion is
complex and confusing, and thus rife for dialogue and interpretation.13 This is no less true
for Christianity and Christian theology, which appear in a wide variety of forms. These
divergences, and the varieties of Christian theological proclamation which they engender,
are in themselves not at all troubling. Since the beginning of the Christian tradition, even
prior to the usage of the word, there has never been an homogenous theology which could

Philosophers and sociologists of religion have widely debated how the term ‘belief’ functions, and how it
ought to be defined. The psychologist Justin Barrett offered a helpful description of two different ways that
belief might be construed: reflective and non-reflective. Reflective beliefs approximate what we colloquially
call beliefs. “We hold consciously reflective beliefs and may arrive at them through deliberate reflection.
When asked if we believe something in particular, a reflective belief is what we reply… Whether a belief is
reflective does not bear on its truth-value or whether it is justified. Non-reflective beliefs, in contrast, operate
without our conscious awareness in the background. Non consciously accessible or arising through
deliberation, our minds produce non-reflective beliefs automatically all the time… Like reflective beliefs,
non-reflective beliefs may or may not be true, empirically verifiable, or rationally justifiable.” Justin Barrett,
“Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology” in The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and
Theological Reflections on the Origin of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 77-78.
Throughout this dissertation, both categories of religious belief will be discussed. Reference to a ‘belief
system’ points toward reflective beliefs. Yet, there will be other examples of non-reflective beliefs that appear
to be conditioned upon socio-cultural development (e.g., a study which shows that racist tendencies arise
when a subject is primed with religious language). Christian theology operates at both levels. Each ‘believer’
intentionally creates a structure of reflective beliefs, but even these intentionally developed beliefs are
influenced by the non-verbalized non-reflective beliefs which have not yet come to the surface.
12

13

E.g., a dozen different ways to approach and understand religion are presented in Hans Schilderman, ed.,
The Concept of Religion: Defining and Measuring Contemporary Beliefs and Practices (Boston: Brill, 2014).
Yet more possibilities are described in Jan G. Platvoet and Arie L. Molendijk, eds., The Pragmatics of
Defining Religion: Contexts, Concepts and Contests (Boston: Brill, 1999). For the purposes of this project, I
tend to follow Molendijk, “On the whole, I take a pragmatic stance on defining religion. I regard definitions
as heuristic working tools. The criterion for evaluation ought to be the insight into human religious behavior
which a certain view of religion gives us.” Ibid., 435.

8

rightly and uniquely be called, “Christian.” To the contrary, one of the reasons that the
Christian faith has shown such resiliency and lasting power is because of the ways in which
it can easily adapt to a variety of cultures and contexts. Christianity was, from the outset, a
missionary movement.14 While this history has, at times accurately and importantly, been
criticized as a domineering colonizing force,15 the earliest Christians were involved in
translating their newfound faith into a variety of languages and cultures because they were
deeply concerned with trying to understand the world and its relationship to God.16

Why Does Theology Matter?
Whatever is meant by the term ‘Christian’ need not, and arguably cannot, refer to
any one thing. This critique of Christian theological discourse(s) is, thus, not to say that
any particular group is ‘wrong’ in se. The major problem toward which this dissertation
will point is not strictly one of belief or of creed, but of ethics. One’s system of belief 17 is

14

An easy-reading but thorough description of the missionary impulse within Christianity can be found in
Carlos F. Cardoza-Orlandi and Justo L. Gonzalez, To All Nations from All Nations: A History of the Christian
Missionary Movement (Nashville: Abingdon, 2013).
15

E.g., on the impact of Christian missionaries in India see Jacob S. Dharmaraj, Colonialism and Christian
Mission: Postcolonial Reflections (Delhi: I.S.P.C.K., 1993). For a description of how both Christian and
Muslim missionaries influenced Nigeria see Olufemi Vaughan, Religion and the Making of Nigeria (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2016).
16

Cardoza-Orlandi and Gonzalez, 31-50.

Stanley Hauerwas questioned the language of a ‘system’ because he saw it as unnecessarily restricting the
developmental nature of ecclesial proclamation. “I became increasingly skeptical about the very idea of
‘systematic’ theology. Indeed, the more I pondered not so much what Barth said about how to do theology,
but how he did it, I became convinced that the idea of ‘system,’ at least in the nineteenth-century sense of
system, distorted the ad-hoc character of theology as a discipline of the church.” Stanley Hauerwas, The
Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), xx.
I would contend that Hauerwas has overstated his case against systematic theology, but, nevertheless, my
own theological practice is deeply rooted in the ad-hoc character of the disciplines of the church. However,
as so-rooted, the need that I see in Christian theology is not a swapping out of problematic beliefs, but a redescription of the narrative by which the church continues to become.
17
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profoundly influential, often outside even of conscious intention, in the way that one acts.18
Kathryn Tanner has argued,
Beliefs have power over actions and attitudes to the extent that such beliefs
are necessary in order for those actions and attitudes to make sense. Beliefs
have power over actions since beliefs about what is the case are necessary
in order for action to appear reasonable, meaningful, practically possible,
and motivated.19
Tanner claimed that the category of belief holds logical priority over the category of
action.20 While Tanner does make a strong argument that this is the case, it is not the
purpose here to prove that she is correct. The scientific/philosophic studies of behavior run
deep and continue to offer new ideas and new understandings of the relationship between
belief and behavior. Tanner was not attempting to upend this tradition, but rather to
synthesize at least part of the argumentation therein. In order to follow Tanner’s proposal,
one does not need to hold that belief is the only causal factor in behavior, nor does one

18

See Kathryn Tanner, The Politics of God: Christian Theologies and Social Justice (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Fortress Press, 1992). Tanner offered a rigorous analysis of the relationship between belief and action, as
well as a compelling proposal for how a change in one’s beliefs can be influential for a similar change in
action.
Ibid., 16. Tanner’s discussion incorporates both reflective and non-reflective belief. Because reflective
beliefs are broadly shaped by non-reflective beliefs, each is influential in the determination of one’s actions.
The distinction between ‘first-order’ belief and ‘second-order’ reflection has already been described, but one
ought not to confuse this distinction with the distinction between reflection and non-reflective belief. Both
reflective and non-reflective belief exist within both ‘orders’ of thought.
19

Tanner is pointing primarily to the idea of ‘first-order’ belief as unconsciously informative to action. Yet,
again, Hauerwas reminds us of the difficulties of purely distinguishing between first-order belief and secondorder reflection. “Indeed, the church across the centuries and through the communion of saints believes more
than any theologian could possibly say.” Stanley Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings: Probing TwentiethCentury Theology and Philosophy (New York: SCM, 2001), 5. One value of second-order theological
reflection is that it can better analyze the ways in which beliefs engender actions. So, for my purposes, the
goal behind second-order reflection is not only analysis, but the possibility of shifting patterns of belief
accordingly.
20
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even need to hold that belief is a causal factor.21 Rather, so long as it is accepted that beliefs,
at some level, mediate behavior, Tanner’s point should be well taken.22
It would be very easy to make this exercise entirely theoretical – to survey the
literature regarding belief and behavior, between the internal and the external insofar as the
two are distinguishable, and to make a corresponding theological declaration regarding
orthodoxy and orthopraxis. Yet, such a disinterested study would offer very little to the
practice of theology, to the church which it supports, or to the world for which the church
seeks to enact God’s redemption. A disinterested study of the relationship between
theological belief and behavior would also fail to account for the fact that theological belief
is inherently proclamational. Theological belief is not merely internal, but, at least within
the historical Christian traditions, truly becomes realized through its proclamation.23 The

“A philosophical perspective on the connection between Christian beliefs and comportment… shows that
it is wrong to account for variations in Christian actions and attitudes by bypassing the influence of Christian
beliefs. Christian beliefs have the power to direct the attitudes and behaviors that Christians display.” Tanner,
16.
21

22

Since Tanner made this particular argument the neurosciences have shown more and more clearly that
intentionality is not always at play in determining behavior. Indeed, some neuroscientists have argued that
“action precedes reflection… This is not to say that human consciousness plays no role or that it is not special
in its powers to transform, manipulate, and convey information…but that this consciousness is not necessary
to achieve the sophisticated, adaptive, and intelligent behavioral guidance demonstrated in the emerging
priming literature.” John A. Bargh and Ezequiel Morsella, “The Unconscious Mind,” Perspectives on
Psychological Science 3.1 (2008), 73-79, accessed September 17, 2016, http://dx.doi.org10.1111/j.17456916.2008.00064.x.
Barth used the term ‘proclamation’ very intentionally as a means of describing God’s manifestation in the
practices of the church. “Proclamation is human speech in and by which God Himself speaks like a king
through the mouth of His herald, and which is meant to be heard and accepted as speech in and by which
God Himself speaks.” Barth was quick to point out, however, that proclamation is not just any speech-act,
and is not only verbal, but “is primarily and decisively preaching and the sacraments.” Karl Barth, Church
Dogmatics I, 1, Eds. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2004), 52, 80. I
use the term ‘proclamation’ less technically, but with consideration of the seriousness with which Barth
conceived it. Here, proclamation is not limited to sermon and sacrament, but incorporates other intentional
practices of the church by which it seeks to make redemption manifest in the world.
23
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speech-act of proclamation gives flesh to that which is proclaimed. Belief can be tentative
and fleeting until it is proclaimed.24
If, as Volf says, theology is a two-pronged practice, seeking understanding and
enacting redemption, then proclamation is the moment at which these two prongs come
together. Proclamation is the act by which understanding is given a voice and redemption
a body. With the proclamation of a theological belief, the proclaimer locates herself both
historically and ethically. The proclaimer situates herself within a particular broad religious
tradition, while also beginning to describe how the proclaimed belief will impact her
actions in the world. Because proclamation stands as an act that is simultaneously internal
and external, it also serves as an intermediary between belief and behavior. It is in
proclamation, even if not exclusively so, that belief asserts a potentially determinative force
on behavior, and likewise where behavior can assert a potentially determinative force on
belief.
However, since proclamation is neither one nor the other, there is no certainty
which direction this movement is going at any particular moment. Whether intentional or
not, proclamation does not always perfectly correspond to a singularly definable reflective
belief. This is precisely why it is so common to see two people making competing
proclamations based on an, at least broadly conceived, shared belief.25 Without seeking to

Badiou made an interesting observation regarding the nature of theological proclamation, ““It is not the
singularity of the subject that validates what the subject says; it is what he says that founds the singularity of
the subject.” Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2003), 53. Proclamation stands as both first-order theological belief and second-order theological
interpretation because an unproclaimed theology is neither belief nor critique.
24

25

E.g., in many Christian denominations there is a major point of divergence on topics related to human
sexuality. Regardless of where one comes down on any particular debate, people from all different
directions point to ‘the love of God’ as justification for their opinion. Christian blogger Kristen Padilla
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understand the ethical outcomes of a particular iteration of theological belief(s), Christian
theology can and will be used in problematic ways. “Probably more often than not over the
course of Western history, Christians have used beliefs about God and the world to
undergird attitudes and actions with a highly problematic political import.”26 In order to
develop such an understanding, it is necessary to name certain ways that ‘insular
universalism’ has influenced the ways in which Christians might engage with the world.

What Is Wrong With the World?
One might point to a number of different ways in which Christian theology has
been useful or inspirational in morally repugnant way. Here, a few overarching examples
will be offered in order to describe the importance that I see in Moltmann’s ability to offer
a shifting of the narrative from which Christian theology can be conceived.27 The first such
wrote, “Can you know the love of God in the abstract without knowing God relationally? And can you
relationally know God without repentance? If the answer is no to this second question, then you cannot
know the love of God (God is love) without repentance.” Kristen Padilla, “Homosexuality and the Love of
God: A response to Jen Hatmaker and Katelyn Beaty,” accessed July 21, 2017,
https://kristenrpadilla.com/2016/05/04/homosexuality-and-the-love-of-god-a-response-to-jen-hatmakerand-katelyn-beaty/. Writing for Christianity Today, Katelyn Beaty pointed to this interpretation of what it
means to know/experience the love of God, but countered, “The out of the world nature of [God’s] love
doesn’t end with the word but... this radical love of God in Christ is precisely what compels us to love
God.” Katelyn Beaty, “What Jen Hatmaker Gets Right About Christian Love,” in Christianity Today,
accessed July 21, 2017, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2016/april-web-only/lgbt-what-jen-hatmakergets-right-about-christian-love.html. Both writers begin with a concept of ‘the love of God’, but end with
very different looking praxis.
26

Politics of God, 1.

My approach to these issues has been influenced by Mark Noll’s text, The Scandal of the Evangelical
Mind. Noll argues persuasively, “The evangelical ethos is activistic, populist, pragmatic, and utilitarian. It
allows little space for broader or deeper intellectual effort because it is dominated by the urgencies of the
moment.” Mark Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 12. It would
be a gross oversimplification to deny that deep theological reflection has come from within the evangelical
tradition, but nevertheless I believe Noll points to an important trend. The reason that these issues are
addressed rather broadly is that what I hope to accomplish is a shifting narrative by which deeper theological
conversations can organically occur. Here, the complexity of navigating the ever-changing relationship
between theological belief and theological reflection is evident.
27
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example is the personal denigration of persons and peoples based on cultural, racial,
gender, or other factors.28 Following closely in line, theological beliefs have throughout
history also been misused as rationalizations for imperialist conquest.29 While there is a
deep tradition of so-called Just War Theory,30 in which conscientious thinkers have deeply
struggled with the role that Christians can or ought to play in acts of violence, the
rationalization of conquest runs much deeper socially without any of the intellectual rigor
that generally accompanies claims of just warfare.31 Third, and, while seemingly the most
Here, the phrase, ‘personal denigration’ is used to broadly describe a wide number of interpersonal
expressions that might generally be given terms like ‘racist’, ‘sexist’, ‘jingoist’, etc. Each of these, and other,
modes of interpersonal approach have layers of background and complexity – far more than can adequately
be described here. Yet, they are grouped together in such a general way because each represents a way in
which individuals and communities have been historically and currently oppressed and denigrated based on
one or more unshared characteristics. For insightful studies on the origin of the idea of race and racism see
J. Kameron Carter, Race: A Theological Account (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) and The
Christian Imagination. For a theological account of the complexities of race and multi-racialism see Brian
Bantum, Redeeming Mulatto: A Theology of Race and Christian Hybridity (Waco: Baylor University Press,
2010). Among the most influential rejections of theological sexism include: Rosemary Radford Ruether,
Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon, 1993), and Elizabeth A. Johnson, She
Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse (New York: Crossroads, 1992). A text that
has informed my understanding of the inter-linking of first-order and second-order theology through the
intentional development of communal narrative, in this case in rejection of Christian nationalism, is Stanley
Hauerwas, Unleashing the Scripture: Freeing the Bible from Captivity to America (Nashville: Abingdon,
1993).
28

29

A helpful discussion of the ways in which religion (with a focus on both Christianity and Islam) is
infiltrating historically secular governments, as well as how such infiltration changes the nature of the
religious, can be found in J. Ann Tickner, A Feminist Voyage Through International Relations (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2014), see especially Chapter 10. Rosemary Radford Ruether has offered a helpful
discussion of American imperialism as rooted in a theology of election in, Rosemary Radford Ruether,
America, Amerikkka: Elect Nation and Imperial Violence (New York: Routledge, 2014). In connection with
Unleashing the Scripture, I have also found Michael S. Northcott, “Reading Hauerwas in the Cornbelt: The
Demise of the American Dream and the Return of Liturgical Politics,” in Journal of Religious Ethics, vol.
40, iss. 2 (June, 2012), accessed June 1, 2017, dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2012.00521.x, to be helpful
in describing how ‘hope theology’ has become enmeshed in a narrative of ‘the American dream’.
30

A recent example can be found in Nigel Biggar, In Defense of War (New York: Oxford University Press,
2013). Augustine is also well-known for his exposition on Just War Theory, particularly his distinction
between the justice of war and justice in war. A description of the elements of Augustine’s theory, together
with a contemporary assessment, can be found in John Langan, S.J., “The Elements of St. Augustine’s Just
War Theory,” in The Journal of Religious Ethics, vol. 12, no. 1 (Spring, 1984): 19-38.
31

E.g., Ryan LaMothe argued that a Christian embrace of colonialism and imperial expansionism has been
more heavily impacted by narratives of American expansion than by deliberate theological reflection. See,
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impersonal, possibly the most devastating, Christian theology continues to be abused as a
justification for environmental abuse, misuse, and neglect.32
As these three misuses of theological beliefs are explored in more detail, it will
become evident that they are deeply intertwined, and that one abuse necessarily correlates
with the other abuses as well. Each of these abuses have survived and thrived throughout
the two millennia of Christianity’s existence. While Christians are certainly not the only
group to participate in these destructive practices, nor the only group to sanctify them with
religious language, the church is yet deeply culpable for their existence. The intention
behind pointing to these theological abuses is not simply to castigate an entire faith for all
real and imagined improprieties in its history. This is not about reproach, but about the
hope for something better. Christian theologies cannot possibly rid the world of these evils,
but when looking at the present realities which they engender, the tacit approval of silence
cannot be accepted. Only by naming the ways in which theology has been used to
contribute to the problems described can there be hope that theology can also be a tool
toward overcoming them in redemptive ways.
While each of these problems will continue to be addressed in greater detail, a brief
discussion of each should help to locate them within the historical movements of

Ryan LaMothe, “What Hope Is There: The Enthrallment of Empire Stories,” in Pastoral Phsychology, vol.
56, iss. 5 (May, 2008): 481-495. LaMothe tied the narrative of expansionism specifically to a “distortion of
hope,” with explicit reference to Moltmann’s understanding of hope.
32

A fascinating study of the ways in which consumerism and the economics of colonialism have led to a
theological disregard of ecological matters can be found in Grace Ji-Sun Kim, “Colonialism, Han & EcoTheology,” in Scriptura, vol. 111 (2012): 376-384. A thorough description of the importance of ecological
theology from a biblical basis is Fred Van Dyke et al., Redeeming Creation: The Biblical Basis for
Environmental Stewardship (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1996). Another text that has been
influential in teaching me to view this issue through an eschatological lens is Laura Ruth Yordy, Green
Witness: Ecology, Ethics, and the Kingdom of God (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008).
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Christianity and human history. Beginning with the idea of personal denigration, whether
based on culture, gender, nationality, or other factors, this issue has been a contributing
factor to many of history’s greatest evils. Two ways in which the assertion of personal
supremacy is especially obvious are seen in the areas of gender33 and race,34 both of which
are, from the outset, deeply complicated terms.35 The church is rife with examples of
Christians who utilize a particular interpretation of Christian Scriptures – almost

33

The scriptures of the Hebrew Bible often demonstrate, at best, a disregard for women. Women were
completely ignored in the family chronologies and census reportings, were considered unclean due to
childbirth or menstruation, and lived under a very different set of rules and laws than the men in society
(Num 30, Deut 22, Prov 5, et al.). This same pattern continues into the New Testament when women were
commanded to submit to their husbands (Eph 5:22-24, Col 3:18) and to be silent in church (1 Cor 14:34, 1
Tim 2:11-15). These passages, among others which apparently privilege the male over the female, are
themselves culturally conditioned and complex, yet, to the present, many congregations and denominations
reject the giftedness of women to serve in certain or all leadership roles on their basis. The most obvious
example of this practice is the Roman Catholic Church which, to this day, will not ‘allow’ women to serve
as priests. Likewise, the Southern Baptist Convention, states unequivocally that women are disallowed from
ordained ministry. “While both men and women are gifted for service in the church, the office of pastor is
limited to men as qualified by Scripture.” Southern Baptist Convention, The 2000 Baptist Faith and Message.
A study conducted by researchers from the University of Southern California has argued that “the
intergroup dynamics established by religious identifications… appeared to drive religious racism.” See
Deborah L. Hall, David C. Matz, and Wendy Wood, “Why Don’t We Practice What We Preach? A MetaAnalytic Review of Religious Racism,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, No. 1 (February
2010): 135. A different group of researchers conducted a similar study in which they sought to test whether
being ‘primed’ with Christian concepts demonstrably caused racially prejudicial reactions among Christian
subjects. The researchers concluded, “Results indicate that [being primed with] Christian religious concepts
increase subtle and overt prejudice toward a historically disadvantaged racial group. However, priming
Christian concepts did not appear to cause a shift in reported underlying emotion, such as fear or disgust.”
See Megan K. Johnson, Wade C. Rowatt, and Jordan LaBouff, “Priming Christian Religious Concepts
Increases Racial Prejudice,” Social Psychological and Personality Science 1, no. 2 (April 2010): 123.
34

Regarding the complexities of gender, “Our bodies are too complex to provide clear-cut answers about
sexual difference. The more we look for a simple physical basis for ‘sex,’ the more it becomes clear that ‘sex’
is not a purely physical category. What bodily signals and functions we define as male or female come already
entangled in our ideas about gender.” Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the
Construction of Sexuality (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 4. There are questions of the extent to which
either race or gender are biological or constructed realities. Without taking a stand on either case, both ‘race’
and ‘gender’ will be used here pragmatically, as both are frequently utilized categories of
differentiation/description.
35
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universally while denying that ‘interpretation’ is taking place– in order to solidify their
status in a particular social order.36
A second major problem that has been deeply rooted in Christian theology is the
justification for national or religious conquest. Even in pre-Christian times, one can look
to the stories of the Hebrew Bible and point to a wide variety of tales which encourage and
celebrate conquest. Those people are hailed as heroes who have led “God’s people” to
military victory in foreign lands.37 Moving beyond the times of the Hebrew Bible, military
conquest continued to be a major theme in Christian history. Such conquest is evidenced
by the Crusades, the Inquisitions, and arguably even as recently as the 2003 U.S. led
invasion of Iraq.38 This thirst for conquest is a direct result of the previously discussed
problem of denigrating persons based upon actual or perceived differences. When
Christians have, both intentionally and otherwise, come to believe that they possess an
inherent moral superiority,39 and when the power of that superiority is transferred from

36

See, e.g., David M. Whitford, The Curse of Ham in the Early Modern Era: The Bible and the Justifications
for Slavery (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009). This book, particularly the seventh chapter, “The SelfInterpreting Bible,” details the history of biblical justifications for slavery as well as a description of
arguments made against the idea of biblical interpretation in reading.
37

There are numerous such stories that ought to be horrifying to contemporary hearers and readers. Among
children brought up in Sunday School, the story of “Joshua and the Battle of Jericho” is quite well-known
both because of the compelling nature of the story and, perhaps even more, because the story is frequently
recounted in a peppy jingle. The story which children are taught is fairly simple. God commanded Joshua to
march Israelite troops to the walled city of Jericho. After a pattern of marching around the city and blowing
their horns, the walls of the city “came a’tumblin’ down.” As the story comes to completion, “Then they
devoted to destruction by the edge of the sword all in the city, both men and women, young and old, oxen,
sheep, and donkeys…” (Josh 6:21). Similar stories occur throughout the Hebrew Bible. E.g. see Deut 20.
A recent biography of George W. Bush argues that Bush believed “he was the agent of God’s will, and
[was] acting with divine guidance.” Jean Edward Smith, Bush (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2016), 227.
Bush himself is quoted as saying, “If war is forced upon us [Americans] we will fight with the full force and
might of the United States military, and we will prevail. We Americans have faith in ourselves, but not in
ourselves alone. We do not know – we do not claim to know all the ways of Providence, yet we can trust in
them, placing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life and all of history.” Ibid., 342.
38
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merely religious/moral to majority personal characteristics – masculinity, whiteness, etc. –
the violence that it engenders can be multiplied exponentially.40 This multiplication of
violence is particularly evident when religion and nationalism are conflated.41
Thus far, two important ethical issues have been discussed as they relate to
Christian theology and discourse. While there are countless other problems that could be
explored, there is one issue in particular that is of such a magnitude of importance, that it
is literally life and death for a great number of people: creation care in the face of global
climate change.42 The threat of global climate change is well-known, and there have been
many scholarly scientific studies which demonstrate the data and project possible

39

Max Weber described this as a Gesinnungsethik which is a deeply religious ethics of conviction. Contrasted
with an ethics of responsibility, in which behavioral decisions are based primarily on the presumption of
consequences, Weber describes Gesinnungsethik as, “The Christian acts rightly and leaves the outcome to
God.” Max Weber, “Value Judgments in Social Science,” Selections in Translation, Ed. W.G. Runciman
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 82.
Foucault described the relationship between power and ‘knowledge’ in a way that would be helpful from
within a religious community that might claim particularities of belief as equivalent terms to Foucault’s
‘knowledge’. The questions that Foucault would demand in such circumstances include, “What types of
knowledge do you want to disqualify… Which speaking, discoursing subjects – which subjects of experience
and knowledge – do you then want to diminish… which theoretical-political avant garde do you want to
enthrone in order to isolate it from all the discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about it?” Michel
Foucault, “Two Lectures,” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed.
Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 85.
40

“We should be attuned to the distinctively religious stakes of certain political conflicts, informed by
distinctively religious understandings of right order that are expressed in claims for the substantive regulation
of public life in accordance with religious principles; and we should also be sensitive to the distinctiveness
of religion as a rich matrix… that can– in certain contexts- contribute to political conflict and violence even
when the stakes of the conflict are not distinctively religious.” Rogers Brubaker, “Religious Dimensions of
Political Conflict and Violence,” Sociological Theory 33, No. 1 (March 2015), 13. Easy examples would be
‘pastoral’ calls for the assassination of foreign leaders from Pat Robertson and Robert Jeffress. See, Laurie
Goodstein, “Robertson Suggests U.S. Kill Venezuela’s Leader,” New York Times, August 24, 2005, and
Sarah Pulliam Bailey, “‘God Has Given Trump Authority to Take Out Kim Jong Un’ Evangelical Adviser
Says,” The Washington Post, August 9. 2017.
41

This discussion should extend beyond the purely ecological to the recognition that “The poor will suffer
the bulk of the damages from climate change.” Robert Mendelsohn, Ariel Dinar, Larry Williams, “The
Distributional Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor Countries,” Environment and Development
Economics 11, Issue 2 (April 2006), 173, accessed August 17, 2016, Cambridge University Press Journals
Complete.
42
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consequences.43 That there are distinctly religious influences to this discussion has also
been well-demonstrated.44 The historian Lynn White Jr. has pointed to the development of
Christian theology as the overwhelming root cause of the current ecological crisis. He
argued,
Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric
religion the world has seen… [Humanity] shares, in great measure, God’s
transcendence of nature… [Christianity] not only established a dualism of
man and nature but also insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature
for his proper ends.45
As with systems which wholesale discount groups of people and which celebrate
violent jingoistic conquest, this system of belief may not always or entirely have distinctly
theological causes. Nevertheless, theology is frequently used to sanctify both the
undergirding system of belief and the negligence which is so often its result. As such, White
was again correct to say, “More science and more technology are not going to get us out

43

The United States Environmental Protection Agency has an easy primer to describe the realities of global
climate change. The EPA says, “Climate change is happening. Our Earth is warming. Earth’s average
temperature has risen by 1.5°F over the past century, and is projected to rise another 0.5 to 8.6°F over the
next hundred years… [which can] translate to large and potentially dangerous shifts in climate and
weather…Humans are largely responsible for recent climate change.” The news is not all dire, however,
because “we can reduce the risks we will face from climate change.” Environmental Protection Agency,
“Climate Change: Basic Information,” last modified August 9, 2016, accessed August 17, 2016,
https://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/basics/.
44

University of Cincinnati political scientist Matthew B. Arbuckle and Georgetown University public policy
scholar David M. Konisky have recently shown that Christians, both Catholic and Protestant, “tend to be less
concerned about global warming compared with those not affiliating with a religious tradition.” Moreover,
while these results are perhaps not altogether surprising, in trying to tease out the relationship between
religious practice and climate change denial, the researchers found that, “For many, [a higher level of]
religiosity tends to move people even further away from stronger environmental attitudes.” Matthew B.
Arbuckle and David M. Konisky, “The Role of Religion in Environmental Attitudes,” Social Science
Quarterly 96, issue 5 (November 2015), accessed 8/17/16, Wiley Online Library.
Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” Science 155, No. 3767 (March 1967),
1205. White continued, “Our science and technology have grown out of Christian attitudes toward man’s
relation to nature which are almost universally held not only by Christians and neo-Christians but also by
those who fondly regard themselves as post-Christians. Despite Copernicus, all the cosmos rotates around
out little globe. Despite Darwin, we are not, in our hearts, part of the natural process. We are superior to
nature, contemptuous of it, willing to use it for our slightest whim.”
45
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of the present ecologic crisis until we find a new religion, or rethink our old one.”46 Looking
back to St. Francis of Assisi, White saw that theology needs to re-find a sense of the virtue
of humility both individually and corporately.47
Each of these three areas are serious problems in the world. They are not, by any
means, the only problems facing the world and its inhabitants, but they are overwhelmingly
prevalent and dangerous. Returning to the beginning of this introduction, if the church is
unable to live into the second half of Volf’s definition of theology, the enactment of
redemption, then the church has ceased having any reason to exist. Indeed, it is much worse
yet when the church comports itself within the world, and when Christians comport
themselves toward their neighbors, in ways which are completely contrary to the
redemption that they proclaim. Nevertheless, this is precisely a reality that is evident in the
world. The failures of the church are many and varied, and yet, despite all of that, the
church still proclaims, and still earnestly believes in, redemption. While these are certainly
ethical issues, they are also deeply theological issues. As such, in order for these problems
to be overcome, at least within a Christian context, the underlying theology from which
they arise must be explored, must be countered, and, itself, must be redeemed.

46

Ibid.

“Since the roots of our trouble are so largely religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious.” Ibid.,
1207.
47
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CHAPTER 1: WHY MOLTMANN? WHY HEGEL? WHY NOW?
“If I were to attempt to sum up the outline of my theology in a few key phrases, I
would have at the least to say that I am attempting to reflect on a theology which has: a
biblical foundation, an eschatological orientation, [and] a political responsibility. In and
under that it is certainly a theology in pain and joy at God himself, a theology of constant
wonder.”48 – Jürgen Moltmann

There are many theologians, not to mention thinkers from within and without many
other disciplines, that offer creative and powerful possibilities for moving Christian
theology forward. No single thinker holds the key to perfect theological profundity, so it is
essential that the church actively and openly engage with a variety of thinkers. By engaging
with a multitude of voices, the church sets itself up to learn and grow. Christian theology
can only be meaningful when it seeks to speak to the pressing issues in cultures of change.
Christian theology cannot pretend that the issues which were faced by the New
Testament churches, themselves existing in many and varied contexts,49 are a perfect
encapsulation of the issues which are still important in today’s world. Many issues of
immense contemporary importance – nuclear proliferation, global climate change, and
digital warfare as a few examples – would have been nonsensical to the ears of a person
living in the first century. Likewise, many issues which seem to be of great importance to
certain New Testament era churches would appear to be irrelevant to most contemporary

48

Jürgen Moltmann, History and the Triune God, John Bowden, trans. (London: SCM Press, 1991), 182.

49

One might cheekily ask, what has Ephesus to do with Antioch?
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Christians. Yet, unless Christians feel comfortable saying that large portions of their
Scriptures are irrelevant to their lives, even such culturally conditioned passages must be
considered.
Very few Christians would be willing to jettison large chunks of the biblical text,
at least explicitly so, for fear that such an action would negate the value, perhaps even the
‘truth’, of those parts of the text which they would want to maintain.50 How can one claim
one biblical prescription to be authoritative when dozens of others are not?51 From whence
would such authority come? Hermeneutically this is a deeply complicated problem. Unless
one is a thorough biblical inerrantist,52 it should be at the surface of theological dialogue
to say that the Bible is complex, multivocal, and culturally and contextually rooted in a
world which no longer exists as such.53 Yet, it is nearly universally the case that the Bible,
as it exists in its current forms, is considered theologically informative and, with a wide

A recent attempt to defend biblical literalism in terms of the ‘truth’ of scripture can be seen in Douglas K.
Blount, “What Does It Mean to Say that the Bible Is True?” in In Defense of the Bible: A Comprehensive
Apologetic for the Authority of Scripture (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2013), 47-62. Blount argues, in
a very simplified form, that:
(1’) The Bible is God’s Word.
(2”) God is wholly truthful.
(3”) Therefore, the Bible is wholly truthful.
Although I would question the premise, the method, and the conclusion of Blount’s assessment, he is careful
to define ‘truth’ in terms of a modified correspondence theory, and to recognize that this assessment would
not be accepted by any person who does not a priori accept the ‘truthfulness’ of the Bible.
50

There is a fear that “the defining ‘Word of God’ in the Bible will collapse, leaving believers unsure about
who they are.” John Shelby Spong, The Sins of Scripture: Exposing the Bibles Texts of Hate to Reveal the
God of Love (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 124.
51

52

If, as Derrida might say, there is such a thing.

Christian Smith argued, “Different readings of scripture indeed are possible because the texts themselves
are multivocal, polysemic, and multivalent in character.” Christian Smith, The Bible Made Impossible: Why
Biblicism is not a Truly Evangelical Reading of Scripture (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2011), 50. Smith’s
description in this text demonstrates the spectrum across which the term ‘evangelical’ might be descriptive
and cautions that one not too easily categorize the entire spectrum as single-minded.
53
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variety of nuanced understandings, authoritative. As such, it is an important part of the
equation when one hopes to offer alternatives to theological systems which are potentially
or actually destructive and dangerous. While a profound study of biblical hermeneutics is
well outside the bounds of this dissertation, a very brief discussion of this cornerstone of
theological development is warranted.
Theology is at the heart a communal practice. Particularly given the rootedness of
Christian theology in a specific compilation of texts, theology is necessarily an act that
encompasses and requires multiple acts of translation, although never perfectly so. Any
theological speech-act necessitates linguistic translation(s) as well as cultural and
contextual translations. Yet, all such acts of translation are themselves conditioned by
cultural-linguistic factors.54 The comprehensive nature of this cultural-linguistic
conditioning is precisely the reason why any meaningful theology must learn from a
multitude of voices.55 Theology can never be only, or even primarily, about translation
because taking culturally conditioned ideas and moving them to a different culturally
conditioned context is never a one-to-one proposition. W.V.O. Quine famously wrote of
the indeterminacy of translation in his seminal work, Word and Object. Referring to the

The phrase ‘cultural-linguistic’ originated with George Lindbeck. As an alternative approach to theology,
Lindbeck claimed, “Religions are seen as comprehensive interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths
or narratives and heavily ritualized, which structure human experience and understanding of self and world…
[and organize] all of life, including both behavior and beliefs, in relation to this.” George A. Lindbeck, The
Nature of Doctrine (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1984), 32-33.
54

55

Virgilio Elizondo celebrated the locality of interpretation as that which made theological universality
possible. “We are more and more convinced that all theological reflection is socially and historically
conditioned. Thus we do not consider our thought to be any less authentic than that of any other theological
tradition. It is just that we are very clearly aware of the point of departure of our own reflection. And we feel
that this type of conditioned theological reflection is not only more honest but even more universal.” Virgilio
Elizondo, “Jesus the Galilean Jew in Mestizo Theology,” Theological Studies, vol. 70, issue 2 (May, 2009):
62.

23

difficulties of moving between linguistic worlds, Quine wrote, “Studies of the semantics
of reference consequently turn out to make sense only when directed upon substantially
our language, from within.”56 The same is true for the development of theological belief
structures that move from one cultural-linguistic context to another. One can fully inhabit
one such cultural-linguistic tradition, but remain an external observer to many others.
Theology, thus, is not as simple as translating words and ideas from the Apostle Paul into
the languages and cultures of the 21st century. Such an act of translation is important, but
it is always an imperfect practice. Lindbeck noted, “As modern culture moves ever farther
away from its religious roots, these translations become more strained, complex, and
obscure to the uninitiated.”57
Thus, the first step toward the necessary renewal of theological discourse is an
openness to listen and to learn. Theology is not a universal truth which stands apart from
the practice of contextualized speech-acts. Theology is a wide-encompassing discipline
which must continue to learn and to grow in order to best inhabit specific contextual
realities in the world. Theology cannot thrive in a context in which only one voice is
speaking, particularly when that one voice is the voice of the self.58 When theologians lose
the ability to listen, when theology exists inside of a self-enclosed vacuum, it
simultaneously loses the ability to respond to the very real problems of the world. A
theology of internal monologue tends merely to reify a mindset by which ‘I’ exist as more
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righteous than the ‘other’ and thereby have nothing to learn. A theology which makes
possible, supports, and justifies systems of personal rejection, violence, and apathy is a
direct result of this sort of mindset. In contrast, what has just been described is an
understanding of theology as community narrative. Within this sort of theology, it is
understood that individuals, and individuality, are formed by participation in a narrativelyshaped community. Only by understanding and naming the localized aspects of this
narrative can a localized theology move beyond itself in connection with others. In the
following section, I will begin to argue that the theology of Jürgen Moltmann can serve as
a structure around which such localized narratives can be framed.

Why Moltmann?
In describing Why Moltmann’s work is potentially exemplary for undergirding an
intentionally localized theological narrative it is first important to note that, by almost any
standard, Moltmann is a member of the historical majority theological class. Without
beleaguering the point, Jürgen Moltmann is a white European man just like many of the
so-called “Greats” of Christian theology of the last millennium. This, in se, neither
particularly qualifies nor disqualifies him as a theological exemplar. However, despite the
dedicated time that will be spent digging deeply into Moltmann’s theology it will also be
shown that he has many culturally conditioned blind spots. Even if one accepts that
Moltmann has given something particularly and profoundly important to ongoing
theological dialogue, his contribution is far from the perfection or completion of the
theological enterprise. Even as exemplary, Moltmann’s work must be read critically in light
of the many varied theological dialogues taking place outside the realm of his cultural25

linguistic context. While he might have much to teach, he also has much to learn. The
following analysis of Moltmann’s theology should be read in this context: Moltmann’s
voice is important, but is but one of many voices which can give life to the chorus of
Christian theology.
Even if one begins with this understanding, the question remains, why ought
Moltmann to receive this sort of focus in the midst of so many under-represented
theological voices? Moltmann’s work has already been the subject of a great deal of
analysis. Even so, I contend that there are many reasons why his work warrants further
attention. A few of these reasons, in particular, will be explored in greater detail here.
First, Moltmann has been publishing for over 50 years, and so has a great deal of
public work available to explore. This sort of longevity is impressive, albeit not entirely
unique. Since the publication of his first major work, Theology of Hope, in 1964, with the
first English translation in 1967, Moltmann has published over 25 academic books, several
books intended for a broader ecclesial audience, and many collaborative books, book
chapters, and journal articles. The breadth of Moltmann’s writing is impressive, and he is
widely admired in the broad academic theological community. One of the major strengths
that Moltmann exhibits is the ability to speak into a wide variety of theological contexts.
Moltmann’s work is not only theologically wide-ranging, but geographically so as well. In
the last decade, dissertations have been written exploring Moltmann’s theology in relation
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to the church in Korea,59 Japan,60 Cameroon,61 and South Africa,62 among many other
locales. Outside of graduate education, Moltmann has also been a frequent interlocutor for
a wide variety of established academics.
Karl Barth well-summarized the reason that there is such heavy interest in
Moltmann’s thought when he called Theology of Hope, “Both a stimulating and an
irritating book.”63 Barth had very specific reasons for the irritation that he felt when reading
Theology of Hope, and any particular criticisms that he leveled were directed at this one
work, and did not account for the vast majority of Moltmann’s work which was yet to
come. While Barth’s criticisms of Moltmann were specifically regarding what Barth saw
as Moltmann’s inability to continue Barth’s own work,64 the general feeling that he
described was not at all unique. Given the breadth and importance of Moltmann’s
scholarship, it would be difficult for theologians to trace their way through recent
theological history without at least addressing the ways in which Moltmann served as a
turning point for, at least Western Euro-American, Christian theology.
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Even as early as 1972, less than a decade into Moltmann’s public theological
prominence, the importance of Moltmann’s thought as a turning point was already being
recognized. A.D. Galloway, then Dean of the Faculty of Theology at the University of
Glasgow, for example, saw that Moltmann, alongside similar theological contributions
from Wolfhart Pannenberg, had “given European theology a new turn and opened new
doors.”65 To see Moltmann’s theology as a turning point is not to discount others like
Pannenberg, or like Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendell, who were operating within similar
circles and doing related work. Nor should this focus on Moltmann demonstrate a disregard
for other Christian theologies which were being created in a wide variety of nonEurocentric contexts.66 Those important theologies not-withstanding, Moltmann stood at,
and contributed to the creation of, a theological turning point. During the period during and
immediately prior to Moltmann’s early career, Galloway jokingly described the situation
of continental theology as one in which “the Bultmannians talked only to Bultmannians,
and the Barthians only to God. Their only point of common ground was the conviction that
the whole of nineteenth century theology from Hegel onwards was an elaborate waste of
time and energy.”67
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This was the European theological context in which Moltmann emerged when he
began his academic career in the late 1950s.68 While Moltmann’s first published volume,
Two Studies in the Theology of Bonhoeffer,69 was less ambitious than the work which was
soon to follow, it offers an interesting vantage point into the early development of
Moltmann’s thought. This initial look at Bonhoeffer, when read as an introduction to
Moltmann’s developing work, demonstrates Moltmann standing at a crossroads. Moltmann
entered a theological conversation in which human history was equally discounted on at
least two sides, and thus questions of theological ethics were hotly debated.70
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Coming from the lineage of Karl Barth, history was seen as only invested with
meaning insofar as it was sanctified by a focus on God. “The verdict that all have sinned
certainly implies a verdict on that which is human history apart from the will and word and
work of God… [human history] is itself the product of the perverted and sinful thinking
of man.”71 Although Barth’s view is highly nuanced, it would be a fair generalization to
say that Barth’s insistence that human history only reveals the flaws of humanity, makes
humankind into an object without subjectivity. True subjectivity, it would seem, is only
found in the sanctified space of God. Moving in a different direction, Rudolf Bultmann,
seemed to come to an understanding of human history that was categorically different from
that of Barth. In speaking of his own relation to history Bultmann said,
Obviously the criticisms which many historians deliver, favorable or
unfavorable, are given from a standpoint beyond history. As against this I
have especially aimed to avoid everything beyond history and to find a
position for myself within history… for the essential of history is in reality
nothing super-historical, but is event in time.72
Bultmann was adamant that any sense of value, any judgments made on those things which
had happened in the material world, were wholly outside of any actual history. Since a
historian, really any person, exists concretely within a concrete world, there is no legitimate
possibility of stepping outside of that world in order to understand it from a greater or
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different point of view. Therefore, the best that can be hoped for is to situate oneself within
history, to look backward and perhaps anticipate forward, but only to exist within any given
moment in time and space. As such, the historian stands in history as purely subject without
the hope of any objectivity.73
In the cases of both Barth and Bultmann, themselves dialogical partners, the debate
here was as much or more a question of ontology as it was a question of history or
historicity.74 The Barth/Bultmann dialogue brought up many theological questions
regarding not only biblical interpretation, although this was a primary concern for each of
them, but also of what it means for a person to exist within a world which is conceived as
divine creation. What does it mean to exist within a creation which is, at least in
appearances if not in actuality, other to the individual? What is the relationship between a
Creator God and that which and those whom God has created? These and related questions
lay at the foundation of the Barth/Bultmann dialogue, and it was into these questions that
Moltmann stepped as he entered into the public theological dialogue of the mid-20th
century. Moltmann was neither Barthian nor Bultmannian, neither on one side of this
debate nor the other. Rather, Moltmann’s via media embraced aspects from both of these
onto-historical schools of thought.
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In many ways, the theological creativity that Moltmann has demonstrated
throughout his career is grounded in an onto-historical methodology which takes seriously
Bultmann’s urging that one must recognize the inherent subjectivity of one’s vantage
points and subsequent judgments,75 but that also takes seriously Barth’s claim that even
this inherent subjectivity takes place within a world that is sanctified as God’s creation and
that relies on God for its continued being.76 Within this methodology, the individual exists
as both subject and object, and encounters the other as both subject and object: subjectively
experiencing the world as creation, but existing objectively and contingently as divine
creation. Moltmann made this move as part of a renewal of interest in eschatology as a
primary focus for Christian theology.77 This eschatological interest was not a novelty or a
rediscovery, for eschatology was an important point of discussion for Barth, especially in
his earlier work, and for Bultmann.78 Yet, Moltmann’s theology could not accept a purely
demythologized concept of eschatology, and so he argued that eschatology must function
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as more than simply kerygma. Eschatology is primary for the development of Christian
theology because it is there that Christology and ethics come together in a meaningful way.
Moltmann said unhesitatingly, “Christianity stands or falls with the reality of the raising of
Jesus from the dead by God.”79 One should be careful here not to immediately equate
Moltmann’s use of the word ‘reality’ with the word ‘literality’. Moltmann is doubtlessly
not a biblical literalist, but there is a legitimate opportunity for debate as to whether and
potentially how Moltmann’s eschatological theology, with its focus on the reality of the
resurrection, should or can be viewed literally.
Moltmann rejected the feeling that resurrection, either of Jesus or of the
eschatological dead, was something that should be an embarrassment to Christian theology.
Yet, he also argued that reality is a distinctly different category than historicity. According
to Moltmann, “The historical question as to the resurrection of Jesus also recoils upon the
historical enquirer and calls in question the basic experience of history which is the ground
of his historical enquiry.”80 Questions as to ‘reality’ and to ‘historicity’ are not simply
questions about verifiability. To the contrary, “The fact that human existence in itself has
a hermeneutic structure proves to be the abiding core that motivates the history of man’s
expressions of his life and expositions of his self.”81 Although Moltmann explicitly
disagreed with Feuerbach’s notion that theology is anthropology, it is nevertheless the case
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that given Moltmann’s methodology, theology cannot adequately operate as entirely
separate from anthropology.82
It is here, at the intersection of seeking God and seeking to understand how to seek
God, that Moltmann transformed the Euro-American theological landscape of the 20th
century. At this moment, too, even without a direct reference as such, one can see just how
profoundly influential Hegel’s philosophy was on the young Moltmann. In words that
sound as though they could have very easily come from the mouth of Hegel himself,
Moltmann said, “From the depths of his creative unfathomableness man must ever again
seek and find himself, ever again form and determine himself, and it is this that constitutes
that common core of similarity which makes historical understanding possible and also
necessary.”83 In this process of seeking and finding, of forming and determining, theology
moves well beyond the realm of the hypothetical or of the purely abstract. Theology cannot
consider only the divine or it will inevitably fall into a hole of circular interiority. Theology
simply cannot consider God without simultaneously considering the position from which
such consideration can occur. Theology is not anthropology, but theology should not exist
without anthropology. The importance of Moltmann’s theology, then, is not merely in the
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speculative theological formulations which he proposes, but in his recognition of where
those formulations come from.
To the question of, “Why Moltmann?” the simple answer would be that his
theology remains profoundly important and potentially transformative. Indeed, because of
the great attention that his thought has garnered, Moltmann stands as exceptionally
qualified to continue transforming the landscape of Christian theology, and, as such, his
theology is well-equipped to speak to the ethical issues which have already been discussed.
His work is particularly well-suited to address the three ethical issues that were previously
addressed in the introduction to this work. The strengths of Moltmann’s work, which also
tend to be the moments at which he has been the most creative and transformative of the
theological landscape, can speak directly to the issues of the varieties of personal
supremacy, of programmatic and unapologetic violence, and of human-driven ecological
abuse. These themes will be explored further through a quick overview of Moltmann’s
understandings of eschatology, the Social Trinity, and the doctrine of creation.

Eschatology
Beginning with the common problem in which one claims moral and perhaps
ontological supremacy over another for reasons which might include race and/or gender,
among many others, Moltmann’s eschatological focus can offer an important
anthropological corrective. One of Moltmann’s later books, created primarily for a popular
audience rather than the academic audience to which he has often written, is called, In the
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End – The Beginning.84 While this book does not offer much by way of novelty to those
who are already familiar with Moltmann’s previous academic work, the title itself offers a
glimpse into the theological function that he sees in maintaining eschatology as a central
focus of Christian theology. Eschatology, for Moltmann, is not merely the result of a career
of theological meandering. Eschatology is not, in any meaningful way, the end of Christian
theology any more than it represents the end of personal or corporate history. For
Moltmann, eschatology is that theological movement from which all future theological
movements originate. Eschatology is not substantially speculation about the future, but
rather a historical and anthropological description of why things are as they are, and how
they can be made otherwise. In Moltmann’s own words, “If the last is not the end but the
new beginning, we have no need to stare fascinated at the end of life.” 85 A thorough
examination of Moltmann’s theology will reveal that by beginning with eschatology, by
seeking to describe the possibility of newness and of life in the midst of death, theology
must be oriented by an anthropology which celebrates this possibility equally for all people.
For Moltmann, given the forward-looking-backward dynamic of eschatology, any
discussion of eschatology must be grounded in a discussion of creation, for ultimately
eschatology is nothing more than creatio nova,86 a new creation which should be seen as a
Jürgen Moltmann, In the End – The Beginning, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004).
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continuing movement of creation “in the beginning.” Moltmann positively cited Hans
Rosenzweig’s characterization of Christians as “eternal beginners” for this very reason. 87
Christians are eternally beginning anew because they refuse to accept the darkness of the
world as the eternal status quo. Moltmann’s eschatological orientation will, therefore, be
mined in order to demonstrate a theological anthropology and a philosophy of history
which can be utilized to reject the theological justification for claims of individual or
corporate superiority over and against the ‘other’.88 This anthropology will be rooted in a
discussion of the inherent relatedness of God, as described by Moltmann in terms of social
trinitarianism.

Social Trinitarianism
Moltmann is also well-equipped to offer an alternative vision which can refuse to
sanctify the violence of political messianism while continuing to reject inter-personal
oppression. In addition to offering a theological model which has rejuvenated eschatology
as centrally important, Moltmann is also well-known for the ways in which he has
addressed the classical theological doctrine of the Trinity. As a primary expositor of a
loosely defined movement which has come to be known as Social Trinitarianism,89
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Moltmann’s Trinitarian theology will here be explored as a theological rejection of
Christian participation in political messianism and the sanctification of political violence.
Moltmann’s understanding of the Trinity, as with his eschatology, finds grounding in a
particular anthropological conception of the relationship between God and God’s creation
within history.90 Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity, which he, perhaps confusingly within
traditional theological categories, contrasts with “monotheism,” is grounded in human
history, and thus is inherently anthropological. That trinitarian theology ought to function
as an ethical rejection of political messianism is made clear when Moltmann explicitly
contrasted a Trinitarian conception of God with one of monotheistic Monarchianism.91
The notion of a divine monarchy in heaven and on earth…generally
provides the justification for earthly domination – religious, moral,
patriarchal or political domination – and makes it a hierarchy, a ‘holy rule’.
The idea of an almighty ruler of the universe everywhere requires abject
servitude, because it points to complete dependency in all spheres of life.92

Darton, 2004), 49. See also Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology (New York: T&T Clark,
1997), and Anne E. Carr, Transforming Grace: Christian Tradition and Women’s Experience (New York:
Bloomsbury Academic, 1996) for further examples. Ibrahim S. Bitrus also used a social trinitarianism to
explore themes of postcoloniality and community engagement through a thoughtful sociological study of
Christian dialogue in Nigeria. Ibrahim S. Bitrus, Community and Trinity in Africa (New York: Routledge,
2017). Stanley E. Grentz has helpfully used a social trinitarianism as a basis for a discussion of interpersonal
relationships in Stanley E. Grentz, The Social God and the Relational Self: A Trinitarian Theology of the
Imago Dei (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001).
Catherine Lacugna has also rooted trinitarian theology in a similar way. “The doctrine of the Trinity is the
summary statement of faith in the God of Jesus Christ. Even though God ‘dwells in light inaccessible,’ Christ
is the visible icon of the invisible God, making tangible within human history and within human personality
the ineffable mystery of God.” Catherine Mowry Lacugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1993), 21.
90

91

For a quick history of Monarchianism in the early church see John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The
Doctrine of God (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2001), 474-476.
92

Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1993), 191-192.
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Moltmann pointed directly to the ways in which monarchical conceptions of God have
been used to legitimate monarchical political structures of violence throughout history.93
Thus, Moltmann’s Social Trinitarianism will not be explored as an intellectual curiosity,
but as an intentionally political statement regarding the ways in which theology can be used
to develop a Christian community which refuses to sanctify political violence under the
guise of political messianism. If the monarchical monotheistic God can be used to justify
the violence of a sovereign against perceived or actual subjects, then the Trinitarian God
can likewise be used as a tool to reject this very violence.
The Trinitarian rejection of political violence will take several different but related
paths. First, the relation of the three persons of the Godhead will be described as one of
perichoresis. Though the term is not original to Moltmann, this particular perichoretic
conception is one of Moltmann’s most important contributions to Trinitarian theology.
With this term, Moltmann has argued that the internal life of God, so far as one can separate
this from the external life of God, is one of unending fellowship and of mutual
manifestations. Beginning with this understanding of God’s perichoretic nature, Moltmann
then went on to argue that this internal relationality is also expressly made manifest in
God’s external relationship with creation.

Without rejecting the political thrust of Moltmann’s claim, David Wilhite has argued that it is overly
simplistic to consider Monarchianism, with whatever descriptors might be added to the term, as a easily
definable totality. Rather, there should be seen a “spectrum of ‘monarchianisms’... With this way of thinking,
we can also see the orthodox teaching about God’s oneness as lying along this spectrum.” David E. Wilhite,
The Gospel According to Heretics: Discovering Orthodoxy Through Early Christological Conflicts (Grand
Rapids: Baker, 2015), 96-97.
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The Trinitarian God is not only inherently relational within Godself, but also
substantially relational with the world that God has created. This external relationality is
demonstrated in a vulnerable divine pathos.94
The history of the divine pathos is embedded in this history of men…it is
his interest in his creation and his people, by which God transfers his being
into the history of his relationship and his covenant with man. God takes
man so seriously that he suffers under the actions of man and can be injured
by them.95
The pathos of a Trinitarian God is the sign of a living relationship of love between the
trinitarian unity which draws in the world external to God. This opening of the divine
trinitarian Self to the world, including the acceptance of the risk for pain and death, is, for
Moltmann, a model for true human community. This model for a perichoretic community
of love, with Moltmann’s Trinitarian theology at its heart, will be used to counter the
political narratives of violence that are so prevalent in the Western world and which are so
often accepted and justified by Christian theology. In order to do so, however, Moltmann’s
own work must first be grounded in a doctrine of creation through which the trinitarian
relationality of God is made manifest beyond God’s inter-trinitarian life.

Creation and Liberation
The doctrine of creation stands, for Moltmann, as the foundation upon which a
political theology can be built. The doctrine of creation roots eschatology and trinitarianism

Moltmann drew heavily from Heschel’s study of the concept of ‘divine pathos’ in the prophets. See
Abraham J. Heschel, The Prophets (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 2001).
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Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian
Theology, trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 270-271.
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in a world in need of redemption. It unites God with the world, and also the world with
itself.
The cry for liberty therefore unites humanity and nature in a single hope.
They will either be destroyed by their division and enmity or will survive
as partners in a new community… The cry for freedom is not only the cry
of exploited, oppressed, alienated, divided, and frightened humanity. It is
also the cry of the creation which man is destroying.96
Thus, a theology which seeks after liberation97 is the point at which doctrines of creation,
eschatology, and a social Trinitarian God come together. The groans of creation cannot be
separated from the cries of the exploited, alienated, and oppressed. Because the destruction
of the planet will first and hardest hit those who are already otherwise exploited, alienated,
and oppressed, ecological issues must be recognized as deeply connected to interpersonal
political realities as well.98
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Jürgen Moltmann, The Future of Creation, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia, Fortress Press, 1979), 98.
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This term is intentionally left ambiguous as to its relation to the movement(s) known as Liberation
Theology. Moltmann was an early and vocal advocate for varieties of liberation theology. He spoke of his
relation to the relatively early years of Liberation Theology, “It also became clear to me between 1975 and
1980 that I personally could not authentically frame a ‘theology in context’ and a ‘theology in movement’
(liberation theology, black theology, feminist theology), for I am not living in the Third World, am not
oppressed, and am not a woman. In those years I tried as best I could to let the voices of silenced men and
women be heard in the world too – the world in which I myself live.” The Trinity and the Kingdom, vii. Yet,
later in life he recounted being among a group excoriated by James Cone for participating in a liberationist
conference that was filled nearly entirely with white theologians. For a recounting of this story see, Jürgen
Moltmann, A Broad Place, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 229-230.
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The World Health Organization projects that rising global temperatures, among other factors, will lead to
a wide variety of diseases that will disproportionately impact those living in poverty. See, World Health
Organization, The Global Burden of Disease, 2004 Update (Geneva, WHO Press, 2008). The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has also argued at length about the relationship between climate
change and poverty. One such study looks specifically at the potential for lost livelihood among the already
impoverished. L., M. Olsson, et al., “Livelihoods and poverty,” Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation,
and Vulnerability (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 793-832.
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Returning to Miroslav Volf’s definition of theology from the introduction,99
creation, eschatology, and trinitarian thought are each points at which the quest for
understanding the world meets the need to mend the world in redemptive ways. These are
also points at which Moltmann’s work demonstrates great creativity and theological
importance. As such, it is these areas which will be specifically explored as possible
responses to the ongoing and growing brokenness of creation. However, it will also be
demonstrated that these themes did not arrive to Moltmann fully formed, but demonstrate
a deep engagement with a particularly Hegelian philosophy. In order to best understand
Moltmann, one must also seek to understand the Hegelian background from which much
of his thought has been influenced.

Why Hegel and Why Now?
To the question, Why Moltmann?, the brief answer was that Moltmann’s work is
important, innovative, and potentially helpful. Even if one were to accept this answer, the
“Why Moltmann?” question could still continue to be asked. Moltmann’s work is widely
viewed as important in part because it has received so much scholarly attention. Many
books, articles, theses, and dissertations have been dedicated to explorations, critiques, and
explanations of his work. Yet, despite the great attention that Moltmann’s theology has
received to date, there remain holes in the secondary Moltmannian scholarship that need

It is, of course, no accident that Volf’s definition of theology was selected to provide structure. Moltmann
served as Volf’s Doktorvater at the University of Tübingen, so the two thinkers have a long-standing
connection.
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to be filled. One such hole that, to the present, remains mostly undisturbed is a thorough
explanation of the philosophical undergirdings of Moltmann’s theology.
By way of example, the strongest primer to Moltmann’s theology, The Theology of
Jürgen Moltmann, 100 is structured such that the author explores important movements of
Moltmann’s theology, e.g. divine suffering, theodicy, political theology, etc., without any
extended discussion of the philosophical background which led Moltmann to develop his
thoughts on these various subjects. Here, in two chapters about Moltmann’s Trinitarian
theology, an area in which Moltmann is greatly indebted to Hegel, Hegel only warrants
one passing reference.101 While this is a primer, and thus one perhaps ought not to expect
too much background exploration, the same general trend is apparent in academic
Moltmann scholarship.102 One might point to a wide array of influences, intentionally
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Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (New York: T&T Clark Ltd., 2006).

This reference is emblematic of the way that Moltmann scholarship often glosses over Moltmann’s
philosophical influences. “The Trinity here undoubtedly has a Hegelian dialectical structure…though this
does not mean that the content is entirely Hegelian.” Ibid., 154.
101
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While searching the entirety of the University of Denver library system, including online journal and
dissertation databases, a simple search for the names Hegel and Moltmann together provided 133 search
results. Of these 133 results, only one demonstrated a primary interest in exploring the philosophical
background of Moltmann’s thought, and that not exclusively so. See, Nicholas Adams, “Eschatology Sacred
and Profane: The Effects of Philosophy on Theology in Pannenberg, Rahner and Moltmann,” International
Journal of Systematic Theology 2, issue 3 (November 2000), accessed June 14, 2016, EBSCOHost. Similar
results were encountered when using search terms of “Moltmann + philosophy” and the German “Moltmann
+ philosophie.” While this is not an exhaustive list of search terms which might lead to studies of Moltmann’s
philosophical heritage, other such searches yielded similar results. In Bauckham’s primer to Moltmann’s
theology, he included a bibliography of secondary literature which studied Moltmann’s work in detail. While
not exhaustive, this bibliography includes over 150 entries in German, English, and French. Yet, within this
bibliography, not a single entry uses any variation of the word ‘philosophy’. While the line between
theologian and philosopher can be rather fine, at least for those coming from the Christian tradition, there are
likewise scant references to any particular philosophical influences. One book listed in this bibliography
explored the relationship of Moltmann’s theology to the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. Marko Matić, Jürgen
Moltmanns Theologie in Auseinandersetzung mit Ernst Bloch (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1983). While this
relationship is undoubtedly important, this particular text has received very little traction in the greater body
of secondary Moltmann literature, and scarcely mentions Hegel’s influence on either Bloch or Moltmann.
There are only two entries in this bibliography that primarily cite the relationship between Moltmann and
Hegel. The first is a very brief examination of Moltmann in an out-of-print French book dedicated to the
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philosophical and otherwise, which undergird and influence Moltmann’s work in a variety
of ways. Even so, I will argue that Hegel’s influence, particularly on Moltmann’s
development of doctrines of creation, eschatology, and the Social Trinity, is of significant
importance. The relationship between Hegel and Moltmann is complicated. Moltmann has
never classified himself as an Hegelian, and it would be short-sighted to do so exclusively.
Moltmann’s work demonstrates a great philosophical complexity that stems from a lifetime
of copious reading and deep contemplation. Philosophical influence is never clean and
never simple.103 Nevertheless, even if Moltmann is not himself ‘an Hegelian’, and even if
there is a broad philosophical lineage from which Moltmann’s theology has drawn, it will
be demonstrated here that his theology demonstrates profound Hegelian influence. Thus,
to the question, “Why Hegel?” the answer would be that Hegel’s fingerprints are evident
in precisely those areas in which Moltmann’s theology can most clearly speak to the
brokenness of the world. And, of course, this also points to an answer to the question of,
“Why Now?” The brokenness of the world is evident, and that brokenness is profound and
debilitating. If Moltmann’s theology can be an effective voice in helping to mend the world
in these points of brokenness, then it is imperative that a continued deep examination of
Moltmann’s theology be undertaken.
influence that Hegel has had on contemporary theology. D. Müller, “Résumé des débats,” in Hegel et la
théologie contemporaine: L’absolu dans l’histoire?, ed. Louis Rumpf (Paris: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1977),
219-225. The second, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis, explored an Hegelian influence on Moltmann in greater
depth, but remains rather obscure as it is only available at four libraries connected to WorldCat. Anne
Primavesi, The Cross and the Rose: The Interaction of Lutheran Paradox and Hegelian Dialectic Exemplified
in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann (Ph.D. thesis, Heythrop College, University of London, 1987).
103

Canon John Macquarrie argued that philosophical influence ought to be understood in terms of lineage.
“I would like to repeat that the philosophical background of the theologies of hope is not to be found in any
single philosopher, whether Bloch or Hegel, but in what may be called the Hegel-Feuerbach-Marxist line.”
Canon John Macquarrie, “Theologies of Hope: A Critical Examination,” The Expository Times 82 (January
1971), 100.
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CHAPTER 2: A MOLTMONSTROUS HEGEL
“Thus, as far as factual information is concerned, we find that what in former ages engaged
the attention of men of mature mind, has been reduced to the level of facts, exercises, and
even games for children; and, in the child’s progress through school, we shall recognize
the history of the cultural development of the world traced, as it were, in a silhouette.”104 Hegel

Before it is possible to move on to a conversation of what exactly theology looks
like in the work and thought of Jürgen Moltmann, it will first be necessary to examine his
Hegelian heritage. Hegel is, by no means, the only philosophical influence that Moltmann’s
work incorporates, but he is among the most frequently cited and among the most
important. Even, perhaps especially, in Moltmann’s earliest publications, the fingerprints
of Hegel are found in plentitude. Moltmann very frequently and dutifully cites direct quotes
from Hegel.105 Moreover, even when Hegel is not being specifically cited, the careful
reader can see a profound influence of Hegelian philosophy throughout Moltmann’s
corpus. Moltmann’s usage of Hegel, as Macquarrie reminded us earlier, comes through an
established intellectual history.106 For this reason, the purpose of this chapter is not to try
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Phenomenology of Spirit, 16.

Using Theology of Hope as an example, Hegel is directly referenced on 34 different pages. Moltmann’s
bibliography in this text is vast, but for the sake of comparison, other influential thinkers are cited as follows:
Sӧren Kierkegaard is cited on 6 pages, Hans Georg Gadamer is cited on 6 pages, Johann Gottlieb Fichte is
cited on 6 pages, Martin Heidegger is cited on 8 pages, Friedrich Nietzsche is cited on 9 pages, and Immanuel
Kant is cited on 20 pages. Two things in particular bear noting here- this list is not even remotely exhaustive,
and Moltmann does not always cite these thinkers, Hegel included, in entirely or even partially positive ways.
105
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For example Karl Marx stands as a recognized interpreter and utilizer of Hegelian philosophy. It can be
no surprise, then, that Moltmann, standing chronologically at the end of this particular intellectual lineage,
will at times come back to Hegel through both the intellectual and empirical history of Marx and of Marxism.
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to prove, if such a thing were even possible, that Hegel holds the highest place of
philosophical esteem in Moltmann’s mind. Rather, to say that Hegel is “among the most
important philosophical influences,” is the beginning of an interpretation of Moltmann as
an interpreter of Hegel and as a thinker in his own right.
In this interpretation, Hegel stands at a place of profound import. Moltmann’s
thought should not, however, be made so simplistic as to say that it is thoroughly, solely,
and unapologetically Hegelian. Moltmann is adamant that theology, his own theological
works certainly included, should always speak into a particular spatio-temporal context.107
Moltmann has consistently oriented his theology by pointing to particular ethical and
political issues. This orientation disallowed Moltmann, at least ideally, from speaking from
the standpoint of a de-contextualized insular theology.108 Regarding a contextualizing of
theology Moltmann wrote, “The biblical, Christian and church traditions were indeed
primarily written and put together by dominant males… Now we can read these traditions
‘from above’, but we can also read them – contrary to the way in which they were intended

Moltmann is well aware of this intellectual progression, and at times has named it as such. There are other
times, however, in which Moltmann, even if he was aware, did not point to the progression of thinkers,
Marxist or otherwise, through which his references and his thoughts have come. Likewise, there are numerous
times in which Moltmann will point toward a thinker who has been clearly influenced by Hegel, without
definitively making the connection between them.
Here, Hegel’s influence is evident. As Habermas described Hegel’s system, “A philosophy which knows
itself to be the result of the same formative process that it comprehends in terms of the interrelationship of
nature and history cannot set itself outside the element of time. Spirit devours time, but time for its part can
render judgment on an impotent spirit.” Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1974), 170.
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An interesting example of this self-contextualizing of theological speech is evident in Moltmann’s
relationship with his wife, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, who was, herself, an influential theologian. Together
they wrote a short book, structured as a dialogue, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel and Jürgen Moltmann, GodHis and Hers (New York: Crossroad, 1991).
108
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– from below.”109 The ‘from above’ reading which Moltmann here critiqued would be a
reading of scripture that takes male dominance for granted because of an uncritical reading
of biblical texts which have been written from the standpoint of male dominance. By
proclaiming the need to read the biblical text ‘from below’,110 Moltmann recognized his
own situatedness, and his own inclination to experience Christian texts and traditions in
ways that are culturally prescribed.111 Throughout Moltmann’s career, he has looked for
and often, though not exclusively, worked “from below,” as here described.112
This ‘from below’ intentionality which Moltmann described necessitates that his
readers pay careful attention to the context in which he was writing – and thereby, too, to
those particular ethical issues with which he was grappling in any given text – as well as
to the context of the reader. Thus, rather than taking the Moltmannian corpus as a
monolithic whole and proclaiming its profound and enduring Hegelian nature, this chapter
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Ibid., 8.
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Elizabeth Johnson has similarly recognized the need to locate the theological task in this way, particularly
because of male-privileging social structures. In order to impact the social structures which can be oppressive
to human flourishing, she used a social-Trinitarian framework to speak of God’s “intrinsic relatedness to the
world, alliance with human flourishing, [and] liberating care for the poor.” She Who Is, 21. For a more indepth discussion of “from below” methodology see Elizabeth A. Johnson, “Christology’s Impact on the
Doctrine of God,” Heythrop Journal 26 (1985): 143-163.
An excellent study of the concept of ‘situatedness’ can be found in David Simpson, Situatedness, or Why
We Keep Saying Where We’re Coming From (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). Simpson
described that ‘situatedness’ ironically conveys a broad array of meanings, rather than itself being entirely
set. “Situatedness, then, is not naming anything precisely but sheltering a whole range of other terms that are
themselves equally approximate.” Ibid., 40. For this study, the concept of ‘situatedness’ will be rooted in an
Hegelian ontology of becoming which makes room for the negation of what ‘situatedness’ simultaneously is
and is not.
111

Moltmann’s usage of the term ‘from below’ is not unique. It has even been argued that ‘from below’ was
the standard theological method prior to Barth. “In essence, Barth was calling for a revolution in theological
method, a theology ‘from above’ to replace the old, human-centered theology ‘from below’.” Grenz and
Olson, 67. While Grenz and Olson do not reference Moltmann directly in this conversation, they argue that
his contemporary Wolfhart Pannenberg began with such a methodology before realizing that “such an
approach is incomplete.” Ibid., 195. For Moltmann, the ‘from below’ is an approach to scripture, but not the
totality of an approach to theology.
112

47

will track an Hegelian line which is frequently and importantly evident in Moltmann’s
writing. This Hegelian line is evident in the larger structure and flow of Moltmann’s
publishing history, in particular theological areas with which Moltmann seems consistently
concerned, as well as in the actual arguments made by Moltmann on these and other topics.

Using Hegel as a Tool
Before it is possible to begin tracing this line, Hegel must first be dealt with on his
own terms. As with Moltmann, and perhaps even to a greater degree, Hegel’s thought is
anything but monolithic. There are continuing themes and trends which repeatedly
reappear in Hegel’s written work, but the complexity of his argumentation and the
difficulties of his language have allowed an incredibly wide array of competing
interpretations to be argued as essentially Hegelian. The literature which directly attempts
to interpret and explain Hegel is vast. While there is a place for continued textual
exploration and novel interpretation of Hegel’s writings, that is not the goal of this chapter.
At some level, Hegel must be dealt with on his own terms, but, here, Hegel must also be
approached through a Moltmannian lens. Thus, a view of Hegel will be presented which
will help to deeply examine Moltmann’s theology.113

As such, the examination of Hegel’s work will proceed thematically, rather than systematically. By
approaching Hegel thematically, following the thematic reading of Moltmann that has already been outlined,
much of his work will be explicitly left in the background. My reading of Hegel, particularly through my
reading of Moltmann reading Hegel, has been informed by the larger reality of Hegel’s system, but will
proceed with particular focus on the interlocking issues of history, Geist, and sublation, as well as the
development of subjectivity and eschatology/the ‘end of history’. These will be read in parallel with
Moltmann’s creation, Trinity, and eschatology. These Hegelian themes will be examined primarily through
discrete sections of The Phenomenology and The Science, but will also incorporate a discussion of the notion
of tragedy as seen in Lectures on Fine Art. This is following Moltmann’s citations of Hegel which rarely
stray beyond these specific texts.
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For Moltmann, Hegel exists in the background as an important influence, but at
face value primarily as a tool. And, as with any tool, Hegel’s work can be wielded in a
variety of ways, at times unexpected, that may or may not align with the intention of its
creator. While the personal intentions of a philosopher are infinitely more difficult to define
than the intended use of a physical tool, the moment that a philosophy is used as an
intellectual tool it is immediately open for uses which might run contrary to authorial intent.
Gilles Deleuze well described just how freely philosophy as a tool might be used
when he described his relationship with other philosophers as one of forceful copulation,
Or (it comes to the same thing) an immaculate conception. I saw myself as
taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own
offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his own child,
because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child
was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting,
slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions.114
Particularly given the systemic nature of Hegel’s work, Moltmann has of necessity utilized
the shifts, slips, dislocations, and hidden emissions that Deleuze named. Moltmann was
very clearly not interested in being a mere commentator, but rather has shown himself to
be a utilizer. Yet, as Deleuze saw in his own work, in utilizing the writings of Hegel,
Moltmann remains bound to a certain textuality. It would be in bad faith, although not
unheard of, to simply use Hegel as a puppet with no regard to what it is that Hegel offered.
The offspring produced must be his, even if monstrous.115

Gilles Deleuze, “Letter to a Harsh Critic,” Negotiations, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1995), 6.
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On my reading, Moltmann accepts being bound to Hegel’s text and, while utilizing Hegel, seeks to
interpret Hegel on Hegel’s own terms, albeit non-systematically. I would describe Hegel’s relation to
Moltmann as one of broadly direct influence: major Hegelian thematic elements are evident in both the
structure and content of Moltmann’s work, but Moltmann rarely demonstrates an explicitly detailed reading
of any major passages of Hegel’s text. The titular description of “Moltmann’s Creative (Mis)Reading of
115
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To meaningfully utilize Hegel as more than a puppet requires both careful reading
and also deep interpretation of his work. The Hegel presented in this chapter is therefore
intentionally not pure, if one could perfectly describe a pure Hegel anyway, but rather a
tool to be wielded. This tool is a Moltmannian Hegel just as much as it is an Hegelian
Hegel. In what turns out to be an easily recognizable Hegelian way, an interpretation of
Hegel seems to be at its best when one refuses to read Hegel as static and purely historical.
Every philosophy has been and still is necessary. Thus none have passed
away, but all are affirmatively contained as elements in a whole… The most
recent philosophy [is] the result of all preceding, and hence no philosophy
has ever been refuted. What has been refuted is… merely the fact that this
[philosophy] should be considered final and absolute in character.116
Hegel thus opened his own philosophy to deep interpretation from those who follow when
he argued that, in exploring history, of which he is now an integral part,
Whatever is true exists eternally in and for itself – not yesterday or
tomorrow, but entirely in the present, ‘now’, in the sense of an absolute
present... it exists absolutely now. This in fact means that the present world
and the present form and self-consciousness of the spirit contain within
them all the stages which appear to have occurred earlier in history.117
However one regards Hegel’s particular relationship with history, on his own word it can
be considered that even if the content of his philosophy was the Absolute, 118 the method

Hegel” is not intended to demonstrate that Moltmann is a poor interpreter of Hegel, but rather that he is a
non-systematic reader of Hegel, a practice that Hegel would certainly reject as meaningless. Nevertheless, I
will argue that Moltmann is not entirely disinterested in a deep reading of Hegel, but that he recognizes a
fragility of Hegel’s system by which he can accept much of Hegel’s insight apart from the requirement for
systematicity.
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G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy Vol. 1, trans. E.S. Haldane (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1995), p. 37.
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G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History: Introduction, trans. H.B. Nisbet (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), 150.
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Or Reason, or Geist, or Truth, or any number of terms that Hegel used throughout his writing.
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with which he derived his thought, or the form in which he expressed it, was contingent on
the happenstances of history, geography, and culture. Hegel’s conclusions, and the system
which he created to draw those conclusions, are of great importance. However, those
conclusions, and their underlying methodology, must be read ‘from below’ with as much
vigor as they are read ‘from above’. This ‘from below’ methodology will be the strategy
for a ‘monstrous’ reading of Hegel – true to his words, but unapologetically interpreted.119
Moltmann’s utilization of Hegel, as here described, should not be understood
simply as an attempt to theologize Hegel, or to interpret Hegel’s philosophy from within a
religious discourse. Rather, Moltmann’s approach to Hegel is more akin to the fanciful
flights of a jazz artist. Moltmann (in the vein of Dizzy Gillespie) had to first understand
the theme that is running through a work. Only when that theme is understood can one
meaningfully improvise beyond the theme. An improvisation often pushes boundaries
beyond what the original creator ever envisioned, but does so in such a way that
demonstrates respect for the original. Moltmann’s “(Mis)reading” of Hegel demonstrates
this rootedness in and respect for Hegel, but rejects that Hegel is the final word even on
Hegelian themes. Moltmann both uplifts and rejects, riffs on and shows appreciation for,
Hegel.
One fundamental issue upon which Moltmann simply breaks with Hegel, which is
of particular importance here, is on the finality of religion. Hegel was repeatedly clear that,

Following Quine, Donald Davidson has written about the ‘indeterminacy’ of interpretation. “The aim is
not the absurd one of making disagreement and error disappear… A theory for interpreting the utterances of
a single speaker… would have many equally eligible rivals.” Donald Davidson, “Belief and the Basis of
Meaning,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation: Philosophical Essays (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 153. One should be careful, however, not to understand by Davidson’s words that even if there
can be multiple eligible rivals, that all interpretations are de facto equally valid.
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though in his mind Christianity represented the culmination of religion, even this
consummate religion must be sublated by philosophy.120 As will be described in more
detail later, Hegelian sublation represents both an uplifting and a negation. Philosophy’s
sublation of religion is, on the one hand, a purification, but it is such a purification as
describes something like an overcoming.121 Yet, Moltmann’s project, in ways beyond
Hegel’s project, is inherently religious. Thus, even at the most fundamental level,
Moltmann has intentionally aligned himself as contrary to Hegel’s finalized system. In the
next section will be explored one of Hegel’s most important terms, Geist. This term is not
only important within Hegel’s philosophical system, but also serves as a demonstration of
why Moltmann’s relationship with Hegel is so complex. Geist has strong resonances with
the classical language of Christian theology, and so seems like an easy intersection. But,
given the complexities of Hegel’s thought, even comparing Hegelian terminology with that
of classical Christian theology must be done carefully, and much more so when Hegel
becomes more than a mere point of comparison.

“The Spirit of the revealed religion has not yet surmounted its consciousness as such, or what is the
same, its actual self-consciousness is not the object of its consciousness… The content of this picturethinking is absolute Spirit; and all that now remains to be done is to supersede this mere form… or rather,
since this belongs to consciousness as such, its truth must already have yielded itself in the shape of
consciousness.” Phenomenology, 479.
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Even so, Charles Taylor argued that, even as sublated, religion continued to hold an important place in
Hegel’s thought. “The union with God which is philosophy thus requires the union with God in heart and
feeling which religion provides; and this not just as a termporally prior stage which is destined to be left
behind, but in a continuing way, since the union in thought can only continue if the union in life persists.”
Charles Taylor, Hegel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 486.
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The Becoming of Geist
This section will utilize Hegel’s language of Geist as a starting point to explore the
development of particularly religious belief and the way that such belief(s) impact the
development of individual and communal behaviors. Geist, it will be argued, is not the
ethereal, strangely metaphysical, disembodiment by which Hegel is often caricatured.122
Rather, as Hegel described, “Spirit is what it is only in transcending what it is immediately,
stepping back from it. In other words, we are to consider the movement in Spirit… Being
is the form of immediacy, but Being should be posited in its truth.”123 Geist is that middle
ground upon which conscious subject is brought together with object. Geist is language,
story, shared intersubjectivity. Within the context of a religious community, Geist is
communal praxis: the historically rooted words, stories, and rituals upon which a
community is based.124 However, this Geist is not merely a passive language game, but
rather an actively developing, self-regenerating form of life. On the individual level, one’s
surroundings are never given, but processed. An individual only comes to experiences
through a conceptual framework which is necessarily linguistically grounded.125 So, too,

“It is important to debunk the familiar caricature that depicts Kant as the ‘critical philosopher’ and Hegel
as the ‘philosopher of system’ whose philosophical theology allegedly lapses into pre-critical metaphysics.”
Robert R. Williams, Hegel on the Proofs and Personhood of God: Studies in Hegel’s Logic and Philosophy
of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 59.
122
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G.W.F. Hegel and Leo Rauch, Hegel and the Human Spirit: A Translation of the Jena Lectures on the
Philosophy of Spirit (1805-06) with Commentary (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1983), 85.
“The distinction between theory and praxis becomes irrelevant, since theory itself, by liberating the spirit,
destroys the foundations of outworn institutions as effectively as any praxis.” Robert Gascoigne, Religion,
Rationality, and Community: Sacred and Secular in the Thought of Hegel and his Critics (Hingham: Kluwer
Academic, 2012), 79.
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See Jere O’Neill Surber, ed., Hegel and Language (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006)
for a series of excellent discussions about the importance of language for Hegel and for German Idealism
more generally. In particular, Surber argued in the introduction to this text that, “For Hegel, language is
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Geist, as the mediator of a communal form of life, is linguistically grounded, and actively
construed.126
Geist is complex and multi-layered. Geist is always becoming, always developing,
always already incomplete.127 Yet, Geist should not be misunderstood as a pure
transcendence.128 Even in his idealism, Hegel explicitly rejected the notion that philosophy
could be entirely transcendent.129 Just as Hegel’s philosophy of Geist should not be
confused as entirely transcendent,130 even if transcendental,131 one ought also to be careful

associated, most fundamentally, with the self-determining processes of reason (Vernunft), but that, when
reduced to the merely formal structures of logical judgment, becomes an inert and empty shell incapable of
expressing the power of reason to produce and articulate the broader and more complexly mediated unities
involved in genuine thinking.” Hegel and Language, 12. Hegel’s conception of language is obviously far
more complex than a single footnote as it is wide-ranging across his written work. Because Hegel did not
explicitly offer a systematic discussion of language, within the variety of references to language Hegel is not
always entirely consistent.
“It is thinking, when externalized through language, that permits the passage from the realm of subjectivity
to that of “Objective Spirit” and its “higher realms” of law and the state and, ultimately, to “Absolute Spirit”
itself.” Ibid, 12.
126

“Geist is that consciousness which is an indivisible part of the human social world at any point in time,
changing as humans interact with each other to develop new kinds of understanding. Ultimately, the
development of Geist and human consciousness are indivisible; Geist just is human consciousness as it
develops in the course of social interactions.” Anthony King, The Structure of Social Theory (New York:
Routledge, 2004), 103.
127

Ẑiẑek is adamant that Hegel cannot be entirely, or, at least for Ẑiẑek- at all, de-materialized. “The crucial
mistake to be avoided is therefore to grasp the Hegelian Spirit as a kind of meta-Subject, a Mind, much larger
than an individual human mind, aware of itself: once we do this, Hegel has to appear as a ridiculous
spiritualist obscurantist.” Slavoj Ẑiẑek and John Milbank, The Monstrosity of Christ: Paradox or Dialectic,
ed. Creston Davis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 60. See also a nearly identical quotation in Slavoj Ẑiẑek,
Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (New York: Verso, 2012), 406.
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“Hegel regards himself as a defender of the powers of cognition, not by reducing the objects of knowledge
to a set of subjective (or intersubjective) states, but by arguing that our conceptions can be adequate to
comprehend the world itself.” Kenneth R. Westphal, Hegel’s Epistemological Realism (Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1989), 140.
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Geoffrey Holsclaw describes Geist as, “‘Not non-natural’ human existence… [which] is immanent to
natural processes but self-transcends them through its own normative self-relation.” Geoffrey Holsclaw,
Transcending Subjects: Augustine, Hegel, and Theology (Malden: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), 23.
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Whether and to what extent Hegel’s work demonstrates a transcendental method, or even an attempt at
the same, is debated within Hegel scholarship. Charles Taylor influentially argued for a transcendental
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not to impose certain Christian conceptions of the Holy Spirit onto the term.132 While Hegel
was undoubtedly influenced by his early theological training, and general Christian
heritage, Geist ought not to be too easily deified. Indeed, while Hegel wrote at great length
about subjective spirit, Geist itself cannot be easily subjectified or personified. Geist is a
hermeneutical experiential process cyclically compounding upon itself. “Geist is simply
the underlying unifying principle of consciousness, and, at the same time, the underlying
rational will ‘behind’ all practical reason and action.”133 Geist is not purely singular, nor
can Geist be individualized in persons. At the same time, Geist is not formless.134
The spiritual alone is the actual. It is essence, or that which has being in
itself; it is that which relates itself to itself and is determinate, it is otherbeing and being-for-self, and in this determinateness, or in its selfexternality, abides within itself; in other words, it is in and for itself.135

reading of Hegel in Charles Taylor, “The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology,” in Hegel: A Collection
of Critical Essays, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1972), 157-187.
On the other side of this debate, Stephen Houlgate argued forcefully against Taylor’s interpretation. See,
Stephen Houlgate, “Is Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit an Essay in Transcendental Argument?” in The
Transcendental Turn, eds. Sebastian Gardner and Matthew Grist (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015),
173-194.
E.g., Eric Dale, although carefully, did just this in describing that “Hegelian Geist is a religious or
theological category” However, Dale noted that any such theological usage, at least for Hegel, “Encompasses
in philosophical or adequately conceptual form the Holy Spirit which the church confesses.” Eric Michael
Dale, Hegel, The End of History, and the Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 190. As a
religious term Geist is not equivalent to the Christian Holy Spirit, but philosophically describes the concept
which theology so names.
132
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R.C. Solomon, “Hegel’s Concept of ‘Geist’,” The Review of Metaphysics 6 (1970), 660

“Thus Geist must have a vehicle in finite spirit. This is the only kind of vehicle it can have. Moreover,
there cannot be only one such. For Geist cannot be confined to the particular place and time of any one finite
spirit. It has to compensate for its necessary localization, as it were, by living through many finite spirits.”
Charles Taylor, Hegel, 90.
134
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Tellingly, in the Philosophy of Mind (Geist): Part Three of the Encylopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences, the concept of Geist was described in three different ways:
subjective, objective, and universal.136 Each of these broad headings corresponds to a
discussion of Geist in its various manifestations. It is never solely subjective, nor solely
objective. Rather, “The notion which is aware of itself in its objectivity as a subjectivity
identical with itself [is] for that reason universal.”137
Here, the discussion of Geist in-and-for-itself overlaps with questions of
knowledge. As Hegel conceptualized Geist, being in-and-for-itself meant a knowing of
itself. Hegel began to re-describe something of an anthropology of the subject. Hegel
wanted to do away with Kant’s bifurcation of the subject into a transcendental ego and an
empirical ego.138 What Hegel offered in exchange is a subject of becoming, “The moment
of the ‘I’ which is for itself pure negativity.”139 This ‘I’, when understood as subject, is
known through the process of simply becoming. Hegel rejected, or at least nuanced, much
of Kant’s transcendental idealism in favor of an idealism which is, in many ways, less
‘ideal’ than that of Kant.140 “Of the absolute it must be said that it is essentially a result,

136

G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Mind (Geist): Part Three of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences,
trans. A.V. Miller (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
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Ibid., 176.
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E.g. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2003), A108. Here, Kant spoke of the transcendental unity of apperception, “The original and
necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally
necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts... For the mind could never think
its identity in the manifoldness of its representations… if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its
act.”
139
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“Hegel’s rejection of an unknown thing-in-itself leads to a fundamental difference between his idealism
and Kant’s. For Hegel, reason grasps the essence of things, their very reality… another way to put this is to
140
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that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. to
be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself.”141
Using Hegelian terminology, the ‘I’ is in the process of movement from merely
being in-itself to being in-and-for-itself. Of course, it is not merely the subjective ‘I’ that
exists in transformation. Nothing exists except as part of this transformative process. “The
‘I’, or becoming in general, this mediation, on account of its simple nature, is just
immediacy in the process of becoming, and is the immediate itself.”142 This movement is
necessary for Hegel in order to avoid an empty unicity of the Absolute.143 Hegel contrasted
his thought to that of his contemporaries who saw no self-differentiation in the Absolute.
One such example is Hegel’s famous critique of Schelling whose philosophy Hegel
described as the “night in which, as the saying goes, all cows are black.” 144 Although he
was, by no means, parroting Aristotle, Hegel saw himself as following a similar
philosophical trajectory. It is with reference to Aristotle that Hegel claimed, “Reason is
purposive activity… purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved which is also
self-moving, and as such is Subject. Its power to move, taken abstractly, is being-for-self

say that reason is not merely a subjective phenomenon, a characteristic activity of minds; reason, for Hegel,
is also objective.” Philip J. Kain, Hegel and the Other: A Study of the Phenomenology of Spirit (Albany,
SUNY Press, 2005), 73.
141
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“For Hegel the Absolute is not simply the without-relation or the without-movement; rather it is absolute
relation and movement, a complete relation unto itself.” Giorgio Agamben, “Excursus 7 (after the final day)”
in Hegel and Contemporary Continental Philosophy, ed. Dennis King Keenan (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004),
383.
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or pure negativity.”145 Hegel was concerned to describe a negative movement of positivity,
the creation of subjectivity by a process of self-alienation in which the self is seen not as
subject but as object. Only when the self becomes object, can it return to itself in order to
then become subject. This hits at the heart of the Hegelian dialectic, for it is only through
the denial of subjectivity, the purely negative, through which subjectivity comes to be - the
negative which is also a positive. The concept of Geist has here been described for two
primary reasons, to demonstrate Hegel’s understanding of the movement of history, and to
begin to describe how this relates to the development of a subjective ‘I’. Looking forward,
in order to connect these ideas with the practice of theology we will now turn to a
discussion of how Hegelian Geist can help to define ‘belief’ with relation to ‘knowledge’,
and whether either can be described as ‘absolute’.

Truth and Belief
In order to define ‘belief’, one must first conceive of the possibility within an
individual consciousness, for even communal beliefs, as with the ‘team spirit’ example
below, necessarily occur at an individual level. Hegel helps to do so by describing that the
individual movement of becoming can be seen as a microcosm of the becoming of Geist
itself. Geist does not stand apart from individuals, but neither is it solely defined by them.
In the same way that ‘team spirit’, say, for the Denver Broncos, refuses to be limited to the
distinct actions of individual sports fans, the same can be said of Geist. Geist is
transcendent(al) to the individual subjectivities of its participants, and so must be spoken

145

Ibid., 12.

58

of with reference to its particular manifestations.146 Geist can be described as absolute not
because it is metaphysically transcendent but because it is itself the process of becoming.147
Thus, Hegel’s claim that “The Absolute alone is true, or the truth is absolute,”148 cannot be
reified into a concept of ‘Absolute Truth’,149 a distinction which will become very
important when exploring the ways in which Moltmann’s theology can be used to address
pressing ethical concerns. Hegel rejected pure objectivity in favor of a concept of
becoming-object. Knowledge is always knowledge of a subject becoming object to itself.
This allows for Hegel’s claim, “Truth is not a minted coin that can be given and pocketed
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One might think here of the philosophical debate regarding individualism and collectivism, or, in the
political realm, liberalism and communitarianism. Elizabeth Frazer gave a good overview of the
commonalities held by those who have been grouped together under the heading of ‘collectivism’. “First, an
ontological or metaphysical thesis: that it is not the case that all there is in the world is individuals… Second,
an ethical thesis… the locus of value is not only the individual as such, but also (or perhaps rather) the social
individual… Third, a methodological thesis: the way to do ethics and to derive political principles is not to
try to deduce and apply universally valid fundamental principles, but to interpret and refine values that are
immanent in the ways of life of really living groups.” Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian
Politics: Unity and Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 21. The most influential liberal
political philosophy in recent times can be found in John Rawls, who summarized his philosophy in terms of
justice, “Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It
does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed
by many.” John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1999), 3.
Alasdair MacIntyre rejected the term ‘communitarian’ for his own thought, but has nevertheless been
categorized as such. He offered a helpful example of the kind of middle-ground that Hegel was here
identifying. “The story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from which I derive
my identity. The possession of a historical identity and the possession of a social identity coincide.” Alasdair
MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 205. For MacIntyre, as for
Hegel, the question is not merely one of politics but equally one of identity. The politico-ethical role of the
individual is of great importance, but only insofar as that individual comes as already identified within
broader social structures. The role of Geist is in determining the boundaries by which social structures and
individuals define each other and themselves. Individual subjects are in the movement of becoming (in-andfor-themselves) while also manifesting the becoming of Geist.
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In common parlance, ‘absolute truth’ is often conceived as disembodied, as standing outside of any
particular conceptual framework- untainted by empiricism. Within conservative theological circles this
notion has been given much attention. E.g. in defense of Christian missionary activity Francis Schaeffer
wrote, “If we are not functioning in the area that this is absolute truth, such evangelism is cruel beyond
measure.” Francis Schaeffer, A Christian View of Philosophy and Culture (Wheaton: Crossway, 1985), 143.
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ready-made.”150 Truth is formed, not delivered. Truth which is absolute, in distinction to
‘Absolute Truth’,151 then, is found in the embodiment of a philosophical system of
becoming. This is Hegel’s ‘science’.
Kenneth Westphal has argued that Hegel’s epistemology is best described as
“epistemological realism.” “Hegel’s brand of idealism is a kind of ontological holism
according to which all parts of the world are fundamentally interrelated, where these
interrelations are fundamentally conceptual relations.”152 These conceptual relations take
place within, and in their dialectical unification help to compose Geist. This fundamental
interrelatedness does not deny the individual, capturing it up in the great flood of
multiplicity, but rather celebrates the individual as the locus of the absolute.153
Consciousness, on its part, likewise makes its appearance as an actuality,
but also as divided within itself, and in its work and enjoyment this
dividedness displays itself as breaking up into a relation to the world of
actuality or a being which is for itself, and into a being that is in itself.154
Belief, according to this Hegelian model, is formulated by reason, and is in no way
opposed to reason. Knowledge holds no higher rank than belief, for Hegel, because
knowledge itself is never sedentary. Knowledge is not merely a rationalistic result, but a
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It bears noting that a discussion of the possibility or reality of ‘absolute truth’ looks very different in the
analytical philosophical tradition than in other areas. E.g., working in Jena a generation after Hegel, Gottlob
Frege argued vehemently for absolute truth particularly in relation to mathematics. For an excellent overview
see Ulrich Pardey, Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).
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Absolute spirit “is present as the individual subject thinking logical thoughts… Absolute spirit is, after
all, the unification of subjective and objective spirit [which] individual subjects have to perform.” Markus
Gabriel, “The Dialectic of the Absolute,” in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, ed. Nectarios G. Limnatis
(New York: Continuum, 2010), 86.
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rational practice. “Reason…approaches things in the belief that it truly apprehends them
as sensuous things… but what it actually does… [is] transforms thought into the form of
being, or being into the form of thought.”155 The task of reason is not for an individual
consciousness to achieve ontological certainty, but to make sense of consciousness itself.
“Belief…starts from the individual consciousness… but without attaining to the presence
of its essential being.”156 Here, Hegel demonstrated that believing cannot be a selfsustaining practice until the believer conceptually turns inward in order to understand the
very concept of ‘belief’ itself. Beliefs are shown to be of secondary importance, not to
knowledge, but to belief.157
Belief is not inferior to knowledge any more than a proposition is inferior to its own
negation. The negation of a proposition is always a determinate negation which is internal
to the proposition itself. Hegelian negation is less of a, ‘No!’ than a ‘Yes, but…’
Determinate negation does not cancel a proposition, it sublates it.158 Hegel was quite clear
that sublation involves (at least) two elements: suspension and preservation. Even while a
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“Hegel nowhere doubts that we must, in effect, rely on our finite competences: it’s only that, given that
thinking is itself historied, every finite assertion or belief will be superseded by the force of evolving
experience – ‘sublated,’ as Hegel affirms.” Joseph Margolis, “The Greening of Hegel’s Dialectical Logic,”
in The Dimensions of Hegel’s Dialectic, 206.
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Jon Stewart has offered an interesting description of sublation in terms of belief, rather than of
Being/being, by considering that every belief is part of a larger structure. “Whenever a particular network of
beliefs gets called into question, there is always some experience, belief, datum that stands in contradiction
to it… If this experience of belief is persistent, the network of beliefs itself may come into such difficulties
that it must be given up as implausible in favor of a new explanation. In this sense, the old network is
‘negated,’ but in the negation something is left over… and it is this belief which forms the basis of the new
belief system. This belief can thus be seen as a determinate negation.” Jon Stewart, The Unity of Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit: A Systematic Interpretation (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2000), 43.
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proposition is being abolished, it is simultaneously being preserved in the novelty that is
created. Dialectic is not the process of creating a new identity, but of recognizing the
identity of identity and difference.159 Belief, then, functions as the initial proposition. Belief
may well be rationally incomplete, but it is nevertheless preserved by knowledge. As
knowledge is here recognized as the identity of belief and its determinate negation,
knowledge likewise already self-contains its own determinate negation. Geist is ever
forward moving because Geist is always self-contemplative.
This fact – that I look at the thing as a mere sign, yet at its essence as I, as
meaning, as reflection in itself – this itself is [my] object. Only then is it
merely immediate inwardness; it must also enter into existence (Daseyn),
become an object, so that on the contrary this inwardness is made external
– a return to being (Seyn).160
Already prior to the publication of the Phenomenology, Hegel had in mind a
particularly embodied understanding of Geist. Hegel argued in 1805-1806 that Geist itself
was a linguistic practice.
This is language, as the name-giving power. The power of imagination
provides only the empty form; [it is] the designative power positing the form
as internal. Language, on the other hand, posits the internal as
being (seyendes). This, then, is the true being of spirit as that of spirit as
such….At the same time it immediately negates itself – fading, yet
perceived… [Language] gives it a name and expresses this as the being of
the object.161

“As categories of essence neither identity nor difference can be thought apart from each other but only
through and by means of each other. Hegel shows that the attempt to isolate difference from identity fails.”
Robert R. Williams, “Double Transition Dialectic, and Recognition,” in Identity and Difference: Studies in
Hegel’s Logic, Philosophy of Spirit, and Politics, ed. Philip T. Grier (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 46.
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One might well argue, following Hegel’s logic, that belief, too, ought to be approached
primarily through linguistic categories. Like language, and like Geist, belief is developed,
not determined.162 But, moreover, belief is not only developed by the individual, but is
constitutive of the individual. This is the ‘name-giving power’ expressed above. So, if an
individual is constituted by the language of belief then what does it mean to be an ‘I’ that
is so-constituted?

On Being an I
To speak of the development of a self, of an ‘I’, in Hegel’s work is to begin with
the heart of the matter. Immediately after the Introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit,
Hegel’s first section is given the title, “Consciousness.” It is informative of Hegel’s project
as a whole that he thus begins this first major work by describing the ‘this’ from which
cognition originates. “The knowledge of knowing which is at the start or is immediately
our object cannot be anything else but immediate or receptive.”163 Hegel called this
receptive knowledge “sense-certainty,” and saw that, at first glance, it might seem that this
sense-certainty is the most pure form of knowledge insofar as it is immediately presented
to the ‘I’ before the ‘I’ has “omitted anything from the object.”164 Yet, upon deeper
When contemplating the concept of a particularly ‘Christian belief’, one might, without full fidelity to
Hegel, take this Hegelian outline and transcribe the concept of church onto that of Geist. Ecclesiology, along
this path, must take seriously the catholicity of the Christian faith, without thereby imposing an unbending
definition of ‘orthodoxy’ against which all beliefs (and all believers) are judged. At a base level, beliefs are
formed through the movements of Geist before they ever become matters of conscious reflection. Christian
beliefs, likewise, immanently transcend theological reflection through sacramental practice. Cyclically,
Christian beliefs are both determined by and determinate of Christian praxis. Through shared language, in
the re-telling of (hi)story, and by common ritual, believing, as communal praxis, is formed.
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introspection it turns out that not only is sense-certainty not the most pure form of
knowledge, but rather is “the most abstract and poorest truth.”165 Sense-certainty is the
poorest truth, in Hegel’s eyes, for the very reason that it appears as the most pure, because
it stands as unmediated by an ‘I’.166 “Here neither I nor the thing has the significance of a
complex process of mediation; the ‘I’ does not have the significance of a manifold
imagining or thinking; nor does the ‘thing’ signify something that has a host of
qualities.”167 Sense-certainty merely describes a momentary encounter of two objects, here
called ‘I’ and ‘thing’. Yet, in this momentary encounter, neither object allows itself to be
constituted by the other, and thus neither demonstrate the full complexity of existence. 168
Rather than stop at the moment of initial encounter, the ‘I’ becomes further constituted
when it is mediated through the encounter with a ‘thing’ or an ‘other’.
When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is
only immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time
mediated: I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and
it, similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the
‘I’.169
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“Hegel does not use the term ‘sense-certainty’ to denote the variety of sense experience; instead, this
expression is intended to designate the most undifferentiated form of existence given in sense.” Jon Stewart,
Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 269.
Interestingly, here Stewart argues that Kierkegaard is actually positive (perhaps even derivative) of Hegel’s
interpretation of sense-certainty.
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Westphal even questions whether sense-certainty can be said to be a state of consciousness. “Sense
Certainty concedes the untenability of its position. In thinking a consciousness which strictly adheres to its
criterion of immediacy it shows how fully indeterminate and empty that consciousness must be, if it can
legitimately be called consciousness at all.” Merold Westphal, History & Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 72.
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In order to make sense of an ‘I’ which is always mediated beyond the process of
self-certainty, one must experience a specific spatio-temporal moment.170 Thus, Hegel
described the ‘I’, at least with reference to sense-certainty, not as substantial but as “a pure
[act of] intuiting.”171
Since, then, this certainty will no longer come forth to us when we direct its
attention to a Now that is night, or to an ‘I’ to whom it is night, we will
approach it and let ourselves point to the Now that is asserted. We must let
ourselves point to it; for the truth of this immediate relation is the truth of
this ‘I’ which confines itself to one ‘Now’ or one ‘Here’.172
In a move that will become very important in the shift from Hegel to Moltmann, the ‘I’ is
constituted by the Here and Now, just as the Here and Now are each constituted by the I
which points in their direction. This ought not to be understood too simplistically, as, for
example, saying that an individual has no capacity to consider before or after the Now, as
to do so would be to pause the process by which an ‘I’ is constituted by the Now. Rather,
Hegel’s argument is not strictly ontological, but, as Westphal described, empirical realism.
Were we to examine this truth [of the immediate relation of the I]
afterwards, or stand at a distance from it, it would lose its significance
entirely; for that would do away with the immediacy which is essential to
it. [In order to move beyond solipsism] we must therefore enter the same
point of time or space, point them out to ourselves, i.e. make ourselves into
the same singular ‘I’ which is the one who knows with certainty.173
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For I, myself, the author of these words, there exists a specific Here and a specific Now. Here, would, at
this moment, be a computer sitting on a desk at the public library, and the Now is a specific date and time.
Simply by turning my body around, the Here of my ‘I’ ceases to be a computer, and turns out to be a shelf
full of magazines. Likewise, my Now, even in the time it has taken to compose two sentences, is no longer
the Now which constituted my ‘I’ but a few moments ago.
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Occurring at the beginning of Hegel’s earliest major work, this brief description of
sense-certainty, which continues into Section B of the Phenomenology, is at least a
beginning of a description of Hegelian ontology.174 Yet, in moving towards a discussion of
Moltmann’s theological anthropology, it would be helpful to first ask whether Hegel’s
thought should even be utilized despite the racially-charged baggage evident in his own
cultural-conditioning.

Can Hegel be Saved?
Standing at the present in a particular Here and Now, looking backward, one can
very easily recognize many specifics about the Here and Now within which Hegel was
working. In this case, with a defined ethical impetus for writing, Hegel’s Here and Now
could easily become, at best, an embarrassment or, at worst, an impediment. Particularly
given that race and racial issues are areas which Christian theology has often done a very
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While it is well beyond the intentions of this dissertation, there is a wide-ranging and long-standing debate
among philosophers and Hegel scholars as to what exactly constitutes a mature Hegelian system, or at least
where Hegel is seen at his strongest point. This debate is often centered specifically on the question of how
the Phenomenology ought to be considered among Hegel’s work. The question, simply put, is whether the
Phenomenology ought to be considered, in its entirety, the work of a mature Hegel, or whether his later work
demonstrates a disregard for, or a sublation of, the Phenomenology. Parallel to this discussion is the question
of whether the Phenomenology should be considered in whole, or whether its seemingly disjointed
construction and, generously, confusing layout, demonstrate a clear Hegelian priority for the first half of the
work over the second. Just as there are those for whom the Phenomenology is, at best, secondary to the
Science of Logic (Robert B. Pippin, e.g., calls the Science, “Hegel’s most important work.” Robert B. Pippin,
“You Can’t Get There From Here,” in Frederick Beiser, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Hegel (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 55.) On the other hand, as Hans Friedrich Fulda has described, there are
those who would choose to put almost entire focus on the Phenomenology at the expense of the Science. See,
Hans Friedrich Fulda, Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik (Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1965), 1-13. As evidenced by direct citation, it seems as though Moltmann, no doubt influenced
by Ernst Bloch, tends toward the latter camp. Tellingly, Moltmann’s first two published references to Hegel
both explicitly reference, “early Hegel.” See Theology of Hope, 27 and 48-49. Even so, Moltmann does not
exclusively look toward the Phenomenology, but also demonstrates a deep interest in Hegel’s less exhaustive
theological writings and his philosophies of history and religion.
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poor job of addressing/understanding,175 given the ways that Hegel addressed racial issues
it might be problematic to hope that he can serve as a backbone for a meaningful theological
dialogue. To the absolute extreme, Karl Popper rejected the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy
as simultaneously inane, deceptive, and dangerous.
Especially the philosophers of history, of politics, and of education are still
to a very large extent under [Hegel’s] sway. In politics, this is shown most
drastically by the fact that the Marxist extreme left wing, as well as the
conservative centre, and the fascist extreme right, all base their political
philosophies on Hegel.176
Popper believed that Hegel’s influence, at least in philosophical circles, was
waning, but hoped to hasten Hegel’s demise philosophically and politically. He pointed to
the political use of Hegel to instigate both class warfare and race warfare as reasons why it
was necessary to overcome Hegel once-and-for-all. However, even a cursory reading of
Popper’s polemic demonstrates an argument that is heavier on passion than on
profundity.177 Walter Kaufmann has done a masterful job of refuting Popper’s particular
take on Hegel, while offering a more nuanced reading of Hegel’s writing and the political
uses to which it continues to be put.178 Although by no means exclusively so, Kauffman

175

Michael Emerson and Christian Smith have argued that, even while evangelical Christianity has the
potential to offer some important contributions to the solution of racial division in the United States, “If white
evangelicals continue to travel the same road they have traveled thus far, the future does indeed look bleak.”
Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, Divided By Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),
171. This book offers a detailed history of racial thought and practice in evangelicalism alongside
sociological and economic analysis of the continued reality of racial division. It is important reading for those
interested in the complexities of race and racial relations in American Christianity.
176

Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (New York: Routledge, 2011), 245.

One such example is Popper’s claim that Hegel “is supreme only in his outstanding lack of originality…
I do not even think that he was talented.” Ibid., 246.
177

Walter Kauffman, “The Hegel Myth and Its Method,” in From Shakespeare to Existentialism: An Original
Study (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 95-129.
178

67

characterized Popper’s attack on Hegel, among many similar arguments, by saying,
“[Hegel] is but little known to most of [his critics]; very few indeed have read as many as
two of the four books that Hegel published. Hegel is known largely through secondary
sources and a few incriminating slogans and generalizations.”179
Kauffman was also quick to say that “Hegel certainly has grievous faults.”180 Yet,
in determining and pointing to such faults, Kauffman insisted that all bits of text needed to
be read in context rather than plucked out to prove a predetermined point. That such a
contextual reading of Hegel is necessary can be demonstrated by his proclamations
regarding the Jewish faith and people.181 Kauffman saw that “Hegel’s earliest essays,
which he himself did not publish, show that he started out with violent prejudices against
the Jews.”182 Yet, “When Hegel became a man of influence, he insisted that the Jews should
be granted equal rights.”183 Even so, Hegel’s complicity in propagating and normalizing
attitudes of racism and prejudice cannot be overlooked. As Joseph McCarney saw,
“Hegel’s aspersions on the Non-European peoples of his own time… are many and
various… They range from coarse defamation of a straightforward kind to more studiedly
offensive remarks.”184 Examples of such studiedly offensive remarks are easy enough to
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find.185 While Hegel’s use of such language should not be ignored or overlooked, they are
not indemic to his system. Patricia Purthschert has argued that, while Hegel’s anthropology
need not be saved, neither can Hegel be ignored. She described that, at least in part, the
tools to ‘save’ Hegel are already available in his own work. “Hegel introduced a subject
that is in formation rather than static and that is constitutively dependent on the recognition
of others.”186
In order to theologically utilize Hegel, it is important to recognize that his
anthropology can be rejected without making a parallel claim against the larger
philosophical system that he was trying to create. Indeed, if Hegel’s system can be used to
develop a theological anthropology to explicitly reject the racism of Hegel’s own, this
would be all the better. If such a task is to be undertaken, it will be best to follow
Moltmann’s example and begin with the end. For, understanding the telos of the individual

184

Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History (New York: Routledge, 2000), 142

E.g. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Hegel claimed, “Slavery has awakened more
humanity among the negroes.” G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H.B.
Nisbet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 183. He argued that the practice of buying and selling
human beings gave monetary value to lives that would have otherwise simply been extinguished. Likewise,
in speaking of the African continent and its peoples, Hegel claimed that “History is in fact out of the question.
Life there consists of a succession of contingent happenings and surprises. No aim or state exists whose
development could be followed; and there is no subjectivity, but merely a series of subjects who destroy one
another.” Ibid., 176. These lectures, as with all of Hegel’s ‘published lectures’ should be treated with an extra
bit of caution. As Hegel himself neither wrote nor published these lectures in their final form, the actual
wording contained therein should be approached cautiously. There is scholarly consensus, however, that the
published ideas can credibly be attributed to Hegel, even if the particulars of the language are open to varying
levels of debate. For further reading on the implicit racism in Hegel’s work see Sander L. Gilman, “The
Figure of the Black in the Thought of Hegel and Nietzsche,” The German Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 2 (March,
1980): 141-158, or Ronald Kuykendall, “Hegel and Africa: An Evaluation of the Treatment of Africa in The
Philosophy of History,” Journal of Black Studies, vol. 23, no. 4 (June, 1993): 571-581.
185

Patricia Purtschert, “On the Limit of Spirit: Hegel’s Racism Revisited,” Philosophy and Social Criticism,
vol. 36, no 9, accessed February 12, 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0191453710379029: 1040.
186

69

will help to describe its inherent relatedness to the other and what it means to exist within
a community of others.

Moving Toward Telos
One of the most important, and therefore one of the most contested, elements to the
Hegelian philosophical system is the concept of telos.187 Phenomenology of Spirit contains
a small subsection dedicated explicitly to teleology. Here, Hegel described teleology in
terms of an organic being. Such an organism comports itself within the world as one
moving toward a goal. This goal, while seemingly external, is ultimately nothing more nor
less than the organism itself.188 “Yet the organism, as it has been characterized above, is,
in fact, the real End itself, for since it preserves itself in the relation to an other, it is just
that kind of natural existence in which Nature reflects itself…”189 This teleological
organism ought not to be seen simply as self-identical, however. Rather, Hegel described
that any understanding of teleology would be incomplete without a significant
differentiating movement. The telos toward which Hegel’s philosophy points is therefore
neither pure unity, nor pure difference, but the identity of identity and difference. In relation

E.g. see Willem DeVries, Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 44
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to Hegel’s ‘I’, the individual, and likewise individuals in community and the empirical
world more generally, are not static beings but dynamic agents of becoming.190 Just as there
can be no ‘I’ prior to the mediation of an other, so too, there can be no ‘I’ without an
internal mediation between movements of difference. Hegel described this internal struggle
in terms of,
Two moments of cause and effect, of active and passive moments, which
were the result of a necessary separating-out, [which are] brought together
into a unity… Because [the ‘I’] has returned into itself, the last, or the result,
is just as much the first which initiated the movement, and is to itself the
realized End.191
The ‘I’ is an instantiation of what Hegel calls ‘Notion’ (Begriff), just as another
self-identified ‘I’ must be. Notion, for Hegel, is the term given to the ultimate
epistemological telos, to the actual identity of identity and difference writ large. The
identity of identity and difference is the telos for the entirety of Hegel’s philosophy. Yet,
as the telos, it is also the beginning from which Hegel’s philosophy originates. 192 The

Hegel’s movement toward a language of becoming has been met with some skepticism. In Dale M. Schlitt,
Hegel’s Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 47, he argued that, “Hegel’s
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identity of identity and difference is the goal of Hegel’s philosophy as viewed from the
beginning looking forward. The development of Geist, and therefore the development of
thought, of human history, and of the individual self-consciousness, is a dialectical process.
Every part of Hegel’s thought stems from the interplay of identity and difference and the
movement toward their mutual identity. This mutual interplay, this development of
subjectivity, is not an isolated happening, but rather must be understood in terms of a larger
systemic description of the identity of identity and difference.

The System of Philosophy
In Hegel’s earliest published original essay, The Difference Between the Fichtean
and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy193 known colloquially as the Differenzschrift,
Hegel had already begun the process of developing his scientific philosophy. The purpose
of the Differenzschrift seems to be an explication of the early stages of Hegel’s own
dialectical philosophy just as much as it is actually a comparison of the philosophies of
Fichte and Schelling.194 Throughout this text, Hegel, both in his own right and in citing the
work of Fichte and Schelling, used a number of different terms to describe each element of
the identity of identity and difference. Among them, Hegel pointed to these contradictory

Metaphysics,” in Hegel and Metaphysics: On Logic and Ontology in the System, ed. Allegra de Laurentiis
(Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2016), 34.
193

G.W.F. Hegel, The Difference Between the Fichtean and Schellingian Systems of Philosophy, trans. Jere
Paul Surber (Reseda, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1978).
194

In a deeply critical comment, Wayne Martin argued that the Differenzschrift did not merely serve as an
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moments as “I and nature, pure and empirical self-consciousness, knowing (Erkennen) and
Being, self-positing and op-positing, [and] finitude and infinity.”195 Each of these
descriptors are viable ways in which the philosophical task might encounter identity and
difference. While the cultural contingencies which determine the empirical descriptions
can differ, Hegelian philosophy is both processive and oppositional. In order to fulfill this
requirement to be both oppositional and processive, a true philosophy, according to Hegel,
must take the form of a system.196 Without a system, one could point to identity, and one
could point to difference, but one could never make the most important step of describing
the identity of identity and difference.197 The Differenzschrift might be seen as a preamble
to such a system. It did not actually begin constructing the system as such, but set forth the
intellectual materials with which the system could be erected.
Moving forward, Hegel hardly made it into the preface to the Phenomenology
before he began to describe the importance of a system of philosophy. “The true shape in
which truth exists can only be the scientific system of truth as such.”198 For Hegel,
philosophy’s ultimate goal was more than an appreciation of knowledge, it was true
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knowing, and “only the systematic exposition of philosophy itself provides it.”199
Interestingly, Hegel differentiated between system and systematicity, and he believed that
both are essential to the production of viable philosophy.200 This double system(atic)
movement parallels Hegel’s revolutionary claim that in the Absolute, form and content are
inseparable. This inseparability is the identity of identity and difference. System is the
content of true philosophy, and this content always appears in the form of systematicity.
The form is the content, and vice versa.201 Of course, it is not merely in the Phenomenology
that Hegel explicated the importance of system(aticity). The title of the Science is itself
telling, and in this text he also went on to say, “Logic is to be understood as the system of
pure reason, as the realm of pure thought.”202 This systematicity, however, is not imposed
as whole, but is shown to be the development of the movement of Geist. Geist’s movement
is seen to take place in dialectical form.
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Dialectic
Just as, in the content of Hegel’s system, the form is the content and vice-versa, the
same is true in the form of Hegel’s system. The form of the system is the content of the
system, and the content of the system is the form of the system. In shorthand, one could
call this interpenetrative content/form, “dialectic.”203 The system, through dialectic, was
intended to achieve the Notion, the Absolute. Yet, in striving toward this goal Hegel argued
that the universal could not be entirely separated from the individual.204
The individual is constituted as an individual through participation in the becominguniversal.205 The internal is always mediated by the external. Outside of the universal there
is no individual, but likewise, outside of the individual there is no universal. 206 Hegel
problematized conceptualities of both subject and object by arguing that the universal
individual is simultaneously both subject and object.
The object’s own self, which presents itself as the coming-to-be of the
object, is not a passive Subject inertly supporting the Accidents; it is, on the
contrary, the self-moving Notion which takes its determinations back into
itself. In this movement, the passive Subject itself perishes.207
For an overview of dialectic in Hegel see Michael Forster, “Hegel’s Dialectical Method,” in The
Cambridge Companion to Hegel, 130-170. For a more in-depth discussion of dialectic see Michael Rosen,
Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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It is fundamental to Hegel’s thought to remember that there is always a mediation occurring
between a subject and an object, or between identity and difference. It is a far too easy
caricature of Hegel to see his idealism as entirely ideal, rather than recognizing the inherent
physicality by which the ideal is mediated.208 This understanding rejects criticisms of Hegel
such that would claim, “The tendency of idealist thought- especially as represented in its
greatest representative, Hegel- [is] to swallow up the concrete, the particular, the individual
and the contingent within the necessary self-development of the notion.”209
The goal of the individual self is to move toward its own negation, toward its own
telos within the Absolute.
Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence it is
something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it is
something that goes beyond itself… Thus, consciousness suffers this
violence at its own hands: it spoils its own limited satisfaction.210
This reference to the internalized violence of consciousness is fascinating for several
reasons.211 First, by thinking of the development of consciousness, and therefore, too, the
development of history, as a violent production, one can immediately see that dialectical
movement is something very different than the ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’ which is so
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often imposed on Hegel.212 Dialectic, that process by which identity and difference move
toward a teleological identity, or by which the Notion becomes known in-and-for-itself, is
more than mere opposition. Dialectic is an existential violence through which death and
resurrection exist in unison.213
Yet, on the other hand, to speak of dialectic as an existential violence would seem
to raise questions regarding any philosophy which sees in itself a completed system in
which the Absolute has come to be known.214 This points to several related criticisms that
are often leveled at Hegel’s claims of systematicity. Ernst Troeltsch, for example, was a
vocal opponent of what he saw to be Hegel’s philosophical overstepping.
To be sure, the attempt to identify this concept of a goal with a generative,
causal law has to be abandoned; so too with the attempt to compute absolute
realization from an empirical series of qualitative gradations and from what
is alleged to be a historically demonstrable exhausting of its inner
principle… One cannot, however, recombine these two into a unified
organic development…This notion, popular even today due to the influence
of Hegel, is not practicable in this form. The speculative concept of
evolution remains an intuition and a presentiment. Science can establish
causal relationships only from case to case.215

For a brief history and debunking of this model see Gustav Mueller, “The Hegel Legend of ‘SynthesisAntithesis-Thesis’,” Journal of the History of Ideas 19 No. 3 (June 1958): 411-414, accessed March 14, 2017,
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Hegel would have rejected this critique as a failure to understand the complexity of
what has here been termed ‘existential violence’ and its ontological power of negation.
Ẑiẑek answered, from an Hegelian perspective, why this contention is off-base.
[Hegel’s] wager is not to adopt toward the present the ‘point of view of
finality,’ viewing it as if it were already past, but, precisely, to reintroduce
the openness of the future into the past, to grasp that-which-was in its
process of becoming, to see the contingent process which generated existing
necessity.216
While there exists a deep complexity regarding how Hegel viewed his own place in history,
particularly in the history of philosophy or more specifically in the history of the Notion,
an argument can be made that any such complexities are not inherently destructive to
Hegel’s system.217 Rather, they will here be described as ‘ruptures’ or ‘excess’, which do
not inherently break the system.

Systemic Ruptures
If one were to accept Pippin’s contention regarding the necessary instability of the
Notion(s), then it might appear that Hegel had walked himself into a philosophical impassehaving created a system that is unable to adequately demonstrate a process of becoming,
while simultaneously proposing a new understanding of epistemology whereby truth, to a
degree, becomes contingent upon, or at least mediated by, the experiences of a becoming-
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individual. One might call this a rupture of Hegel’s system.218 A rupture, here, should not
be understood to be something destructive, as, say, the rupture of a vehicle’s tire. Rather,
a rupture should be understood as the in-breaking of something productive.219 This rupture
is an Hegelian project through and through.220 The rupture dis-rupts the movement of the
system. The rupture is evidence of a philosophical overflow, of the system’s own
developmental nature, of its becoming. If this is the case, then one needs to recognize the
rupture as what it is, an in-breaking of something new, as possibility for a new direction.221
Before exploring further what such a rupture might mean for Hegelian philosophy,
there are still other examples which can be offered. One such example which explicitly
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relates to the possibility of a dialectical unity of subject/object can be found in the famous
passage of the Phenomenology in which Hegel described the master-slave dialectic. This
is a difficult passage to interpret because it offers so many possibilities within its own
text.222 The passage begins as a discussion of self-consciousness, leading one to assume
that the passage is going to be only about the subjective development of the individual.
Yet, just as with the previous discussion, the individual, the subject, means nothing unless
it is in relationship to an other, an object. “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when,
and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.”223
In words that sound as though they could have come directly from the mouth of Levinas,224
Hegel went on to say, “Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has
come out of itself.”225 The difficulty of interpretation lies in the fact that the reader is unsure
whether Hegel was speaking about a distinctly inter-personal experience, or whether this
self-consciousness that has come out of itself ought to be regarded as the innerdevelopment of an individual. Surely, given Hegel’s attempt to subvert the traditional
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discourse of subject-object, he, to a degree, had both in mind. Yet, it would seem that a
‘both’ reading would differ significantly from an ‘either/or’ reading. It may even be that a
‘both’ reading would be a cheap dialectical trick, which ultimately could not stand up to
the nuances of Hegel’s system. As such, it will be argued that reading the master-slave
dialectic as the internal process of an individual serves as a rupture of this too-easy
understanding of Hegel.
Read as a story about the self-discovery of an individual, the master-slave dialectic
would look something like this: “Self-consciousness is, to begin with, simple being-forself, self-equal through the exclusion from itself of everything else.”226 Here, selfconsciousness is absolute consciousness insofar as the self does not recognize its own
limitations. It is only when self-consciousness recognizes its limitations, when it can
recognize its own division, that absolute consciousness becomes consciousness of the
Absolute.227 As newly divided, self-consciousness appears to itself as other. This is a
complicated dance, for “each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and
therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth.”228 As the two sides of the divided self
face each other, they begin a “life-and-death” struggle for truth, for certainty of being forthemselves.229
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Only thus is it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not
[just] being, not the immediate form in which it appears, not its submergence
in the expanse of life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which
could not be regarded as a vanishing moment, that it is only pure being-foritself.230
However, paradoxically, the conclusion of this life-and-death struggle brings about neither
death, nor perfect life. Rather, the conclusion of this struggle, interior to the individual,
merely reifies the chasm between the self being-in-itself and the self being-for-itself. Thus,
one and the same self exists simultaneously in a state of both lordship (master) and bondage
(slave) to itself.231
Within Hegel’s work there is no easy resolution to this dialectical set-up. Simply
put, there can be no equality between master and slave, even if/after a role reversal is made
possible by the slave’s self-valuation. Self-consciousness will always be self-evident as
both lordship and bondage. Both the master and the slave possess self-knowledge, made
possible by knowledge of the other, but they simultaneously lack knowledge of the other
as self. The overcoming of the master-slave dialectic could only be the unified individual
being in-and-for-itself, possessing a singular knowledge of the Absolute. When this process
is read as the interior life of the individual, this struggle with the other is the attempt to
understand the self as simultaneously subject and object to oneself.232
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A reading of lordship and bondage which is entirely interiorized cannot account for
the deep complexity of Hegel’s writing. It must quickly become clear that the divided
individual, the subject-object that is in an eternal struggle for recognition of its own
identity, never continues the struggle autonomously.233 If Hegel’s system is indeed built
upon a conception of progress, and if history is the becoming of the Absolute (Spirit), then
the individual’s internal strife transcends the interiority of the individual. The interior strife
is contained within a narrative of Absolute striving. It is unthinkable in exclusion from the
strife of other individuals, past and present, also subject-objects trying to find a way to be
in-and-for-themselves.234 If the strife of the individual is ultimately productive, it must be
productive of the Absolute. Here, Hegel’s reaction against Kant 235 raises the question of
whether either the Master or the Slave can ever truly be sublated within self-consciousness.
The Hegel of the master-slave dialectic does not, indeed cannot, offer a guaranteed
outcome in the battle of master and slave. What is offered is not the possibility to become
a sovereign master, nor a unified master-slave. Rather, Hegel described a process of eternal
tension in which master becomes slave, slave becomes master, and back again. While this
is a process of development, it does not necessarily represent a process of growth. 236 That

“Correspondingly, the pattern unfolds in social life. The mutual awareness of two persons, their reciprocal
need for recognition, their struggle to obtain it, and the final subjection of the one to the other… seen this
time from the angle of society but still rooted in the problem of the developing consciousness.” Ibid.
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is, as the master and the slave struggle, as roles are continuously reversed, as roles are
possibly too nebulous to even be named or categorized, both master and slave inform the
subjectivity of the individual. And, of course, the developing subjectivity likewise
continues to more clearly and astutely look at itself as an object. Yet, if this argument is
correct, and if the master-slave dialectic has no discernible telos, it again represents a
rupture in Hegel’s system. This rupture dis-rupts the march of progress, the guaranteed
outcome - a certain teleological reading of the world.237 Here, with the rupture of the
system, Hegel argued against himself the possibility that the importance of
life/history/philosophy takes place in unsurpassable conflict rather than in conflictive
progress.238

In Summation
After offering a more general interpretation of Hegel’s philosophical system, the
second half of this chapter has also looked at two particular Hegelian movements. It has
been argued that both of these movements are purely Hegelian, yet, each of them represent
at least a potential rupture in Hegel’s philosophical system. A rupture does not appear in
the system as a break, but rather as an overflow. Hegel’s own ideas were, at times, in excess

“There is no good reason why two identical egos, locked in combat, should not struggle to a static
stalemate. To say that Hegel’s resolution is good dialectics answers nothing.” Kelly, 181.
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of the system in which he believed them to fit. When Hegel spoke of a consciousness which
goes beyond itself he illustrated a potential shortcoming of his own system if it were to
only operate with a linear view of progress. Likewise, Hegel’s master-slave dialectic also
calls into question the meaning of progress. As a counter-point to Hegel’s philosophy of
history, the master-slave dialectic points to a possible understanding of progress that
centers on conflict in se, rather than on resolution through conflict. As alternative, this calls
into question the necessity which Hegel believed to be inherent to his philosophical system.
Hegel’s work offers forth the possibility to take seriously the system without becoming
enslaved to it. This renewed understanding of Hegel’s work, simultaneous with a renewed
understanding of Hegel’s importance, is not a critique from outside, but, in the purest
dialectical way, a reading-against from within – a reading ‘from below’.
In the current chapter it has been argued that Hegel is among the most important of
Moltmann’s philosophical interlocutors. Moving forward, it will be shown that
Moltmann’s interest in eschatology, social trinitarianism, and the doctrine of creation are
often deliberately in dialogue with these and other specifically Hegelian themes. Yet, it
will also be described that while Moltmann owes a philosophical debt to Hegel, it has never
been Moltmann’s intention to be an “Hegelian theologian.” In Moltmann’s work, he has
never, for instance, demonstrated the sort of interest that Hans Küng has described of his
book, The Incarnation of God, “[This book is] not only a presentation of Hegel’s statements
about Jesus Christ all neatly strung together, but a many-levelled ‘initiation’ into Hegel’s
life and thought with particular reference to his religious world, and thence into his
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theology and Christology.”239 Moltmann has never addressed Hegel in this systematic way.
However, Küng also described why Hegel is of such an important formative influence on
Moltmann and many theologians of his generation. Küng wrote of “that section of the
history of theology which Hegel’s thought embodies and which has determined the whole
future of the subject.”240
While some might dispute the claim that Hegel ‘has determined the whole future
of theology’, Küng is right to understand the power that Hegelian thought has and continues
to hold over much of, at least, Western theology.241 Yet, because Moltmann’s intention was
not to offer a systematic reading of Hegel, there is also much of Hegel that he leaves
unaddressed. For example, while it will be important to understanding how Moltmann
utilizes Hegel, Moltmann has shown little inclination to take on directly the task that Kant
described as, “[lending] aid in making this path (i.e. Kant’s critical philosophy) into a highroad.”242 Moltmann’s project has not been a continuation of Kantian critical philosophy in
the same way that Hegel’s clearly was: Moltmann’s project is not to describe ‘the
Absolute’, but to understand ‘revelation’ of the Absolute, contrary to Hegel understood as
a subjective God.243 Just as for Hegel, in Moltmann’s conception all knowledge is
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participatory knowledge. Yet, Moltmann has been influenced enough by Barth to believe
that knowledge is not a subjective working out of the in-and-for-itself, but that there is an
additional element of imposition of the seemingly subjective. This imposition is revelation.
Although Hegel describes Christianity, the pinnacle of religion, as “Revealed Religion,”
Moltmann’s understanding of revelation goes beyond this apparent revealing. Revelation
is, itself, a subjective movement in history.244 This movement is the in-breaking of the
future into the present. For Hegel, to the contrary, the revelation of religion is not an inbreaking but an out-working. For Hegel, revelation is found in the discovery of that which
is ultimately obvious.245 As Merold Westphal has described,
Hegel is not in the least bashful about using the traditional language of
Christianity as a revealed religion, just as he uses traditional language about
creation, trinity, incarnation, and so forth. In each case he seeks to give a
persuasive redefinition in terms of his own system of thought.246
Because Moltmann’s project is not an explication of Hegel, and because he comes
to the table with differing theological commitments, Moltmann has never explicitly taken

a revelation of God; but if I believe in God then I have a positive standpoint over against nature and this is
different because nature is to much jeopardized with human destruction that we need God to defend nature
over against human beings whose knowledge is power.” Jürgen Moltmann, “From Physics to Theology: A
Personal Story,” (public lecture given to Faraday Institute for Science and Religion, Cambridge, February
14, 2012), accessed 1/7/16, http://www.faraday.st-edmunds.cam.ac.uk/Multimedia.php?adfke
“When he states that the Christian revelation is essentially an eschatological one, he means that the
Christian faith is grounded in the occurrence of a definite historic event, the raising of Jesus, and lives from
the promise of the future of that event, namely, the future realization of the righteousness of God, of a life as
a result of resurrection from the dead, and of the kingdom of God in a new heaven and a new earth, a nova
creatio ex nihilo.” Martin R. Tripole, “Ecclesiological Developments in Moltmann’s Theology of Hope,”
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the time to describe fundamental Hegelian concepts like ‘reason’ (Vernunft), ‘Being’
(Sein/Dasein), ‘understanding’ (Verstand), ‘concept’ (Begriff), Spirit, (Geist), or a ‘thingin-itself’ (Ding-an-sich). When these concepts are addressed by Moltmann, they are not
done so as intentionally faithful to Hegel’s thought. These concepts will, here, be explored
insofar as they help to understand Moltmann’s approach to Hegel, but neither Moltmann,
nor therefore this dissertation, will make a judgment on Hegel’s description of these
important terms. The question, here, is not whether Hegel was ‘right’ (insofar as such a
description can even be used with respect to an Hegelian sort of speculative philosophy247),
but of what value Hegel’s philosophy held for Moltmann’s theological development. Thus,
a great many pieces of Hegel’s wide-ranging system of thought will be left unaddressed.
A direct explication of Hegel could not avoid deep inquiry into questions of selfconsciousness and particularly the Unhappy Consciousness, Reason (in many forms), selfalienation (both in Hegel’s own vernacular and as taken on by Marx), culture and art,
judgment, law, and logic (variously understood). Here, however, these concepts play a
secondary role of importance in Moltmann’s theological development, so will not receive
the treatment that they might otherwise deserve.
This chapter does not reproduce Hegel or his system in their fullness and nuance.
While such work is important, countless others have already attempted this feat. Rather,
here is presented Hegel as monstrous. This is the beginning of a Moltmannian
interpretation of Hegel. This is the presentation of a particular Hegel who continues to be
influential in the theological thought of Moltmann and his intellectual lineage. By better
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understanding this version of Hegel, and the influence that he holds, a better understanding
of Moltmann’s theology can come to the fore. It is to that task which we will now turn.
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CHAPTER 3: DIALECTIC AND HISTORY
“Things we lose have a way of coming back to us in the end… if not always in the way
we expect.”248 – Luna Lovegood
Moltmann’s academic journey has never been defined, as was Hegel’s, by a quest
for a system, or for a ‘scientific’ description and understanding of theology. Rather,
Moltmann has repeatedly demonstrated that his primary academic and theological impetus
is a responsiveness to very real problems in the world.
[Theology] cannot be exhausted in general and abstract definitions of the
relationship between church and state or dogmatic faith and political action.
Concrete attention must be paid to religious problems of politics and to
laws, compulsions and the vicious circles which for economic and social
reasons constrict, oppress or make impossible the life of man and living
humanity.249
This sort of theological praxis is not merely academic, nor merely ecclesial – if such a
distinction can even be made from other societal strata, but intensely and painfully
political.250 Moltmann’s theology, then, “Calls especially for dialogue with socialist,
democratic, humanistic and anti-racist movements,” and, “Reflects the new situation of
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God in the inhuman situations of men, in order to break down the hierarchical relationships
which deprive them of self-determination, and to help to develop their humanity.”251
While not having arisen from the traditional Latin American context of Liberation
Theology- insofar as this can be described as a unified movement,252 it is clear that
Moltmann’s theological sympathies with Liberation Theology run deep. It is also little
surprise that many Liberation thinkers point to Moltmann’s work as important and
influential.253 Without ethical and political dimensions theology would be nothing more
than a shouting into the wind. This is why Moltmann’s theology was developed to ask,
Not only what sense it makes to talk of God, but also what is the function
of such talk and what effect it has. Even here, none of the so-called
substance of faith is lost; rather, faith gains substance in its political
incarnations and overcomes its un-Christian abstraction, which keeps it far
from the present situation.254
Even in books with a very particular theological focus, the ethical and political
dimensions to theological praxis were never far from the surface. 255 With reference to
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Christology Moltmann has said, “The leap into the messianic future presupposes the
downfall into the misery of the historical present.”256 In the same work Moltmann said,

Injustice and suffering acquire a meaning only to the degree in which we
refuse to accept them. Faith and hope for the righteousness and justice of
God are the spur to keep us from surrendering to them, and to make us fight
injustice and suffering wherever and however we can.257
In looking at the doctrine of the Trinity specifically, Moltmann again made similar claims.
The person who acts has God behind him and the world in front of him, so
to speak. For him, the world is the domain to which he is sent, the domain
where the gospel is to be proclaimed, where we are to love our neighbour
and liberate the oppressed. The future is the domain of open potentialities.
He thinks in the movement of God to the world and is himself part of this
movement.258
While perhaps lacking the same political depth as previously quoted passages, it is here
nevertheless clear that Moltmann’s theological agenda is consistently one in which belief,
faith, and ecclesial shibboleth should be seen as precursors to, or the actual beginnings of,
political and ethical engagement with a world in need of redemption.259
This politico-ethical orientation is important for one who hopes to perform as an
interlocutor of Moltmann. It holds heuristic importance in the quest for understanding, but
to an equal degree it is important insofar as it demonstrates something fundamental to
Moltmann’s methodology. Theology, for Moltmann, should be dialogical rather than
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dogmatic.260 Theology is not a practice of deciding and telling but of contemplation and
discussion. Theology’s primary concern is not creedal assent but moral embodiment.261 It
is the making real of that for which creation groans – the enlivening of teleological hope
for wholeness. As embodied, a key feature of theological description must be a
consideration of the limitations (and strengths) of one’s own point-of-view as being
situated particularly within space and time.

On Being Situated
When seeking to interpret Moltmann, one is faced with a theological non-system
which nevertheless seeks to be systematic in breadth and depth.262 As a ‘non-system’, there
is no usurpation of authority taking place in subsequent volumes. Nor do subsequent
volumes, necessarily, build upon an established foundation of prior work to bring about
deeper levels of meaning or understanding. To the contrary, to understand Moltmann’s
methodology is to understand a key theological focus and a key interpretive tool.

Alen Kristić has performed a fascinating thought-experiment regarding the question of, “What would
constitute the concrete and contextual implementation of the fundamental program of The Crucified God…
for religions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Within this experiment he argued, “Only humaneness, concrete
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constitution and activity of religious institutions.” Alen Kristić, “The Development of Democratic Political
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Moltmann’s theology is grounded by an epistemic humility of situatedness.263 Just as Hegel
pointed to an empirical and demonstrable spatio-temporal location as the place of
philosophical thought, Moltmann limits any claims to his own profundity by pointing to
the limited vantage point from which he could work.
The writer recognizes the conditions and limitations of his own position,
and the relativity of his own ‘whole’ as part of a whole that is much greater.
He cannot therefore aim to say what is valid for everyone, at all times, and
in all places. But he will set himself, with his own time and his own place,
within the greater community of theology. For him this means a critical
dissolution of naïve, self-centred thinking.264
It would be well to examine if and to what extent Moltmann has been able to maintain this
sort of dispassionate particularity while trying to make the sorts of universalizing claims
from which Christian theology – at least an intentionally confessional sort of Christian
theology – could scarcely be loosed. Whether Moltmann’s work demonstrates a complete
fidelity to this ideal, or whether Moltmann himself could have even seen all of the ways in
which his own situatedness was reflected in the written word, the very fact that he was so
explicit about using particularity as a cornerstone of theological development is telling.265
Moltmann’s understanding of his own situatedness, his insistence on beginning the

Joy Ann McDougall described this sort of epistemic humility as a cornerstone of Moltmann’s theology so
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theological endeavor from a particular standpoint of epistemic humility, is essential
because it serves both as method and theological medium. And, to truly understand what it
is that Moltmann has to say and why his theology is both unique and important, it will be
helpful to understand just how and to what extent his theology has been influenced by his
reading of Hegel. If Hegel were removed from the equation, Moltmann’s theology would
look much different, and almost certainly would lack the sense of embodiment which gives
it an ethical thrust. This sense of embodiment will become clear as Moltmann’s theology
is explored in greater detail moving forward.266 Moltmann’s theology will here be
considered thematically, beginning where Moltmann chronologically began his career,
with the twin themes of ‘hope’ and ‘crucifixion’. Yet, in each instance, one should consider
the situatedness from which these discussions arose, and the situatedness in which they
continue to return.

The Hope of Crucifixion
In trying to bring together Moltmann’s own theological work with a sense of the
importance of Hegel’s influence thereon, one logical starting point would be a trinitarian
doctrine of God. Moltmann is often considered to be among the most important trinitarian
thinkers of the 20th century.267 Yet, Moltmann did not begin with a notion of Trinity, but

Ashmita Khasnabish credited Moltmann’s view of history for specifically claiming a sense of
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Political Sublime: Intervention of a Postcolonial Feminist (New York: Lexington Books, 2009), 126.
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(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013), ix, as well as, “A springboard for the major rethinking of the understanding
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rather with a notion of ‘hope’. So, following Moltmann, it is to hope which we will first
turn. Moltmann’s first major work, Theology of Hope, serves to orient his readers to the
eschatological nature of his theological ruminations. Theology of Hope thus serves as an
important interpretive tool for everything that follows.268 It is hope in the face of despair
which enlivens the ethico-political nature of theology. Without hope, and more particularly
without a thoughtful explication of the structures and promises of hope, theology would
remain a quaint ecclesial practice rather than the force for change that Moltmann has
envisioned. This sort of theology is not a movement from the church outward, but from the
world inward to the church. The work of Moltmann’s theology is not that of conversion or
explicit evangelism, but of reforming the church in such a way that it can actually
participate in God’s redemptive activity rather than causing more reason for it.269 As such,
Moltmann’s theology is often internally critical, and he celebrates “the criticism of the
church and theology which we have been fortunate enough to experience, and which is
justified on sociological, psychological and ideological grounds.”270 Hope is not pure
naïveté, and so can only grow from the fertile soil of genuine despair. Hope does not mask

of the Trinity that has been such a marked feature of Western theology since the 1970s.” Peter McEnhill and
George Newlands, Fifty Key Christian Thinkers (New York: Routledge, 2005), 162. Of course, there are
other who find Moltmann’s trinitarian contributions to be more problematic. See e.g., Karen Kilby,
“Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” in New Blackfriars, vol. 81
(November 2000): 432-445, accessed July 21, 2017, http://dx.doi.org.10.1111/j.1741-2005.2000.tb06456.x.
Indeed, to a point Moltmann’s entire theological project could be understood as a theology of hope. E.g.,
see Ryan A. Neal, Theology as Hope: On the Ground and Implications of Jürgen Moltmann’s Doctrine of
Hope (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2008), xix.
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Moltmann has even been criticized as one who “emphasizes social and political action to the detriment of
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Violence on Northern Nigeria, and a Theological Reflection on its Healing (Carlisle, CBA: Langham
Monographs, 2011), 64.
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reality, but celebrates possibility by standing in rejection of that from which despair has
arisen.
Working from the position of hope, Moltmann’s second major work, Crucified
God, sought to Christologically ground ‘hope’ in the painful realities of the world. This
movement from hope to crucifixion, from eschatology backward to death, 271 itself
evidences Hegel at work.272 In the Introduction to this volume, Moltmann wrote, “As I
intend to show, the theology of the cross is none other than the reverse side of the Christian
theology of hope.”273 It would be easy to conceptualize Theology of Hope as one side of a
coin and The Crucified God as another side of the same coin. If this were the case, then the
two different aspects of this theological coin would serve to balance each other. Depending
on the particular theological ‘coin toss’, the result would be a focus on either hope or
crucifixion. While each theological aspect could critique the other as its opposite, the two
could never exist simultaneously as complementary theological foci. Moltmann’s intent
cannot be fully understood using this sort of physical analogy. Rather, to say that a theology
of crucifixion is the reverse side of a theology of hope is to jump head-on into Hegelian
dialectical thought. With Hegel, and therefore with Moltmann, this sort of dual exploration

Anna Madsen noted that Moltmann demonstrated a fear “that a pietistic interpretation of God’s act on the
cross, one which concentrates primarily upon the salvific benefits of Christ’s crucifixion” would lead to an
abandonment of the eschatological element of Eucharistic practice.” Anna M. Madsen, The Theology of the
Cross in Historical Perspective (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2007), 206.
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E.g., in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, “The crucifixion of Christ is a negation of every
idolatrous religious claims (just as the death of God deconstructs every theology).” Peter C. Hodgson, Hegel
and Christian Theology: A Reading of the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 239.
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is never a zero-sum game, as with the coin flip. 274 Rather, nothing is truly only what it is,
but is also simultaneously the determinate-negation of that which it is.
All that is necessary to achieve scientific progress… is the recognition of
the logical principle that the negative is just as much positive, or that what
is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract
nothingness…and therefore the result essentially contains that from which
it results.275
Thus, to say that The Crucified God is the reverse side of Theology of Hope is to
already put these two works, or at least the themes which they represent, into a dialectical
relationship. To read The Crucified God, or to contemplate the intentionally pathetic God
which it describes, is to begin the process of refining the process begun in Theology of
Hope. To maintain a dedicated focus on the crucifixion is not to reject or negate
Moltmann’s early hope, but rather serves as a purification of the concept of hope.276 Again,
one can see at least a general Hegelian influence taking place here. While there are those
who have interpreted Hegel as a pure idealist, Moltmann’s reading of Hegel has rejected
any such interpretation. Undoubtedly Moltmann looks back to Hegel through both Marx
and Bloch, and so has inherited a rich history of pulling out the materialist aspects of
Hegel’s philosophy.277 Daniel Rossi-Keen described Moltmann’s theology as “Post-

274

One might point to the differences between Platonic dialectic and Hegelian dialectic to help to understand
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Ryan Neal argued against the understanding that The Crucified God should be read as a ‘continuation’ of
A Theology of Hope, yet also saw the ways in which the two can stand in dialectical relation. See, Ryan Neal,
“Minority Report: Reconsidering Jürgen Moltmann’s Turn to a Theology of the Cross,” International Journal
of Systematic Theology, Vol. 14, No. 1 (January 2012): 26-43.
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metaphysical” for this very reason.278 A theology of hope is not an intellectual practice of
wishing and dreaming, but an embodied practice of naming the need(s) for redemption and
then acting in specific ways such that redemption can be made manifest. In order to
meaningfully hope, which is to say, to meaningfully embody hope, one must first dwell in
brokenness. For the Christian, there is no brokenness greater than the crucified God, for
there is evidence of the brokenness of humanity – the very brokenness of creation itself.
Moltmann made the biblical admonition to “take up your cross”279 an important point of
orientation for The Crucified God. For Moltmann, this admonition demonstrates a material
practice that also transcends the merely material. “It is right to extend the understanding of
the following of Christ and to give concrete meaning to our taking up the cross, for this
does not take place only in the inner life of faith, any more than concrete martyrdom is
exhausted in the mystical conformitas crucis.”280 Moltmann’s theology, particularly as
evidenced by his theologia crucis, can only make theological claims in light of material
reality.281 This will again be demonstrated through a discussion of Moltmann’s doctrine of
creation, in which any conception of an ‘internal’ life of God is always tied to the

Bloch There Was Blumhardt’: a Thesis on the Origins of the Theology of Hope,” Scottish Journal of
Theology, vol. 62, no. 1 (February, 2009): 26-39.
See Daniel E. Rossi-Keen, “Jürgen Moltmann, Karl Marx and God: An Unlikely Trinity,” Toronto Journal
of Theology, vol. 23, no. 1 (2007): 47-60.
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“[Moltmann constructs] accounts of the world as fundamentally open precisely because God’s salvific
engagement with it is not yet complete.” Christopher Baker, Thomas A. James, and John Reader, A
Philosophy of Christian Materialism: Entangled Fidelities and the Public Good (New York: Routledge,
2016), 18.
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materiality of creation.282 If the life of God is so tied to materiality, and if the theological
task is one of seeking and enacting redemption, then one must understand the mechanism
by which redemption can materially be described. For Moltmann, the Hegelian concept of
‘sublation’ serves this role.

Sublation: The Moving Force of History
This transition from theology of hope to theology of the cross exemplifies an
overarching structural reality of Moltmann’s theology. While the theology of the cross is
the ‘reverse side’ of the theology of hope, these two are not opposites. Rather, they stand
in a dialectical relationship of sublation (aufhebung). Hegel used the term ‘sublation’ often
and repeatedly in his written work.283 Yet, notably, there are four primary instances in
which he offered something of a detailed explanation of the concept of sublation.284 The
first, found in the Phenomenology, demonstrates at least an initial complexity in the term.
“[Aufhebung] exhibits its true twofold meaning which we have seen in the negative: it is at
once a negating and a preserving.”285 Hegel’s second explicit description of sublation takes
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Though Moltmann has tapped into a materialist Hegelianism in theological construction, the ramifications
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Interpretation (PhD Diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2009). Although as yet unpublished, this
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place in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Here, Hegel maintained a focus
on the two-pronged understanding of sublation, and then went on to say,
This ambiguity in linguistic usage, through which the same word has a
negative and a positive meaning, cannot be regarded as an accident nor yet
as a reason to reproach language as if it were a source of confusion. We
ought rather to recognize here the speculative spirit of our language, which
transcends the ‘either-or’ of mere understanding.286
Moving beyond the oddity of having a single word with two potentially opposing
meanings, Hegel then began to point to the possibility that, in a philosophically important
way, both opposing meanings should, or perhaps must, be utilized simultaneously. This
became even more explicit in the two longer discussions of sublation in the Science of
Logic. “Thus what is sublated is at the same time preserved; it has only lost its immediacy
but is not on that account annihilated.”287
In the Science of Logic Hegel argued that sublation is “one of the most important
concepts in philosophy,”288 so it should be no surprise that Moltmann has taken up the
theme. Moltmann’s movement from Theology of Hope to The Crucified God is best
understood as a movement of sublation. While the Christian tradition has often celebrated
the crucifixion in ways which might seem very strange from the outside, and, indeed, even
from the inside,289 the frankness with which Moltmann addressed the concept-
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E.g., Mel Gibson’s 2004 film, The Passion of the Christ, was marketed specifically to pastors and Christian
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unqualifyingly embracing theopaschism,290 makes a theology of the cross much less
amenable to a theology of hope. The Crucified God was intended to move beyond a
theology whose content was the hope of creation, to a theology which looked first not at
the relationship of creation to God, but of God to Godself.
In The Crucified God Moltmann dedicated a great deal of time in seeking to
understand Jesus’ cry of dereliction, “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?”291
For Moltmann, this moment exists as a pinnacle for Christian theology. “Every theology
which claims to be Christian must come to terms with Jesus’ cry on the cross.”292 The cry
of dereliction is not merely poetic, nor a creative throwback to Hebrew scriptures, but a
moment of genuine existential angst293 – a glimpse into actual God-forsakenness and
demonstration of “enmity between God and God.”294 Using this moment as an example,
Moltmann had no qualms speaking about genuine God-forsakenness in the world.295 While
it would be easier to understand this ‘spiritually’- whatever one might actually mean by

Massacre – that thinks it’s an act of faith.” David Edelstein, “Jesus H. Christ: Mel Gibson’s Bloody Mess,”
Slate, February 24, 2004, accessed July 21, 2017,
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/movies/2004/02/jesus_h_christ.html.
Although, it is also the case that “He takes great pains to distinguish his theopaschitism from
patripassianism since the latter carries the stigma of heretical overtones.” Daniel Castelo, “Moltmann’s
Dismissal of Divine Impassibility: Warranted?,” Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 61, no. 4 (November,
2008): 403.
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Moltmann prioritizes Mark’s recounting of the cry of dereliction, and he “faults the Gospels of Luke and
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The Cry of Dereliction and the Trinity,” Colloquium, vol. 48, no. 2 (November, 2016): 133
293

294

Ibid., 152.

295

Moltmann’s theology demands that one “cries out with the godforsaken.” Ibid., 227.

102

that- or as a feeling rather than an empirical reality, to do so would be to reject the bodily
importance that Moltmann saw in this cry. In order to understand why the cry of dereliction
holds such an important place within The Crucified God, one should seek to interpret it as
an example of Moltmann’s sublative methodology. The cry of dereliction stands between
birth (hope) and crucifixion – a moment of utter despair.296 This despair is both the negation
and the preservation of the hope of resurrection.
The cry of dereliction, and in this case the entirety of The Crucified God, overcomes
the immediacy of Theology of Hope, but at the same time preserves the hope for newness
and possibility in the face of despair. The Crucified God, at its heart, spoke to an
“overcoming of the crucified hope.”297 That is to say, the very nature of Christian hope
always already contains within itself the negation of crucifixion, which is itself always
already open to the sublation of hope. This is not merely a repetitive cycle of A-B-A-B-AB, but rather what Deleuze, interpreting Nietzsche, has called, “Repetition in the eternal
return,” or, “Conceiving the same on the basis of the different.”298
Just as The Crucified God served to purify the concept of hope by tying it to the
reality of death – to both negate a too-easy conception of hope while preserving and
uplifting the possibility of hope in the face of despair – one might also see that his next

And this despair, of course, is embodied. “Jesus suffered his own particular suffering in human flesh…
[which] prevents us from speaking of a generic or theoretical or universal suffering experienced by Jesus
Christ.” Michael Jinkins and Stephen Breck Reid, “God’s Forsakenness: The Cry of Dereliction as an
Utterance Within the Trinity,” Horizons in Biblical Theology, vol. 19, no. 1 (June 1997): 41.
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1994), 41.
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major work, The Church in the Power of the Spirit stands as a sublation of The Crucified
God.299 Again, this sublation is not a rejection of the previous, but a way of bringing the
essential points into a sharper, more practical focus. Moltmann described the intention
behind The Church in the Power of the Spirit as, “To carry on theology in an ecumenical
context.”300 As a practice of two-fold sublation, this text further purifies a theology of hope
by sublating the individualism that often corresponds with considering one’s own mortality
through the crucifixion of Christ, and maintains and uplifts the hope of resurrection as a
practice which should be intentionally rooted in the life of the church.301 This intentionality
of community serves as a purification of hope by bringing an additional connection
between theology and the empirical world. Theology in community is inherently embodied
and is therefore the very sort of political theology which Moltmann has striven to practice.
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Of course, there were a number of smaller books that Moltmann wrote in the years between these first
three major texts. This outline of Moltmann’s thought is not intended to reject or entirely bypass those smaller
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that those works were ‘minor’ compared to this early ‘major’ trilogy. See, Jürgen Moltmann, The Church in
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Sӧlle helpfully reminded that even this focus on the church, or on the whole of creation, cannot be
separated from the actual lives of individuals. “The gospel has to do with freedom for all, or more precisely
– since the reality of oppression remains in the picture – its essence is the liberation of all.” Dorothee Sӧlle,
Political Theology, trans. John Shelley (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 67. What is here being critiqued
is not the idea of individual salvation or individual relationship with the resurrected Christ, but the failure to
connect the working out of one’s own salvation with the need for the redemption of all, including the
liberation from oppression of countless other individuals.
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The Crisis and Promise of History
While it is easy to point to the general trajectory of Moltmann’s thought and to see
that it is not accidentally dialectical,302 and particularly Hegelian at that, the thoughtful
reader of Moltmann can also see Hegel’s philosophy at work throughout the content of
Moltmann’s work as well in its structure.303 Perhaps the easiest example, and one of the
most important given the processive nature of Moltmann’s thought, can be seen in
Moltmann’s understanding of history.304 In some ways, it would be easy to overlook
‘history’ since it is not a classical theological category.305 Yet, because of the intense focus

Richard Gibb described that the “dialectical interpretation of the cross and resurrection of Christ, which
provides the hope of the eschatological transformation of the world, is the most significant controlling
theological idea in Moltmann’s early work and shapes his understanding of political theology.” Richard Gibb,
Grace and Global Justice: The Socio-Political Mission of the Church in an Age of Globalization (Eugene,
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2006), 67.
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openness to the other.” Henry Jansen, Relationality and the Concept of God (Atlanta: Rodopi, 1995), 113114.
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Theological Politics as Exemplified by Jürgen Moltmann and Stanley Hauerwas (Notre Dame: University of
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that Moltmann put on the classical theological categories of ‘Trinity’ and ‘Eschatology’,
history becomes an essential element toward crafting a description of both the internal life
of God in relation to Godself and the external life of God in relationship with creation. The
very notion of history is tied distinctively to the relationship between God and God’s
people.306 “Beneath the star of the promise of God it becomes possible to experience reality
as ‘history’. The stage for what can be experienced, remembered and expected as ‘history’
is set and filled, revealed and fashioned, by promise.”307 In Theology of Hope the concept
of history is deeply tied to God’s promises.308 History, as such, is imbued with meaning by
promise.309 Moltmann saw that it was divine promise which gave motion to history.310
If events are thus experienced within the horizon of remembered and
expected promises, then they are experienced as truly ‘historic’ events.
They do not have only the accidental, individual and relative character
which we normally ascribed to historic events…historic events within the

Even the inter-personal relationships among creation are likewise dependent. “Without access to God,
creation… can only repeat disaster in its own relationships.” J. Matthew Bonzo, Indwelling the Forsaken
Other: The Trinitarian Ethic of Jürgen Moltmann (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009), 7.
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Given how deeply indebted Moltmann is to the work of Ernst Bloch in many ways, this stands out as an
important moment of disagreement. For Bloch, “[For] the Lord’s own people…almost none of the promises
were kept. Instead there came the Assyrians, Medes and Persians, the Babylonian captivity, Antiochus
Epiphanes and the Romans, the destruction of the Temple, the razing of Jerusalem, and then, finally, the
dispersion among the nations.” Ernst Bloch, Atheism in Christianity (Brooklyn: Verso, 2009), 20. In ways
which differed from Moltmann, Bloch conceived of God as “a God who is not yet what he is: who is only in
the future of his promise-to-be.” Ibid., 81. Moltmann would not disagree about the socio-political description
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is much more developmental than the stereotypical Hellenistic unchanging God, his description of God does
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An excellent overview of the ways in which the concept of promise has influence Moltmann’s theology
can be found in Christopher Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann’s Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1979).
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horizon of promise and hope bear the mask of something that is still
outstanding, not yet finalized, not yet realized.311
Hegel’s influence can be felt very strongly here. In the Lectures on the Philosophy of World
History Hegel argued that ‘history’ as such is constituted by those specific moments and
movements which have brought about the continued purification of Geist.312
Problematically, Hegel used this understanding of history to reject the very possibility of
‘history’ as such among peoples from across the entire African continent.313 So, in
recognizing the ways in which this can go badly, one must be careful in describing precisely
what kind of movement sufficiently constitutes ‘history’ as such. Moltmann positively and
repeatedly cited Hegel in his discussions about history. In particular, Moltmann looked to
Hegel to describe how and why history is a participative process of movement more than
a passive study of objective past events.314 There are two concepts to which Moltmann
often returned in describing history as a theological concept: crisis and promise. The
importance of crisis for the movement and understanding of history goes back at least as
far as Augustine, 315 according to Moltmann, but has taken on an even more important
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“We can say that world history is the record of the spirit’s efforts to attain knowledge of what it is in
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merely a series of subjects who destroy one another.” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 183.
313

314
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Press, 2003), 17.
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meaning since the time of the French revolution. It is in times of crisis that “new
possibilities that were hitherto unknown and unsuspected begin to dawn on the horizon.”316
‘Crisis’ is only the first half of Moltmann’s philosophy of history. The second half,
‘Promise’, is decidedly theological, and so grounds history within a particular conception
of, and relationship with, God. A Christian philosophy of history begins with the
acknowledgement of political crises, and moves forward toward their resolution based
upon the promises of God for a future in which God will be all-in-all, in which justice
reigns throughout the land, in which the defining characteristic of history is love, not
fear.317 Thus, a Christian philosophy of history seeks to enact a better future in the present
because of the divine promises of the past.318 “The peculiarity of Christian theology can be
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happenings of the world in a meaningful way. If, as Badiou suggests, an ‘event’ is so rare that perhaps
resurrection is the only truly Christian ‘event’, then the notion that ‘events’ are the building blocks of a
philosophy of history would be a non-starter.
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Hegel can serve as a natural lead-in to this sort of developing Christian philosophy of history insofar as
“[his] first original philosophy might be called a ‘Pantheism of Love’.” Kroner, 11.
Pannenberg made a similar claim, “Within a reality characterized by the constantly creative work of God,
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defined as follows: Christian theology speaks of God historically and of history
eschatologically.”319 Theology begins by looking backward.
It speaks of the ‘God of the exodus’… and of the ‘God who raised Jesus
from the dead’… and unites with faith in God the memory of historical
events. The hermeneutical starting point of Christian theology is therefore
the concrete history witnessed to in both the Old and New Testaments.320
Though, as Moltmann notes, a theology of history should be particularly interested in the
Hebrew Bible as the starting point of the story of God’s relationship with creation. The
New Testament serves as a continuing example of God’s promise(s), but the stories of the
New Testament, looked at through an historical lens, should be viewed as continuations of
the promises God made to Israel, rather than through the distinctively Hellenistic lens
evident in the cultures surrounding the early church. History, viewed eschatologically, is
found “not [in] the Greek logos, but the promise which has stamped the language, the hope
and the experience of Israel. It was not in the logos of the epiphany of the eternal present,
but in the hope-giving word of promise that Israel found God’s truth.”321 By recognizing
the priority of the early promises of God to Israel, Moltmann was acting to reject a theology
which sees eschatology as “concerned merely with the final, closing events of history.”322
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In rooting the concept of history in the twofold dynamic of crisis and promise, and
then by further rooting the concept of promise to the Hebrew narrative of the relationship
between God and Israel, Moltmann has illustrated what he sees to be the movement of
history.323 Moltmann rejects any study which would evidence “the positivist, materialist
reduction of history to the level of past facts and times that have gone.”324 The narrative of
an historical journey transcends this sort of reductionism because it shows history to be a
dynamic process which connects the past, present, and future into a redemptive movement
through the promises and presence of God.325

Hegel on History
Moltmann demonstrated rather explicitly that there is a distinctive dialectical nature
to his thought, and that this dialectical nature owes a great deal to Hegel. Yet, Moltmann’s
work was never intended to be a direct continuation of Hegel, nor purely Hegelian in form
and content. So, while the influence of Hegel is important to recognize, one ought also to
see the points at which Moltmann departs from Hegel. In this instance, the insistence that
the primary moving forces of theological history are crisis and promise adds an element of
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contrast from Hegel, particularly in Hegel’s intentionally theological writings. In
discussing Hegel’s view of theological history, David Nirenberg stated,
The targets of dialectical teleology are moveable, and it makes a great deal
of difference where one places them. If in a genealogy it is the point of
origin that is the crucial choice… the choice that matters for dialectical
teleology are what contraries to recognize as significant and where to locate
their overcoming.326
While we will be moving more directly into a discussion of Moltmann’s teleological
eschatology in the next chapter, for present purposes, it is the description of ‘genealogy’
that is important here.327 If Nirenberg is correct, and the point of origin is foundational to
the movement of a historical genealogy, then it is noteworthy that Moltmann chose to begin
his genealogy of Christianity at a different point than Hegel.
In Hegel’s early theological writing, he claimed that the beginning of the history of
Christianity, was Abraham, “The true progenitor of the Jews.”328 With Abraham, Hegel
said, ‘The history of this people begins, i.e. his spirit is the unity, the soul, regulating the
entire fate of his posterity.”329 Notice here that Hegel explicitly tied the idea of Abraham
as the beginning of the Jewish people with the ‘fate’ of their telos. Hegel implied, in a way
that would be picked up explicitly by Moltmann, that to understand the beginning of (in
this case) a community is to already begin to have a strong idea toward what telos such a
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community is moving. Both Hegel and Moltmann would agree with Nirenberg that the
particular ‘contraries’ which are encountered or chosen also seek to shape teleological
movement. Hegel and Moltmann nevertheless approached teleological history
differently.330 Hegel famously said, “The owl of Minerva begins its flight only with the
onset of dusk,”331 a poetic turn-of-phrase which is generally taken to mean that
philosophical wisdom is most clearly accessible from ‘the end’, or ‘an end’, looking
backward. Hegel, standing at dusk, pointed to Abraham as the beginning of Jewish history
because he naturally saw the trajectory that this particular history had taken. Moltmann, on
the other hand, although likewise situated at dusk, repeatedly affirmed that history should
be considered primarily as a forward-looking enterprise. “The real category of history is
no longer the past and the transient, but the future.”332 As such, Moltmann upended the
typically linear timeline of history in such a way that the focus is not merely on the process,
but on an openness toward future possibilities.333 History is not merely the study of how
we got to where we are, but simultaneously the quest to get where we want to be. A helpful

One might see in Hegel’s genealogical method a glimpse of that which would later be developed by
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way in which Hegel described this quest is in terms of the movement through ‘being’ and
‘nothing’ (as sublation) to ‘becoming’ what we already are.

Being-Nothing-Becoming
Because Moltmann’s future-oriented history is rooted deeply in Hegel’s dialectical
description of Being-Nothing-Becoming, it will be helpful to first describe this process
within Hegelian language. Hegel described ‘Being’ as such, “In its indeterminate
immediacy it is equal only to itself…It has no diversity within itself, nor any with a
reference outwards…There is nothing to be intuited in it… Being, the indeterminate
immediate, is in fact nothing, and neither more nor less than nothing.”334 Hegel made it
very clear, here, that the first and second movements of dialectic, Being and Nothing, are
actually much more closely related than they are complete opposites. The second
movement of dialectic is not ‘antithesis’. The second movement is, in some form, an
overcoming, but it is not a simple reversal.
Hegel described this second movement, ‘Nothing’, in this way, “Nothing, pure
nothing…is simply equality with itself, complex emptiness, absence of all determination
and content—undifferentiatedness in itself.”335 At face value, this brief description of
‘Nothing’ sounds very similar to the previous description of ‘Being’.336 Hegel continued:
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Houlgate described, “Hegel’s opening analysis of being and nothing is quite simple: pure being is so
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In so far as intuiting or thinking can be mentioned here, it counts as a
distinction whether something or nothing is intuited or thought. To intuit or
think nothing has, therefore, a meaning; both are distinguished and thus
nothing is in our intuiting or thinking. Nothing is, therefore, the same
determination, or rather absence of determination, and thus altogether the
same as, pure being.337
Of course, it should be no surprise that when Hegel said that ‘nothing’ is “altogether the
same as” ‘being’, this does not mean that there is no distinction or differentiation between
the terms. According to Hegel, “It is equally true that they are not undistinguished from
each other, that, on the contrary, they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct,
and yet that they are unseparated and inseparable.”338 The key to understanding this
variation on the dialectic is to see that there is no synthesis of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’. The
dialectical movement does not seek synthesis, and, indeed, could never achieve synthesis
anyway. The fact that the first two dialectical movements ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ are
distinct yet inseparable,339 is evidence that the Hegelian system should not be considered a
purely positive and progressive forward-marching movement. Even in those times when
Hegel speaks of the progression of history in such a way, it is only from the present, looking
backward, that such a claim could be made.340 Speaking of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’, Hegel
said, “Their truth is, therefore, this movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the
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other: becoming, a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which
has equally immediately resolved itself.”341
The first movement of dialectic is not merely overcome by its direct opposite, but
is transformed by a difference which was always already present even in the initial
movement itself. A thesis is not transformed by means of its antithesis, but by an internal
and pre-existent ‘nothing’. This ‘nothing’ is not a particular ‘nothing’, which relates
directly to a specific ‘something’. Rather, “Nothing is to be taken in its indeterminate
simplicity.”342 The ‘nothing’ which transforms ‘being’ is not open to the question, “Which
nothing?” It is not the nothing of a particular something. ‘Nothing’, that is, is not merely
the opposite of any particular form of ‘being’. According to Hegel,
We are concerned first of all not with the form of opposition (with the form,
that is, also of relation) but with the abstract, immediate negation: nothing,
purely on its own account, negation devoid of any relations—what could
also be expressed if one so wished merely by (the word) ‘not’.343
A particular ‘nothing’ which is the inversion of a particular ‘something’ is not what Hegel
is after here. Yet, he also sees that both ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ are but moments of
‘Becoming’ insofar as their present and continuous movement is to vanish into one
another.344
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‘Becoming’, then, as the third dialectical movement is not merely the unity of
‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’, and certainly not if these are abstracted from themselves. Much less
is ‘Becoming’ a synthesis of the two. To the contrary, ‘Becoming’ is “the determinate unity
in which there is both being and nothing.”345 Both exist “in this unity, but only as vanishing,
sublated moments.”346 Insofar as both are vanishing sublated moments, both ‘Being’ and
‘Nothing’ are themselves unities of being and nothing.347 “The one is being as immediate
and as relation to nothing, and the other is nothing as immediate and as relation to being.”348
Both ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ differ in focus, and in direction, but, “both are the same,
becoming, and although they differ so in direction, they interpenetrate and paralyse each
other.”349 Both ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ are part and parcel of ‘Becoming’. Yet, it is also true
that the relationship between ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ is not one of reciprocity. It is not only
that ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ as external movements come together in a process of
‘Becoming’. “The one does not sublate the other externally—but each sublates itself in
itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.” 350
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Not surprisingly, given the complexity of Hegel’s thought and of Hegel’s writing,
the concept of 'dialectic’ is never just one thing.351 Moltmann’s theology of history has
been demonstrably influenced by this particular variation on dialectic. ‘Becoming’ the third
movement of this dialectic, is not a completed state. Becoming is an active verb even as it
is used as a noun: the description of an idea or a subject in flux. The process of becoming,
this internal self-sublation of ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ is not mere transitoriness, but in some
sense settles into a stable unity of change.352 Although he was not directly referring to
Hegel, and would be uncomfortable with the analogy, this idea is very similar to Deleuze’s
concept of “chaosmos.”353 The value of using a term like ‘chaosmos’ in this manner, would
be to demonstrate that change itself, becoming in motion, is not a particular event, but the
status quo by which history moves.
This discussion of being-nothing-becoming describes in Hegelian terms the reality
of change – the rejection of staticity. Returning to Moltmann’s language, with the caveat
that this reality of change be understood in empirical terms, we can reconsider Moltmann’s
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discussion of ‘crisis and promise’ with a particular focus on God, the source of the promise,
as a force of historical movement.

The God Who Promises
Moltmann’s philosophy of history demonstrates a keen understanding of the beingnothing-becoming dialectical triad. However, by attempting to shift the historical
orientation from rearward to forward, and by describing the movement of history in terms
of crisis and promise, Moltmann demonstrated an openness to the future that is at least less
explicit in Hegel, or perhaps missing entirely.354 By claiming that Christian history began
with Abraham, Hegel demonstrated that his understanding of Christian history is based
upon a certain promise – that Abraham would be made into a great nation.
Moltmann, on the other hand, by recognizing the beginning of Christian history
well prior to the time of Abraham, demonstrated that it is not God’s promise to Abraham
by which Judeo-Christian history is defined, but rather the God who promises.355 Hegel’s
concern is the becoming-person, while Moltmann’s is the becoming-people. God’s
promises pre-date Abraham, and so the knowledge of God’s character as One who
promises is likewise established before that time. This recognition of the promising God
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who offers hope in the face of crisis opens up history beyond the confines of an individual’s
comprehension. In the face of crisis, any given individual might not have hope for
immediate satisfaction. One cannot simply wait for negation, or the negation of negation,
but rather must move forward in hopeful anticipation of the future which has been
promised. A theology of hope is not naïve, nor does it merely sit and wait for a postponed
fulfilment of desires. Rather, a theology of hope is described by a history which proclaims
righteousness and justice for all of creation, based upon the promises of God, and then
seeks to enliven the sparks of righteousness and justice throughout the world. History does
not, from the end, proclaim that all people will bodily see the kingdom of God. Rather,
history, as a history of the future, sees from the present that “every past was once present,
and existed in its own projects for the future. Every present has come into being out of the
fulfilled and thwarted dawning and dying hopes for the future cherished by those who are
gone.”356 History, as present-future357 remains open to the possibilities of the yet-to-come.
Moltmann waffled on whether the teleological future upon which the past of history
comes to be known should be spoken of as guaranteed or genuinely open.358 Yet, those
points when he has written about the openness of the future seem to be a better fit for a
world in need of redemption.359 If theology is a practice of the enactment of redemption,
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as Moltmann frequently describes, then his frequent comments about the openness of the
future ought to be taken seriously.360 For a political theology which has at its heart the
desire to see real change, both internally and externally, the history of the past and present
is still being written by the openness of the future. The future, one can imagine, is
guaranteed by hope, but only insofar as hope is enacted and enfleshed.
Where hope does not find its way to the source of new, unknown
possibilities, there the trifling, ironical play with the existing possibilities
ends in boredom, or in outbreaks of absurdity… [Hope] does not take things
as they happen to stand or to lie, but as progressing, moving things with
possibilities of change.361
With an introduction to the structure of Moltmann’s work and some of his Hegelian
influence, it is now possible to move forward with a deeper exploration of one of
Moltmann’s key areas of focus: creation. If the world is to be saved, in any and every
possible sense of the word, for Moltmann, ‘creation’ is where this discussion must turn.

Margaret Adam saw the potential closing of the future as Moltmann’s departure from Bloch. “[There is a
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CHAPTER 4: TRINITARIAN CREATION – EVERYTHING OLD IS NEW
AGAIN
“Most people now are looking for a better place, which means that a lot of them will end
up in a worse one… There is no better place than this, not in this world. And it is by the
place we’ve got, and our love for it, and our keeping of it, that this world is joined with
heaven.”362 – Hannah Coulter
Now having an understanding of the ways in which Hegel’s philosophy of history,
and Hegel’s dialectical philosophy more generally, have impacted Moltmann’s theology
of hope, we are led to a deeper exploration of Moltmann’s doctrine of creation. For a
theology of hope which is looking forward while finding rooting in the divine promises of
the past, the continuous interplay of past-present-future, like the Hegelian interplay of
being-nothing-becoming, two of the most impactful philosophical notions are ‘beginning’
and ‘ending’. In distinctively theological terms, the same level of complication is evident
in discussions of ‘creation’ and ‘eschatology’. The evident difficulty lies in the fact that a
dialectic of becoming – an apparently processive if not also progressive movement – seems
to be always erupting from within a pre-established fluidity of self/notion/proposition. The
‘Philosophy 101’ recounting of Hegel’s dialectic(s) in terms of thesis-antithesis-synthesis
is profoundly misleading for this very reason.363 Dialectic never begins with a single
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standalone thesis, but rather arises from within an already complicated situation which was
itself dialectically composed.
Moltmann, with political and theological motives that differ from the
phenomenological/epistemological motives demonstrated by Hegel, demonstrates less of a
problem with the question of a beginning. Theologically, although not anthropologically
or geologically, Moltmann is content to posit something like a traditional Christian notion
of divine creation as ‘the beginning’. By making such a concession Moltmann in no way
does away with the very valid question of existence, whether divine or secular, prior to this
assumed ‘beginning’. Yet, Moltmann, effectively for his purposes, rejected that such a
question was relevant to his particular task.364 Hegel, to the contrary, could make no such
rejection insofar as his general project was explicitly a response to the transcendental
philosophy of Kant.365 As such, Hegel was in no position to arbitrarily block off a
potentially foundational movement of history. Hegel’s insistence on the science of a
system, in notable contrast to Moltmann’s general uncomfortability with system, could not
allow an unsupported ‘beginning’. Yet, because of the dialectical nature of Hegel’s
thought, neither was he able to directly define any sort of ‘beginning’, whether of time, of

Modern Thought (Lexington: Emeth, 2005), 109. Although beyond the bounds of this project, Wood’s
argument regarding ‘theodicy of history’ is an enlightening take on Hegel.
Roger Olson described this as a radical historicizing of the life of God through which “historical events
become determinative of God’s eternal being.” Roger Olson, “Trinity and Eschatology: The Historical Being
of God in Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Scottish Journal of Theology, vol. 36, iss. 2 (May,
1983): 217.
364

See e.g., Sally Sedgwick, Hegel’s Critique of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2012). Sedgwick’s goal with this text was to dispel what she calls the ‘traditional view’ that
Hegel was not a particularly thoughtful reader of Kant. Sedgwick makes a compelling case throughout that
not only was Hegel a careful reader of Kant, but that even non-referentially Hegel’s philosophy was often
an intentional reaction or response to the recognized importance of Kant’s Copernican Revolution.
365

122

a person, or even of philosophy itself.366 He recognized both the importance and difficulty
of seeking a ‘beginning’. “To want the nature of cognition clarified prior to the science is
to demand that it be considered outside the science; outside the science this cannot be
accomplished, at least not in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in
place.”367
As discussed previously, Hegel viewed philosophy as a practice that always took
place within a given situatedness. Paul Ashton rightly recognized, “There is no doubt that
Hegel is rejecting a kind of meta-philosophical perspective, that there exists some space
outside of, or for that matter within, philosophy from which to clarify what philosophy
is.”368 It is not, however, the case that epistemology is thus entirely outside the bounds of
the philosophical endeavor. A great deal of Hegel’s thought went into exactly this project,
but he made it clear that one cannot hope to examine the movement of knowledge – in this
particular case, although the same argument could be made ontologically or historically as
well – from outside the process from which knowledge comes to be. Insofar as Hegel’s
struggle with ‘beginning’ can be dealt with directly, it has been described well
elsewhere.369 For the purposes here, the more important question is not whether one could
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offer a purified description of Hegel’s ‘beginning’, but rather how Moltmann has
interpreted and utilized Hegel’s work to speak about a beginning.
In theological terms the concept of ‘beginning’ is almost always tied explicitly to a
doctrine of creation. This is as true for Moltmann as it is for others. Yet, it will soon become
clear that Moltmann’s doctrine of creation is intentionally and explicitly not only tied to
the idea of a beginning but likewise to the idea of an ending. This unusual tendency in
describing creation is closely tied to the idea of hope. One might see here a chicken/egg
question as to whether there exists, in either direction, a causal connection between creation
and hope. Whether or not one sees a sort of ontological primacy one way or the other, both
are part of a self-informative cycle.370 Both history and hope are moved by promise, and,
at least for Moltmann, it seems that promise is tied in a very important way to creation.
Indeed, because ‘creation’ is seen in both the beginning and the end, it holds an important
role in mediating between the past and the future by transforming the present into the
promised future of hope.371 In this movement of becoming, Moltmann has learned a great
deal from Hegel. Ashton described the transformative capacity inherent to Hegel’s world:
For Hegel the world will change to fully embrace the reality of freedom not
because we can think how to change the world… but because the event of
speculative thinking expresses the changeability of the world itself… It
follows that the world must have already changed in order for its
changeability to be embraced by speculative philosophy, and that

In discussing Ricoeur’s influence on Moltmann’s theology of hope Rebecca Huskey well-described this
cycle, “The promise of the coming Christ points us away from the promise itself, orienting us towards the
future and giving us a sense of history, a sense of something new which is to come.” Rebecca Kathleen
Huskey, Paul Ricoeur on Hope: Expecting the Good (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2009), 38.
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philosophy as post-revolutionary can be understood as a recollection of this
embracing.372
The mediating role held by Moltmann’s doctrine of creation is evident throughout his
political theology. That the term ‘creation’ encompasses more than ‘the beginning’ of
history is tied to Hegel’s understanding of the becoming of Geist. This processive
understanding of becoming demonstrates an important caveat to the doctrine of creation.
Namely, creation ‘in the beginning’ should not be understood as complete, but as already
enmeshed in the dialectical process of becoming. The narratives of creation found in
Genesis should not, therefore, be read in terms of primordial perfection, as a goal to which
we hope to return. Rather, I will argue, creation is best described in terms of ‘tragedy’, an
existence in which brokenness is inherent, and for which redemption beckons.373

The Tragic Politics of Creation
To speak of creation, particularly when ‘creation’ refers not only to beginnings, is
necessarily to speak about the order of the world – the way things are, and ideally is also
to speak about the way things ought to be. Learning from Hegel, Moltmann’s doctrine of
creation is built upon the notion that “[theology] as post-revolutionary can be understood
as a recollection” of the embrace of the changeability of the world.374 Although one might
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look at a work like God in Creation and see that one of Moltmann’s primary ethical
concerns is ecological, the politics of creation run much broader than simple environmental
concern.375 In order to understand why the doctrine of creation is itself a politico-ethical
mandate, Moltmann’s doctrine of creation will here be explored through the lens of
tragedy.376
Moltmann’s doctrine of creation is rooted much more deeply than a re-telling or
interpretation of the creation stories of Genesis. Rather, Moltmann’s understanding of
creation is interwoven with real-world political issues.377 The continued degradation of
creation is one of these political real-world issues, but Moltmann saw that it is but one part
of a much larger tapestry of brokenness. Moltmann made this clear when he said,
The natural environment of human beings cannot be understood apart from
the social environment. The processes which intervene destructively in the
natural environment originate in the economic and the social processes. So

Yet, even these other political concerns cannot be removed from the ecological. “Primarily, the ecological
concept of space may be seen as the intersection of social and moral space where creation is enabled to
flourish by the Spirit and thus become what God desires for it.” Timothy Harvie, Jürgen Moltmann’s Ethics
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if the destruction of nature is to be halted, the economic and social
conditions of human society must be changed.378
Any meaningful doctrine of creation must account for the present reality of these economic
and social processes just as carefully as it considers the origins of the universe. It is from
within this intertwining of promise, hope, and brokenness that Moltmann’s doctrine of
creation originated.
Moltmann’s theology is decidedly political because he understood from early on
that we live in a tragic world.379 As the classical questions of theodicy remind, we live in a
world of natural disasters, a world in which children die, a world of hunger, violence, and
sorrow.380 Far too often in the history of the Christian church, theologians, both
professional and lay, have been all to ready to set aside the tragic reality of the present in
favor of a focus on the otherworldly blessedness of the afterlife.381 The church has read
“Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven,”382 to mean, ‘Do not be
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concerned about your present situation, because the worse things are for you now, the better
they will be in the eternal future’. The church has sung songs with lyrics such as, “Let us
then be true and faithful, trusting, serving every day; just one glimpse of Him in glory, will
the toils of life repay.”383 When hearing such lyrics, one should be immediately struck by
how clearly discounted is the present.384 Living well, being true and faithful, is a toil in
need of repayment. Such Christian beliefs and practices have served to negate the
importance of the here-and-now, of life as we actually know it.385 Just as hope must be
understood through crucifixion, so too must eschatology be viewed through the brokenness
of creation.386 As part of a dialectical movement, negation must always be embraced.
To better understand how one might theologically speak about creation as tragic,
rather than seeing the stories of Genesis as proof of a primordial perfection, a brief interlude

Eliza E. Hewitt, “When We All Get To Heaven,” in Worship in Song Hymnal (Kansas City: Lillenas
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from Hegel is in order.387 An area of Hegel’s thought which has not yet been explored here
is that of aesthetics.388 In the Lectures on Fine Art, Hegel’s treatment of Hamlet can be
used as an entryway into what it might mean to speak of a tragic creation. 389 Hamlet is of
particular interest because it will help to elucidate the literary aspect of the term ‘tragedy’
while also serving as a point of distinction against which the word can be further nuanced.
Looked at from the outside, Hamlet's death seems to be brought about
accidentally ... but death lay from the beginning in the back of Hamlet’s
mind. The sands of time do not content him. In his melancholy and
weakness, his worry, his disgust at all the affairs of life, we sense from the
start… he is a lost man, almost consumed already by inner disgust before
death comes to him from outside.390
Hegel, interpreted theologically, seemed to understand original sin existentially, as
a primordial discontent.391 Death is not the accident of one man’s actions, but a simple
reality of the world. This would be in-line with the first Genesis story of creation which
describes the conflict between ordered life and cosmically disordered chaos. Creation, in
this first story, is less about the giving of life than it is about creating an ordered cosmos in

For an example of how Hegel’s philosophy can be used to speak theologically about the inherent
brokenness of creation see, John M. Bechtold, “On Becoming What We Are: A Hegelian Interpretation of
Eucharistic Embodiment,” in This is my Body: Philosophical Reflections on Embodiment in a Wesleyan
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which life can exist.392 Life, here, is not antithetical to death, but to chaos. Creation is an
act of structuring, of working in and against chaos, not in order that chaos will be overcome,
but that chaos will be kept at bay. Here, life is the intruder; an intruder who, at best, hopes
to carve out a small place for its own existence. 393 It is this understanding of the world as
creation that Hegel seems to see in the story of the Danish prince. The ‘sands of time’ lie
beside and under a vast ocean. The sandbank is in constant danger of being acted upon by
an external force. It is always in peril of being transformed, overcome, or destroyed. The
sands of time lie solely at the mercy of the vast multiplicity of the unknown. Life could, at
any moment and without reason, simply be swept away. Yet, it would be too blasé to simply
say that the fleetingness of life is what makes for a tragic world. Following the first story
of creation found in Genesis, generally speaking, a death might well be sad, but death itself
is hardly tragic.394
Tragedy, for Hegel, can only exist in the interplay of death and life, in the
paradoxical conflict that is simultaneously living and dying. The world is tragic not because
either life or death could become a victor, but precisely because no victory can be
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achieved.395 One might rightly point out that, barring a conception of subjective
immortality, death appears to be the negation of life. Yet, if Hegel is correct, if death has
lurked from the beginning, then one must also cede that life itself is the negation of death.
Tragedy exists in the necessary embrace of both life and death.396 Unlike the tragic heroes
of the Greeks, Hegel argued that ‘modern’ tragedy is found in a subject’s constantly
becoming object to itself. Should the subject choose a single-minded embrace only of life,
the subject would cease to be a subject, and would simply be-in-itself. Unlike with the
Greeks, tragedy is not found in the fear of an external fate, but in the true subject’s inability
to be single-minded. A tragic world is not merely a world in which fate’s coin has always
already been flipped, but a world in which one must simultaneously embrace both possible
outcomes of the flip. Heads – tails, life – death, all are embraced.397 Hegel reminds us that
even before death, Hamlet had already become consumed by inner disgust. Hamlet’s death
was not brought about accidentally. Hamlet’s death had been developing throughout his

Terry Pinkard described Hegel’s understanding of tragedy in these terms, “We must be, he says,
‘amphibians’ who now live in two worlds: a world of contingency that does not seem to bend in an arc
towards justice and a world of absolute commitments and a kind of pledge to the equal worth of all… The
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Religion: Hegelian Thoughts,” in Tragedy and the Idea of Modernity, eds. Joshua Billings and Miriam
Leonard (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 156.
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life. Hamlet had to die, but the reality is that Hamlet had been dying all along. Hamlet’s
story is tragic because it takes place in the borderlands between life and death, in the place
in which both death and life are to be valued and embraced.
This initial description of the concept of tragedy has been intended to serve two
primary purposes. First, Hegel’s notion of the mutual embrace of death and life is essential
to understanding Moltmann’s focus on a theology of the cross. Second, by initially rooting
Moltmann’s doctrine of creation within a theological understanding of tragedy, thereby
rooting it to his early theology of the cross, it will be possible, moving forward, to describe
the ongoing existence of the tragic in terms of the history of God; that is, to argue that the
life of God can never be removed from the realities of suffering in the world.

Constructing a Doctrine of Creation from Within
This is the sort of ‘tragic creation’ which is described in the work of Moltmann:
Tragedy does not mean that the world is ‘bad’, but that there exists a complexity of
brokenness which has lurked from the beginning. This complexity of brokenness ties the
Creator God to the history of the world. To properly describe how Moltmann’s doctrine of
creation can be understood as tragic, at least partially or initially as distinct from Hegel,
there are two primary guiding principles that can be seen in Moltmann’s methodology. The
first guiding principle is epistemological. As Hegel began his system of philosophy with
the notion of phenomenology, likewise Moltmann contended that all “knowledge of nature
as God’s creation is participating knowledge.”398 Such a claim is obviously theological as
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much as it is ‘purely’ epistemological, for it demonstrates that the primary focus is not
something that is transcendental in the way of Hegel’s ‘Notion’, rather something that is
universal by grace, not by nature.399 By this Moltmann meant that nothing that exists can
be known apart from its interrelationships, its surroundings, and its connections with all
else.400 This is again a reminder of the situatedness from which theology arises and in which
theology is grounded. But, it is also just as much a movement toward understanding the
correlation between human suffering and divine suffering, or, as Moltmann described,
“Outward (divine) acts correspond to inward suffering, and outward suffering corresponds
to inward acts.”401
A second guiding principle for Moltmann’s doctrine of creation is that “The sabbath
is the true hallmark of every biblical doctrine of creation,”402 and all creation is moving
toward an eschatological sabbath rest. This principle offers at least two concepts that are
important to Moltmann. First, the notion of sabbath itself holds a primary place in
Moltmann’s thought.403 Eschatology, the looking forward to the continuance of God’s
creative activity, is not best described geographically by saintly mansions and streets of
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gold. Rather, the focus on sabbath ties eschatology again to creation. Whatever it is that
eschatology has to offer the theological task must be distinctively of the empirical world.404
Sabbath only makes sense in the context of the physicality of creation because the concept
itself resists the possibility of being understood non-contextually. Sabbath is ‘the hallmark’
of a biblical description of creation, but as such remains merely one part of a larger cycle.
Moltmann did not describe either the concept of sabbath or the practice of Sabbath keeping
as the pinnacle of creation, nor, more importantly as the goal of creation. Rather, in the
original text, Moltmann called it the “Kennzeichen des Verständnisses,”405 or a ‘feature of
the understanding’. Creation cannot be defined by Sabbath, but neither can it be understood
apart from Sabbath.
In order to understand how Sabbath helps to describe creation, it is necessary to
first understand that, for Moltmann, it is not a person or place which is hallowed, but a
time. “One might say that the sanctification of any creature or space would be particular,
whereas the sanctification of the sabbath benefits all created things… that is to say, it is
universal.”406 The hallowing of a time – the making universal of what might otherwise
seem to be a particular blessing of Israel – is a foreshadowing of Paul’s claim that “there
is no longer Jew nor Greek, there is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male or
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female.”407 Because this original Sabbath day calls from the past for repetition into the
present, this act of sanctification stretches across all of physicality.408 “If what is sanctified
is a time and not a special domain, a mountain or a place, the result is a curious view of the
world’ for the world is then viewed predominantly in terms of time, in events and sequences
of events, in generations and histories, not in spaces and regions.”409 That sabbath serves
as the hallmark to understanding creation demonstrates again Moltmann’s reliance on
something like Hegel’s description of dialectic in terms of being-nothing-becoming. Being,
even the very being of creation, is best described in terms of movement, not of static
unicity. It is not the particularities of the physical world which are sanctified, but the
possibilities of becoming that always already exist in the tangible. Creation, both as that
which ‘is’ and as a descriptor of an ongoing relationship between God and all that is notGod, is sanctified in its movement toward what could be, not as it exists in any given
present.
The doctrine of creation, with sabbath as the hallmark for its understanding, thus
needs not to be crafted with the nostalgia for a non-existent primordial perfection.410 This
is particularly important for those, like Moltmann, who would reject any kind of biblical
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literalism, particularly with reference to the creation stories of Genesis. So long as one
ascribes no literality to the earliest stories of Genesis it becomes all but impossible to
conceptualize the historical plausibility of something like ‘The Fall’ in which the
potentiality for sin is for the first time made manifest by a singular creature thereby
spreading brokenness across all of the physical world.411 If time itself, or at least the
movement of something that is experienced in temporal terms by a thinking creature, is
that which is explicitly hallowed in creation, then the doctrine of creation itself becomes
an ethical imperative. Moreover, through the sanctifying of time, God demonstrates an
entrance into the temporal history of creation. This temporal history, moving forward, will
be described in terms of God’s creative self-withdrawal, or zimsum.

Mortality, Zimsum, and the Distance of God
To describe God’s entrance into the temporal history of creation, it will first be
necessary to describe God as distinct from that temporality. Likewise, if the Creator God
is the giver of life, one must look to the reality of death in terms of God’s absence, and to
consider what it means to embrace both life and death through the cross of Christ. The
Jewish philosopher Hans Jonas, a Jewish student of the then soon-to-be Nazi Heidegger,412
Although Moltmann has not published an explicit rejection of a theology of ‘The Fall’, numerous
commentators have noted Moltmann’s tendency away from rooting creation, eschatology, or even
hamartiology in such a concept. E.g., John David Jaeger described, “Rather than envisioning a perfect
creation and then questioning why things went so wrong, he viewed creation as an ongoing event being
molded out of chaos. This process involved openness to nothingness and risk of flaws and evil developing in
creation.” John David Jaeger, “Jürgen Moltmann and the Problem of Evil,” The Asbury Theological Journal,
vol. 53, no. 2 (Fall, 1998): 8.
411
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understood what it might mean to live in a space in which both life and death are to be
embraced, and to live in a space in which both life and death are valued, each by the
embrace of the other. Jonas set up this in-between space in his book, Mortality and
Morality.413 While Jonas himself did not offer any sort of meaningful discussion of
tragedy- literarily, philosophically, or otherwise- an interesting aspect of his philosophy is
that his thought is grounded in an understanding of the world as creation. Jonas was
forthright about his desire to practice a humanistic secular philosophy, but in the process
of doing so he often returned to the language and ideas of his Jewish heritage.414
The creation story which Jonas told is influenced by the biblical accounts of
creation from Genesis. Jonas’ story is also heavily influenced by the Jewish mystic Isaac
Luria and his conception of creation through zimsum.415 In Jonas’s account, zimsum refers
to a primordial moment of divine self-contraction.416 Simply put, zimsum is meant to

reference the work of Jonas. See, e.g., Jürgen Moltmann, God for a Secular Society: The Public Relevance
of Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 277, for Moltmann crediting Jonas with
being the first to bring together an understanding of zimsum with evolutionary thought; The Living God, 45,
where Moltmann cites Jonas to discuss love as the motivation for God’s self-restriction; or Ethics of Hope,
240, where Moltmann cites Jonas unfavorably as having developed an ethics of fear rather than an ethics of
hope.
413

Hans Jonas, Mortality and Morality: A Search for Good After Auschwitz, ed. Lawrence Vogel (Evanston,
Northwestern University Press, 1996). If one is familiar with Jonas’ own biography, the paradox of this dual
embrace is evident. Jonas’ mother was one of the many victims of the Shoah. Her murder by the Nazis serves
as a demonstration of precisely why mortality can, at times, be a terrible burden. Indeed, her death was tragic,
not because it was the result of a cruel trick of fate, but rather because it was a demonstration of an imbalance,
of the valuation of death over that of life.
For a deeper discussion see, Ron Margolin, “Hans Jonas and Secular Religiosity,” in The Legacy of Hans
Jonas: Judaism and the Phenomenon of Life, eds. Hava Tirosh-Samuelson and Christian Wiese (Boston:
Brill Academic, 2008), 231-258.
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Luria’s conception of zimsum was popularized in Gershom Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism
(New York: Schocken, 1974), 260-265.
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Luria was explicit that zimsum “does not mean the concentration of God at a point, but his retreat away
from a point,” a distinction upon which Jonas did not focus. Scholem, 260.
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describe how a God which is ‘all-in-all’ can create anything at all which is not-God, an
Other. Within the general Judeo-Christian understandings of creation, it is necessary that
creation itself be an other in order to avoid some form of pantheism. According to zimsum
this occurs when the all-in-all God constricts God’s own presence, withdraws into Godself,
and allows a space in which creation can occur.
Zimsum is a means by which to speak of genuine relationship between creation and
divine without conflating the two. According to this story, God and not-God can only be
in genuine relationship so long as there is a clear line of demarcation, so long as each is
seen to be an independent subject capable of encountering another independent subject
face-to-face. This conception of zimsum serves the theological purpose of describing the
existence of genuine free will among the created (at the very least among that portion of
the created which can be addressed as ‘thou’).
While Hegel has no reference to anything like zimsum, his influence on Jonas, like
a great many other thinkers, is evident.417 For the purposes of this chapter, the claim that
the world is a world of tragedy, moving beyond Hegel, is a claim based upon an
understanding of creation through zimsum. When the act of creation is conceived as a
movement of differentiation, it can be that the world is ‘good’ in-line with the first Genesis
narrative, while simultaneously being part of a tragic creation.418 Like Jonas, Moltmann

Christian Wiese pointed specifically to “Hegel’s dialectic concept of the self-alienation of the primordial
mind,” as an influence on Jonas’ philosophy. Christian Wiese, The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas: Jewish
Dimensions (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2007), 124.
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Terence Fretheim rejected the notion that the continued existence of chaos was antithetical to God’s
proclamation of a ‘good creation’. “I claim that to designate this reality as ‘evil’ is not supported by the text;
yet, in some sense ‘chaos’ persists. A key to considering this issue is the divine command to ‘subdue the
earth’. If this command has the sense of bringing order out of continuing disorder, as seems likely, then some
dimensions of the realities of [Gen] 1:2 do continue. For some disorder to persist beyond God’s originating
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gives the concept of zimsum a place of central importance within his theology of
creation.419 “Before God issues creatively out of himself, he acts inwardly on himself,
resolving for himself, committing himself, determining himself.”420 To speak in such a
decidedly odd metaphysical way, even perhaps by the standards of confessional theology,
can lead to a great many complications.421 It was, nevertheless, necessary for Moltmann as
a way to accept the traditional concept of creatio ex nihilo while simultaneously opening
space to speak about genuine human volition and at least the potential for an openness of
the future.422 This openness of the future relates directly to the ‘genuine human volition’
that Moltmann’s doctrine of zimsum makes possible. However, it is not only due to human

creative activity is necessary for the proper development of the creation; such elements of disorder are
‘good.’” Terrence E. Fretheim, God and World in the Old Testament: A Relational Theology of Creation
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2005), 44.
A detailed, but decidedly negative, discussion about Moltmann’s reliance on zimsum can be found in, Ron
Highfield, “Divine Self-Limitation in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann: A Critical Appraisal,” Christian
Scholar’s Review, vol. 32, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 49-71.
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One potential pitfall that Moltmann sought to avoid was an argument about the literality of zimsum as a
physical process. Although Moltmann has used temporal language here, he also made clear that he was not
trying to open a discussion about something like the doctrine of decrees. Rather, Moltmann attempted to
begin a discussion about creation that was “excelled by the trinitarian justification and interpretation of this
‘practical definition’ of God: Deus est caritas.” God in Creation, 86. The practicality of this definition lies
in the rejection of divine physicality. To make an argument about God’s self-constriction does not need to
imply a physicality that would otherwise not be necessary in theological dialogue. Whatever it is that is meant
by the term zimsum, it must be understood in terms of God’s love rather than in terms of a bodily existence.
Jacob Emden argued that zimsum was the “only serious attempt ever made” to give a theological
accounting for creatio ex nihilo. This is undoubtedly an overgeneralization, even in 1870 when it was written,
but does demonstrate the import which is, at times, given to this idea. Jacob Emden, Mittpachat Sefarim
(Lemberg, 1870), 82. Referenced in Scholem, 260-261. On the openness of the future, Lash argued, “The
dark facticity of particular deeds and particular tragedy may not be obliterated for the sake of the coherence
of the narrative. Not the least insidious of the forms of idealism by which Christian religious discourse is
threatened is that which, springing from the conviction that there is a sense which it all makes, seeks
prematurely to give to that sense unified narrative expression.” Nicholas Lash, “Ideology, Metaphor and
Analogy,” in The Philosophical Frontiers of Christian Theology: Essays Presented to D.M. MacKinnon, eds.
Brian Hebblethwaire and Stewart Sutherland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 75.
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volition, but also to the becoming of God in relationship by which the future appears to be
open. “Every stage in the creation process contains within itself the tension between the
light flooding back into God and the light that breaks forth from God.”423 The act(s) of
creation, or, more accurately to Moltmann’s contention, the passion of creation, is a
determinate characteristic of what makes God who and what God is. God does not choose
to create any more than God chooses to love. “For he cannot deny himself… in loving the
world he is entirely free because he is entirely himself.”424 Even the self-emptying love of
zimsum is best understood in terms of identity, not of choice. ‘In the beginning’ God did
not choose to initiate a kenotic movement by which space could be opened up for the
creation of that which is not-God.425 Rather, by virtue of God’s loving nature, kenosis is
an essential characteristic of how God relates to creation. A kenotic relationship is not
accidental, nor even the result of a deliberate choice made by God, but is ontologically
necessary for a relational God.
To describe creation through zimsum is to make a relational claim that begins with
the ‘practical’ definition, “Deus est caritas.” For Moltmann, zimsum was necessary in order
to make possible speech about a world of both life and death, and about a God who seeks
to be in relationship with that world. The relationality of God, however, is not merely
external, but equally internal. One cannot meaningfully understand Moltmann’s doctrine
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Stanley Grenz and Roger Olson have argued against Moltmann’s understanding of zimsum because they
believe that such an understanding “calls into question the deity of God” by introducing temporal history into
the nature of God. 20th Century Theology, 186. Yet, they fail to recognize that Moltmann’s intention in
developing zimsum language was precisely the opposite, to begin with God as wholly other in order to make
relationality possible.
425

140

of creation apart from the inherent relationality of God, but, in order to more fully
understand what it means for Moltmann to speak of the relationality of God, we must also
explore God’s inter-trinitarian relationality.426

Trinitarian Love
Moltmann first explored the concept of the Trinity explicitly in detail in his
exploration of the crucifixion of Jesus. Moltmann’s seminal work, The Crucified God was
premised on the need to speak about God in Trinitarian terms.427 Looking at the crucifixion,
Moltmann described that both God the Father and God the Son suffered. It was not just
Jesus ‘The Son’ that was crucified, but God-self. The act of crucifixion, and the
accompanying suffering of God, demonstrated an interior relationality in God. While this
was not yet a fully Trinitarian discussion, ignoring, as so often happens, the Holy Spirit,
the Father and the Son are shown to be intertwined in suffering. God the Father suffered
the death of God the Son, while God the Son suffered his own dying. Both dying and death
were suffered by God in the crucifixion of Christ.428
This cannot, monotheistically, make any sense outside of a doctrine like that of the
Trinity.429 In order for there to be two mutually exclusive forms of suffering in the same

“Our starting point here is that all relationships which are analogous to God reflect… trinitarian
perichoresis.” God in Creation, 17.
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Or, at least in terms of ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ with the Spirit receiving less direct attention. McDougall noted
that “specific criticisms of The Crucified God… provoked Moltmann’s return to pneumatology.” McDougall,
61.
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Crucified God, 241-249.

“To understand what happened between Jesus and his God and Father on the cross, it is necessary to speak
in trinitarian terms.” Crucified God, 243.
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event there must also be at least two persons participating in that event.430 However,
Moltmann was quick to point out that these two distinct persons are not altogether separate.
The crucifixion of Jesus “contains community between Jesus and his Father in separation,
and separation in community.”431 This community between Father and Son is what allows
the possibility of a doctrine of the Trinity, distinguished from mere polytheism. “In the
cross, Father and Son are most deeply separated in forsakenness, and at the same time are
most inwardly one in their surrender.”432 The crucifixion is, then, “The material principle
of the doctrine of the Trinity.”433 “If the cross of Jesus is understood as a divine event, i.e.
as an event between Jesus and his God and Father, it is necessary to speak in trinitarian
terms of the Son and the Father and the Spirit.”434 This is notably not yet a fully enfleshed
trinitarian doctrine, at best evidencing a binitarian logic. Nevertheless, discussion of
crucifixion is the point at which Moltmann first began to speak about the ’community’ of
God.435 Yet, for Moltmann, it is not therefore also the starting point of trinitarian thought.
Rather, even crucifixion must be viewed as part of a larger theology of history.

That there were two mutually exclusive forms of suffering Moltmann described, “We cannot therefore
say here in patripassian terms that the Father also suffered and died. The suffering and dying of the Son,
forsaken by the Father, is a different kind of suffering from the suffering of the Father in the death of the
Son.” Ibid.
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On the cruciform beginnings of Moltmann’s trinitarian theology, Sӧlle criticized Moltmann for an implicit
patricide in his theology of the cross. “[Moltmann] is fascinated by the brutality of God… also here the
Trinity is so constituted that the first person ‘destroys' the second.” Dorothee Sӧlle, “Gott und das Leiden’,
in Dorothee Sӧlle, Diskussion über Jürgen Moltmanns Buch ‘Der gekreuzigte Gott’, ed. Michael Welker
(Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1979), 115. Quoted in Harvie, 106. There does seem to be a fascination, in
Crucified God, with brutality, although this brutality is not merely the brutality of the Father, but a broader
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The starting point for the Christian doctrine of the Trinity must be the
salvation history attested in the Bible: the history of the Father, the Son and
the Spirit. I further conclude that the method of the Christian doctrine of the
Trinity must correspond to the method of the Old Testament knowledge of
God: there we always have ‘Yahweh is God’ and ‘Yahweh has become
king’. The starting point is the historical and particular revelation of
Yahweh which is experienced in a concrete way.436
The revelation of the triune God through the incarnation of Jesus Christ is more
than merely insight into the Divine nature. Indeed, the incarnation of Jesus is both a sign,
and an invitation, of the openness of the triune God to creation.437 Moltmann’s belief that
the trinitarian history of God and creation is a continually developing process is made
manifest by the continued presence of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the means by
which creation can look forward to the future. “[The Holy Spirit] arises from the event of
the resurrection of Christ and is an earnest and pledge of his future, of the future of
universal resurrection and of life.”438 The Spirit gives eschatological openness and
direction for creation’s continued existence. Despite the relative lack of reference to the
Spirit in Moltmann’s explorations of the crucifixion, even there the Spirit is both present
and active in opening up creation to God and God to creation in the trinitarian history.439

brutality of existence. Yet, when looking at Moltmann’s Hegelian heritage, the idea of the Son being
‘destroyed’ by the Father appears far less brutal when understood in terms of sublation rather than of
interpersonal violence.
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Joy Ann McDougall described this openness, “Although Moltmann does not quite go so far as to state
explicitly that the Trinity is presently incomplete in its being, he does describe it metaphorically as open for
the gathering of restored creation into its midst.” McDougall, 66.
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McDougall saw that Moltmann’s trinitarian pneumatology only began to fully develop with The Church
in the Power of the Spirit. Here, the trinitarian openness of God became ever more evident. “To the degree
that the trinitarian history of God awaits eschatological completion through the glorifying and unifying of
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“[The Spirit] is the unconditioned and therefore boundless love which proceeds from the
grief of the Father and the dying of the Son and reaches forsaken men in order to create in
them the possibility and the force of new life.”440 The trinitarian history of God
encompasses both the past and the present, and is constantly moving into God’s
eschatological future.
Because Moltmann views the Trinity in terms of a direct connection to an affective
world, much can be learned about God’s relationship with that world by seeking to describe
God’s self-relatedness. One of the most noteworthy elements of Moltmann’s Trinitarian
theology is the social nature of his doctrine of the Trinity. If, for Moltmann, the three
persons of the Trinity are all constituted by their relationships with each other, it is that
very relationship that is fundamental to God’s nature. God’s nature is, in this sense,
ultimately relational within Godself.441 However, God’s nature is not only relational within
the Godhead, but this relationality also extends outwards from the triune God and is seen
in God’s participation with all of creation.442 Moltmann defined his social doctrine of the
Trinity by saying,

creation through the Spirit, so, too, we can say that the trinitarian Godhead itself awaits eschatological
unification.” Ibid.
Moltmann, Crucified God, 245. Or, as Bauckham described, “It is as Trinity that God not only affects but
is affected by the world.” Bauckham, 155.
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But, to even speak of “God’s nature” is to presuppose relationality, because, for Moltmann, God can only
be known in relationship. “Moltmann thus seeks to develop a concept of God that arises out of how he is
quoad nos as opposed to how God is in se. Moltmann’s conception of God is one construed on the basis of
‘dynamic relationality’.” Henry Jansen, 106.
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Margaret Adam even interpreted the extent of this trinitarian relationality as eclipsing, in Moltmann’s
theology, the hope found in the resurrection of Christ. “Moltmannian hope further downplays hope in Christ
by narrating human participation in divine trinitarian perichoretic relations as the highest good instead of
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The triune God is a single communion or fellowship which is formed by the
three divine persons themselves. The unity of the triune God is no longer
seen in the homogeneous divine subject nor in the identical divine subject,
but in the eternal perichoresis of Father, Son and Spirit.443
The idea of a Social Trinity, including the description of the Trinitarian activity as
perichoresis is not unique, nor original, to Moltmann.444 Indeed, Moltmann even traces this
idea back to the Johannine tradition. “The divine persons exist not only in relationships to
one another but also, as the Johannine formulations show, in one another: the Son in the
Father, the Father in the Son, the Holy Spirit in the Father and the Son, and the Father and
the Son in the Holy Spirit.”445 Each of the persons of the Trinity participates in an intimate
indwelling and complete interpenetration of the other persons, and it is this indwelling and
interpenetration that is characterized as perichoresis. Moltmann’s entire understanding of
the Social Trinity is built upon this understanding of the divine perichoresis.446 The unity
of the Trinitarian persons is not a secondary unity, for, following Moltmann’s use of

‘trinitarian perichoretic relations’ can be, but she also fails to see how Crucified God served to set the stage
by which it was even possible to speak of ‘trinitarian perichoretic relations’.
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Moltmann, History and the Triune God, xii. Here, Pannenberg criticized Moltmann for failing to conceive
of the Trinity in terms which would allow true unity. “In the immanent Trinity, then, we are not to distinguish
as Moltmann does between a constitutional level and a relational level, between on the one side the
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source of deity?” Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, trans. Geofrey W. Bromiley (New York:
T&T Clark International, 2004), 325.
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E.g., an excellent study of an early and influential use of the idea of perichoresis can be found in, Charles
C. Twombly, Perichoresis and Personhood: God, Christ, and Salvation in John of Damascus (Eugene, OR:
Pickwick, 2015). Twombly described that this concept was not original even to John of Damascus, but that
his interpretation was deeply influential especially for Barth and Moltmann.
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Harvie argued that Moltmann perceived “the use of perichoresis as being the only plausible means
available to contemporary theology to preserve not only the unity, but also the uniqueness of the persons
within the Godhead.” Harvie, 115.
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Rahner’s Rule – The economic Trinity is identical to the immanent Trinity and vice
versa.447 This unity is both internal and natural to God.
The perichoretical nature of the Trinitarian persons is also descriptive of the way in
which God interacts with creation. For Moltmann, a Social Trinity must also be an Open
Trinity.448 The social nature of the triune God, three persons perichoretically indwelling
and interpenetrating one another, is not only social internally, but also equally social
externally. The divine perichoretical dance of mutual interpenetration is equivalent to the
relationship which the triune God desires to have with creation as a whole.
The perichoretic unity of the triune God is…an open, inviting unity that
unites with itself. It is not confined to God in order to define him
exclusively as the one over against the many, but is inclusively open for all
creation, whose misery consists in isolation from the living God and whose
salvation is thus to be found in being graciously taken up into the
community of God.449
The perichoretical dance summons the other, that is creation, to participate fully in that
dance of mutual interpenetration. It is through the Spirit that God is opened up to the world

Moltmann describes two parts to ‘Rahner’s Rule’, “1. The Trinity is the nature of God and the nature of
God is the Trinity. 2. The economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity, and the immanent Trinity is the economic
Trinity.” Crucified God, 240. Rob Lister said critically of Moltmann’s use of Rahner’s rule, “[Moltmann
wound up] making the identity of God necessarily dependent upon certain events in the redemptive economy,
in this case particularly the event of the cross.” Rob Lister, God is Impassible and Impassioned: Toward a
Theology of Divine Emotion (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2013), 244. I would contend that Lister is correct in
this claim, but that, within Moltmann’s theological project, this is both intentional and important, not
inherently problematic.
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and the hopeful future—i.e. the Kingdom—is opened up for humanity.450 The openness
that has been shown to humanity, indeed all of creation, is the openness to participate in
fellowship with God, and even in God. The life and history of the triune God are indelibly
connected to the salvation-history of creation. Indeed, the trinitarian history is salvationhistory, for salvation is found in the eschatological unity between creation and the triune
God.451
Both the sociality and openness of Moltmann’s doctrine of the Trinity are by virtue
of his concept of divine love. Love is the unifying characteristic of the Social Trinity; it is
each Trinitarian person’s love for each other that is the basis of the perichoretical
indwelling.452 Likewise, it is this same love expressed outward that is the sign of the triune
God’s openness to creation. Moltmann argued against a monarchical understanding of the
Trinity that is built upon a hierarchy of rules and rulers, because no monarchical
understanding of God could allow the possibility of God’s open devotion to creation.453
This understanding of divine love in the Trinity needs further explication, particularly as it

Timothy Bradshaw termed this a “mutually conditioning relationship between the Triune God and
creation,” and saw that, “[it] is the role of the Spirit as the agent of creation.” Timothy Bradshaw,
“Moltmann’s Ecclesiology in Evangelical Perspective,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology, 130.
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Sarah Morice-Brubaker has questioned whether Moltmann is right to reject any strong distinction between
the idea of the Economic Trinity with the idea of the Immanent Trinity. She noted correctly, “Moltmann is
emphatic that the trinitarian history must indeed have a historical structure, with something akin to
distinguishable subjects, actions, and moments. Otherwise, it would precisely not cohere with the history of
salvation.” Sarah Morice-Brubaker, The Place of the Spirit: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of Location
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2013), 80.
Harvie noted that, even as early as The Crucified God, “Love, not suffering is constitutive for God’s
being” within Moltmann’s theology. Harvie, 107.
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Linn Tonstad has shown that Moltmann was not entirely successful in his attempt to overcome
monarchical relationships in his trinitarian language. “Although Moltmann is right to highlight elements of
paternal receptivity in this logic, ultimately, this is a return to the Father of all that was his already, and put
playfully, the Son still sits only beside, not on, the throne.” Linn Marie Tonstad, God and Difference: The
Trinity, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude (New York: Routledge, 2016), 155.
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concerns the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of the triune God. Moltmann was clear that
the Holy Spirit is and must be a Trinitarian person.454 However, Moltmann believed that
the Spirit’s personhood must be understood differently than the personhood of the Father
and of the Son.455 Ultimately, Moltmann gave no explicit definition of how the personhood
of the Spirit ought to be understood, but rather was forced to understand the personhood of
the Spirit analogically.456
Through the many different metaphors that Moltmann has used to describe the
personhood of the Spirit through the actions of the Spirit he came to a basic definition of
this personhood, although this definition is still more descriptive than definitive. “The
personhood of God the Holy Spirit is the loving, self-communicating, out-fanning and outpouring presence of the eternal divine life of the triune God.”457 It is easiest to speak of the
personhood of the Spirit through the Spirit’s function of invigorating creativity and life
both within the Godhead and externally for the world. This creativity and vitality is the
source of community and love which are the aspects of life that make it truly alive. “The

Laurence Wood well described why this is an important question for Moltmann. “The Holy Spirit is not
an extension of the human spirit. The Holy Spirit is not just a point of union between God the Father and the
Son. The Holy Spirit is not just the Father and Son working together and relating together as a ‘we.’ Rather,
the Holy Spirit is also just as distinctive in his personal specificity as the Father and the Son.” Laurence W.
Wood, Theology as History and Hermeutics: A Post-Critical Conversation with Contemporary Theology
(Lexington, KY: Emeth, 2005), 203.
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That even the language of trinitarian ‘personhood’ is imperfect will be explored in greater depth in the
next chapter.
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While it may be that this analogical description is the best way to approach an understanding of the Holy
Spirit theologically, Laurence Wood seems to have overstated Moltmann’s relatively limited pneumatology
when he said, “This personal specificity of the Holy Spirit had not received adequate theological recognition
in modern and contemporary theology – until Moltmann brought it into center stage.” Theology as History
and Hermeneutics, 203.
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Spirit who is glorified ‘together with’ the Father and the Son is also the wellspring of the
energy which draws people to one another, so that they come together, rejoice in one
another and praise the God who is himself a God in community.”458

The Trinity in Hegel
That an interpretation of Moltmann’s theology requires a careful grappling with
Hegel’s influence has already been argued. This is true in the general structuring of
Moltmann’s thought, as well as in particular theological doctrines and propositions. This
indebtedness to Hegel is especially evident in Moltmann’s trinitarian theology and
therefore also in the doctrine of creation.459 Although Moltmann is less explicit about the
Hegelian connection to his doctrine of the Trinity, there is a lot of Hegelian material from
which Moltmann has drawn. To a greater extent than with most other theological topics,
Hegel actually showed a strong interest in trinitarian doctrine.460
Even a casual reader of Hegel should understand the truth of Walter Kaufmann’s
claim that Hegel demonstrated a “very decided preference for triadic arrangements.”461
Given Hegel’s early theological training, it would be no surprise that he thus also had an
affinity for a decidedly Christian discussion of the Trinity. Citing Hegel’s influence, it has
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Dale Schlitt gave a good overview of Hegel’s influence on trinitarian theology generally, and on
Moltmann more specifically. See, Dale M. Schlitt, German Idealism’s Trinitarian Legacy (Albany: SUNY
Press, 2016), 308-311.
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been argued, “The doctrine of the Trinity is not only ‘the fundamental characteristic of the
Christian religion’, but it is also the ‘axis on which the History of the World turns’ and ‘the
goal and the starting point of history’.”462 Christian notions of the Trinity thus appear to
have been very informative to Hegel.463 While it may be that his near-obsession with the
number three led him back to the doctrine of the Trinity, one might argue to the contrary
that it was Hegel’s early exposure to a Christian trinitarianism that gave him a framework
by which to structure his later thought.464 This is almost certainly a chicken/egg scenario
without an obviously correct answer. Nevertheless, it is evident that trinitarian notions held
a particular place of importance in even Hegel’s most intentionally non-religious work. It
remains yet more evident in Hegel’s explicitly religious writings that the Trinity can serve
as an exemplar for much of Hegel’s understanding of identity, personhood, and history.465
As Moltmann later would, Hegel rooted trinitarian thought in a discussion of the
relationship evident between Father and Son in the crucifixion.466 In words that sound

Paolo Diego Bubbio, “Hegel, the Trinity, and the I,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76,
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Paolo Diego Bubbio made a compelling argument that Hegel’s interest in the Trinity can be described
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Regardless of where one might determine these origins, Bubbio is correct that, “Defining Hegel’s interest
in Christianity and the Trinity exclusively in terms of an allegory is reductive… the correspondence of the
three parts of the Encyclopedia to the structure of the Trinity suggests that the relevance of this notion in the
context of Hegel’s system extends beyond its role as an allegory.” Ibid, 105.
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This is but one of many ways that Hegel approached trinitarian thought, but serves as a good lead-in to
describe how Moltmann has been influenced by Hegelian trinitarianism. Schlitt described that, to study
Trinity in Hegel, “It seemed strategically wise and indeed necessary not only to treat Hegel’s reading of
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strikingly similar to Moltmann’s understanding of perichoresis, Hegel said, “Love
[consists] in giving up one’s personality, all that is one’s own, etc. [It is] a self-conscious
activity, the supreme surrender [of oneself] in the other, even in this most extrinsic otherbeing of death… The monstrous unification of these absolute extremes is love itself.”467
This is the Hegelian context in which The Crucified God should be understood. Whatever
one’s conceptions about God, so long as love remains a descriptive attribute of God, then
it must be that God’s relationality, both internally and externally, is one of a kenotic givingup, of self-sacrifice.
Sam Powell has helpfully described that Hegel’s trinitarian discussions can be
generally placed into two separate categories: the ontological Trinity of eternity and the
Trinity of history.468 These categorizations tend toward the same distinction described by
the terms ‘economic’ and ‘immanent’, but also provide a helpful nuance with regard to
Hegel, and therefore, too, with regard to Moltmann.469 To describe the so-called ‘Immanent
Trinity’ as the Trinity of history describes not only that the Christian God is understood as
a God of presence, but also the extent to which God is present. God’s presence is not only

Trinity more indirectly in his Phenomenology of Spirit and directly in his Encyclopedia and Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, but also to consider seriously his Science of Logic.” Ibid., x.
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Samuel M. Powell, The Trinity in German Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

Moltmann also called for a reconsideration of the language of ‘economic’ and ‘immanent’, although
without explicitly rejecting either in his own work. “Moltmann’s final preference therefore is for a more
flexible and nuanced trinitarian framework… He proposes that we think in terms of the ‘monarchical,’
‘historical,’ and ‘eucharistic’ concepts of the Trinity, all of which presuppose a ‘primordial Trinity,’ and
which are fulfilled in ‘trinitarian doxology.’” Thomas R. Thompson, “Interpretatio in bonem partem: Jürgen
Moltmann on the Immanent Trinity, in Theology as Conversation: The Signficance of Dialogue in Historical
and Contemporary Theology, eds. Bruce L. McCormack and Kimlyn J. Bender (Grand Rapids: Wm. B.
Eerdmans, 2009), 176.
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found in the person of Jesus, nor in the presence of the Holy Spirit, however conceived,
but is found in the fullness of the Godhead within history. God’s presence is not imposed
from without, but is formed in the process of history.470 “God does not attain actuality until
the Trinity has unfolded in history…through its incorporation of finitude.”471 In much
stronger terms than one would typically understand from the word ‘immanent’, to speak of
a Trinity of history demands recognition that any notion of God as existing prior to the act
of creation is to speak of God as existing incompletely.472 Moltmann’s insistence on
speaking of creation in terms of zimsum is directly related to Hegel’s contention that
actuality arrives only in and with the movements of history. For Hegel, this is no less true
for the being of God than it is when speaking in terms of the phenomenological history of
the world or of epistemology. “[God is properly conceived] only as having within himself
the differentiated infinite universalities, [as having] within himself determinateness, i.e.,
limit, i.e., [as having] difference within himself, and [having it] as difference.”473

Poul Guttesen termed this “theoenpanism,” in contrast to the “panentheism” that Moltmann himself used.
“The broad sweep of God’s history with his creation is shaped by kenotic retraction and expansion… from a
contradiction in God and creation which made their perichoretic communion possible to the fulfillment of
that communion when this double contradiction is overcome.” Poul F. Guttesen, Leaning Into the Future:
The Kingdom of God in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann and the Book of Revelation (Eugene, OR:
Pickwick, 2009), 74.
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Hegel described the ontological Trinity of eternity as both “outside of time” 474 and
“not yet burdened by other-being.”475 As a philosophical notion, such a God can be
understood as the content of religion. Yet, as content, such a God is philosophically
meaningless without being thought by a thinking consciousness.476 “The universal object,
the essence of the object, is only for thinking, and since in religion God is the object, he is
such essentially for thinking.”477 Outside of a human consciousness by which such a God
can be thought, God remains merely speculative.478 Such a speculative God would not be
triune, for “only the dead understanding is identical with itself.”479 A fully internalized God
“is object essentially,”480 or being-in-itself. It is only in God’s manifestation within history
that God ceases to be mere object and can properly be described as being-in-and-for-itself.
Even though Hegel dedicated a significant number of pages to exploring what it
means for God to be object, it is in what Powell calls the ‘Trinity of history’ that Moltmann
most strongly picked up Hegel’s discussion. As God is made manifest in history, God can
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be said to live, for Hegel, in a new and different way than was possible when God was
essentially object. As God tied Godself to history, through the act of zimsum for Moltmann,
even the internal life of God is altered.
‘God is love’ is an expression very much to the point: here God is present
to sensation; as ‘love’ he is a person, and the relationship is such that the
consciousness of the One is to be had only in the consciousness of the other.
God is conscious of himself, as Goethe says, only in the other, in absolute
externalization.481
The phrase ‘God is love’ is neither original nor unique to Hegel, yet, a nuanced
understanding of this phrase, as used by Hegel, is a key to unlocking the depths of
Moltmann’s understanding of the acts of creation by a triune God. “When we say, ‘God is
love’, we are saying something very great and true. But it would be senseless to grasp this
saying in a simple-minded way as a simple definition, without analyzing what love is.”482

The Brokenness of Love
Moltmann picked up on Hegel’s definition of love by arguing that love is not
defined by unity alone, or perhaps at all, but rather by diremption and brokenness. 483 This
diremption is inherent to the Trinity, and is therefore also passed on in God’s acts of
creation. Moltmann speaks of a “dichotomy in God”484 which is experienced as “the pathos
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Fred Sanders pointed to this Hegelian influence as primary to Moltmann, “Hegel’s influence on modern
trinitarianism has been so pervasive as to be nearly inescapable… In Moltmann’s hands, the doctrine of the
Trinity becomes a theology of the redemptive suffering of God in human history… This account of salvation
has the Hegelian family likeness; it is another version of redemption by diremption.” Fred Sanders, “The
Trinity,” in Mapping Modern Theology, eds., Kelly M. Kapic and Bruce L. McCormack (Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2012), 25-26.
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and the initial self-humiliation through which the Almighty goes out of himself and
becomes involved with the limited world.”485 Moltmann’s argument for a dichotomy ‘in
God’ is evident insofar as God suffers with God’s people, and therefore must also come to
confront Godself as the Creator of a world in which such suffering exists.486 This
‘dichotomy’ is not strictly along trinitarian lines, although it is evident in the cry of
dereliction which both Moltmann and Hegel give a place of great prominence. 487 “[Death
is] the moment of spirit~ in which it grasps itself inwardly… submerging itself within
itself.”488 This internal motion precedes the external by which God’s own becoming is
made manifest within the history of creation. “Love seeks a counterpart who freely
responds and independently gives love for love. Love humiliates itself for the sake of the
freedom of its counterpart.”489 Love is the most profound reason “for the ‘rift’ which runs
through the divine life and activity.”490
This rift is at the heart of Moltmann’s theology, but is easy to pass over in favor of
a description of God’s love in terms of unity rather than brokenness. To do so is
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understandable, but would represent a failure to understand the depth of Hegel’s influence
on Moltmann’s conception of the God who is love. Even within a very good study of
Moltmann’s theology, Joy Ann McDougall made just such a move by claiming that
Moltmann’s early writings “contain a distinct concept of divine love that will provide us
with a foil to the author’s social trinitarian concept of love in his later works.”491 To see
social trinitarianism as a corrective to a diremptive love, both within and without God, is
to understand both God and creation as entirely closed to external influence. Such a claim
simply cannot co-exist with Moltmann’s insistence on the pathos of God as exhibited in
creation.
Although Moltmann at times struggles to fully incorporate the idea of openness into
his theology, particularly with reference to eschatology,492 that God is pathetically
dependent on God’s creation is often described clearly. Even in Moltmann’s recent work,
the inter-trinitarian love of God is described in terms of deep brokenness that cannot be
wiped away by the perichoretic dance of togetherness. “In the trinitarian history of God,
divine self-giving to the point of death and resurrection from death become comprehensible
as the reality of divine love.”493 Likewise for Hegel, “Love is a framework for absolute
contradiction.”494 Slavoj Ẑiẑek wrote, in a compelling argument for a strong reading of
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erotic love in Hegel, “The tragic [is] at the very heart of Christianity as the religion of
love.”495 This tragedy of love plays out in the world as the tragedy of creation, as the
inherent brokenness by which love is made manifest in the world.496
This excursus into trinitarian theology and its connection to both creation in the
beginning and God’s continuing acts of creation in the world connects the creation of the
past with the telos of what creation could be. This telos in Moltmann’s theology is defined
as ‘the Kingdom of God’. Moltmann said, “Gratia non perfecit, sed praeparat naturam ad
gloriam aeternam; gratia non est perfecito naturae, sed praeparatio messianica mundi ad
regnum Dei.”497 The core of Moltmann’s trinitarian thinking about creation is that God is
in the world, and the presence of the world is in God. “The God who is transcendent…and
the God who is immanent… are one and the same God.”498 Moltmann’s understanding of
creation cannot be properly understood outside of the realization that both creation and the
triune God are inextricably interrelated. This divine interrelatedness is not uniquely
inherent to humanity, but includes the totality of creation because of God’s faithful
trinitarian openness.499 “All relationships… reflect the primal, reciprocal indwelling and

495

Less Than Nothing, 81.

As Ted Peters described this tragedy of love “What we have experience within history is brokenness
within the divine life proper, a brokenness freely entered into by a God who enters into the stream of our
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Morice-Brubaker attempted to read into Moltmann a “trinitarian theology of place,” by which this
openness could be understood. However, she misunderstood the nature of Hegel’s influence on Moltmann.
She claimed, “Moltmann remains committed to a dialectical structure, even when his aim is to give this
structure a trinitarian grounding.” Morice-Brubaker, 70. To better understand the importance of God’s
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mutual interpenetration of the trinitarian perichoresis… There is no such thing as a solitary
life.”500 In the next chapter this argument will be taken even further to argue that this
‘reflection’ is two-sided: The trinitarian perichoresis also ‘reflects’ those relationships
which are external to God. There can be no life that is not a life in relationship to both the
rest of creation and to the triune God.

Creation3: Originalis, Continua, Nova
Because Moltmann cannot envision life apart from the continued relatedness to the
triune God he also understands that a truly Christian understanding of creation needs to
focus on the entirety of the Christian Scriptures, not simply on Genesis 1-2. He claimed
that when creation is thus understood there are three distinct modes of creation which can
be encountered:

creatio originalis, creatio continua, and creatio nova.501 Creatio

originalis is the act described in Genesis 1-2 whereby the earth was formed and filled.
Moltmann is not a biblical literalist and thus holds no notion that Genesis actually describes
the scientific details of God’s initial creation.502 Genesis describes an understanding of

trinitarian openness for Moltmann, however, it should be seen that the dialectical structure of God-talk,
developed with Hegel’s insight, is its own grounding, and Moltmann’s particular take on trinitarian theology
arises from this grounding, rather than vice-versa.
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theological reflection, can be found in Ryan Patrick McLaughlin, Preservation and Protest: Theological
Foundations for an Eco-Eschatological Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014).
Margaret Adam described what she saw to be a “selective literalism,” in Moltmann’s work. “Moltmann
adopts (without claiming) a literalist translation of many passages of the Old Testament that use
anthropomorphic descriptions of God’s feelings and actions in time and in responsive relationship with God’s
people.” Adam, 84. This description of Moltmann’s biblical approach deserves careful consideration, because
it points to a tendency that is evident in Moltmann’s work. Even so, I would argue that ‘selective literalism’
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creatio originalis without making scientific or physiological claims about that which
exists. Moltmann’s own creation narrative explicitly includes zimsum, although, again, not
necessarily literally so.503 Such an interpretation brings in a narrative that is not explicitly
described in the biblical text. Nevertheless, Moltmann pointed to Genesis as part of the
overarching narrative by which God has become known by creation, and, as part of this
larger narrative it holds a place of theological import. Thus, initial creation points beyond
itself to the future promises of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The continuing act of creation
points beyond itself to, and finds fulfillment in, the salvific life of Jesus. Ultimately, the
new creation, which begins with the resurrection of Christ, points toward its fulfillment,
the Kingdom of God.
Holding this understanding of the three primary modes of creation, all of which are
interrelated in the life of the created order, it is important to understand how each mode of
creation is conceived. Moltmann described the first mode of creation, “To say that God
‘created’ the world indicates God’s self-distinction from that world, and emphasizes that

is not ‘literalism’ strictly speaking, but an informed and intentional approach to the varieties of scripture, and
that anthropomorphizing God, whatever other problems this might cause, is not exclusively the result of
‘selective literalism’.
Moltmann’s language is not always entirely clear in distinguishing between creation as a noun and creation
as a verb, leading to some confusion about when, if ever, Moltmann’s doctrine of creation ought to be
understood literally and physically. E.g., W. David Hall claimed, “Moltmann seems to correlate the
theological idea of God’s continued creative activity with natural evolutionary processes. Curiously, he
begins by stating that evolution, strictly speaking, ‘has nothing to do with ‘creation’ itself’… Not only does
Moltmann treat creation as if it encompassed the theory of the evolution of the species, but he speaks of
creatio ex nihilo as if it were an account of the origins of the cosmos, existence in general.” W. David Hall,
“Does Creation Equal Nature?: Confronting the Christian Confusion about Ecology and Cosmology,”
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 73, no. 3 (September, 2005): 800-801. Hall is correct to
critique the uncareful way that Moltmann addresses this distinction, but given Moltmann’s explicit rejections
of young-earth creationist language and strict biblical literalism, it would be nevertheless fair to read
Moltmann’s descriptions of creation as though they always included the phrase, “But not necessarily
literally/physically.”
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God desires it.”504 The problem with this concept of self-distinction is the paradox of the
traditional Christian doctrines that God is, or at least was at one time, ‘all-in-all’ and yet
that original creation occurred ex nihilo.505 Moltmann believed that to say God created ex
nihilo is an apt paraphrase of the biblical story of creation. In order for creation to occur ex
nihilo would necessitate that the act of creation occurred extra Deum. The only way that
this is possible, for Moltmann, is that in God’s own self-limitation, God withdrew God’s
presence into Godself and opened space in which to create. “There is in fact one possible
way of conceiving an extra Deum. But it is only the assumption of a self-limitation by God
himself preceding his creation which can be reconciled with God’s divinity without
contradiction.”506 This space is literally a “God-forsaken space.”507 In this way the God
who would otherwise be ‘all-in-all’ has chosen the self-humiliating act of making space
for an other. “The nihil for his creatio ex nihilo only comes into being because- and in as
far as- the omnipotent and omnipresent God withdraws his presence and restricts his
power.”508 Having opened up space for the possibility of creating this other, God then goes
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about the actual work of ‘creation’ which is the filling of this openness. For Moltmann,
God’s inversion of Godself was an act of self-humiliation, a self-humiliation that would
later be demonstrated again in the incarnation and yet again in the crucifixion.509 This
divine self-humiliation makes way for the possibility of an other in creation. Were it not
for the divine self-humiliation God would continue to be all-in-all and creation could not
occur.
Creation does not occur simply by God’s calling it forth into existence. “In a more
profound sense [God] ‘creates’ by letting-be, by making room, and by withdrawing
himself.”510 This initial act of creation, though, is only the beginning of God’s work of
creation. There is also an aspect of continuing creation. Moltmann believes that God is
still, even today, in the process of creating and that this can be seen most clearly in the
process of evolution. He argued that recognizing the validity of the scientific theory of
evolution in no way negates God’s power. Rather, evolution describes the way in which
God’s hand continues to form and shape existence in the present. 511 The process of

have existence allows room for something that is non-God to actually come into existence. For a longer
discussion of the role of nihil in Moltmann’s kenotic creation, see Graham Buxton 57-59.
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The data are clear that evolution happens constantly on both micro- and macro- levels. Yet, because of
the pervasiveness of biblical literalism, and a consequent lack of interpretive humility, there is a substantial
population of Christians who are willing to disregard said data. One of the reasons that Moltmann remains
an important theological figure is that he has intentionally placed himself within that part of the Christian
tradition which internally struggles with how faith should influence living in the world. “I can understand the
annoyed reaction of exactly thinking scientists toward pseudo-scientific ‘creationism’, and you will
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continuing creation, like the process of original creation, is a Trinitarian action. This
continuing creation, which is exemplified through, although not encompassed by, the
process of evolution is God’s action to continually overcome death in the world.512
Creation in the beginning occurred out of the nihil of absolute death, and in the same way
continuing creation fights against the death and decay that are found in the present creation.
There is yet one more form of creation that needs to be dealt with. This is seen in
the fact that creation is an open system which has its foundation, its balance, and its goal
not in itself but in its future. This final movement of creation, creatio nova, will primarily
be dealt with in the next section in terms of eschatology. In brief, though, as the third form
of creation Moltmann understands this new creation in terms of the sabbath.
The completion of activity is rest, and the completion of doing is simple
existence. Creation is God’s work, but the sabbath is God’s present
existence. His works express God’s will, but the sabbath manifests his
Being. In his works God goes out of himself; in the sabbath of creation he
comes to himself.513

understand the critical reactions of theologians who take up cudgels against the new naturalistic atheism.
Ideologies spring up as a result of the reduction of complex forms of life… [which] distort the view of truth
and serve irrelevant interests.” Jürgen Moltmann, “Is the World Unfinished? On Interactions Between
Science and Theology in the Concepts of Nature, Time and the Future,” Theology 114, no. 6 (Sept. 2011),
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Due to the social nature of God’s trinitarian being, God’s sabbath is expanded beyond
God’s own practice into the life of the world extra Deum.514 “In the resting, and hence
direct, unmediated presence of God, all created beings find their dwelling.” 515 Sabbath,
however, is not merely about peace. Because the sabbath manifests the being of God in the
world, it also holds a strong ethical imperative to transform the world in redemptive
ways.516 “Men and women never find the peace of sabbath in God’s presence unless they
find liberation from dependency and repression, inhumanity and godlessness. So exodus
and sabbath are indivisible.”517
The eschatological sabbath of new creation is, then, God’s return back into
Godself.518 This return does not in any way negate the potency of God’s ‘other’, but is the
ultimate union of the other with God. By opening up Godself, and by making God’s own
sabbath rest an invitation to relationship, God has demonstrated that the peace of sabbath
rest is not a passive enjoyment but a loving embrace. In the eschatological sabbath all of
creation will be participants in the trinitarian perichoresis.519
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Paul Fiddes criticized Moltmann on this point, however, because he sees in Moltmann’s work that the
redemption of sabbath is primarily one of rest, rather than of action. “It is apparently not in the works of his
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Importantly, it is the negation of God’s kenotic withdrawal - an influx of God’s presence where it had
previously been withdrawn. Bryan Lee described this as “an eschatological panentheistic vision of God’s
Sabbath, where God makes the creation God’s home, fulfilling it with God’s perichoretic love.” Bryan
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Eschatology in Hegel
As with creatio originalis, and the subsequent history of creatio continua through
which it continues, Moltmann’s description of creatio nova – more broadly conceived as
eschatology, has been formed from a kernel of deep Hegelian insight. Hegel’s eschatology
is a topic fraught with philosophical tension.520 There are those who have viewed Hegel as
a force to be overcome, and this feeling has often been based, at least in part, on the
eschatological ‘completion’ of Hegel’s philosophy. Deleuze, for example, waged “an antiHegel campaign [which] has always been fought under the banner of empiricism.”521
Deleuze saw Hegel’s eschatological proclamations as built entirely upon an historical lie.
“Hegel betrays and distorts the immediate in order to ground his dialectic in that
incomprehension, and to introduce mediation in a movement is no more than that of his
own thought and its generalities.”522 As such, for Deleuze and others who participate in
what Jere Surber has termed, “Obsessive anti-Hegelianism,”523 the possibility of Hegelian
history is internalized and non-empirical.524 Much more so, then, to even contemplate the

Ryan A. Neal described the universalist tendency in Moltmann’s work on this point. “God’s indwelling
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end of such a history would seem to be the height of philosophical hubris. Yet, Hegel’s
eschatology, while steeped in the sort of hubris that is generally required to make any sort
of eschatological proclamations, is much more limited than is often assumed.
Surber helpfully reminded that Hegel’s notion of philosophical completion is not
unique, but is directly in-line with Kant’s similar claim that, with a little help from his
friends, it might be possible within two decades “to secure for human reason complete
satisfaction in regard to that which it has all along so eagerly occupied itself.”525 Moreover,
on a philosophical level, Surber argued, Hegel was clear that discussions revolving around
the possibility of ‘completion’, over-generally and improperly called “the end of
history,”526 need to be considered only in relation to the Science of Logic, not to the entirety
of Hegel’s philosophical project. In the Hegel literature it is fairly common to see
Alexandre Kojéve standing in as a primary interpreter of Hegel’s eschatology. Yet, that
Kojéve’s interpretation of ‘the end of history’ is something different than Hegel’s is also
well argued.527 The intricacies of Hegel’s philosophical eschatology continue to be
thoroughly debated at length.528 For present purposes, the key point to which Moltmann
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took hold is that any projection of completion is focused entirely on the internal – for Hegel
this is ‘logic’ or ‘the Notion’, for Moltmann one might call this ‘spiritual’ or ‘transcendent’.
Yet, even if Hegel could rightly point to his logic as a completed system, a dis-embodied
logic remains always already incomplete. The Science of Logic requires the externalization
of its internal movement. “Systematically, it must be followed by a Philosophy of Nature
(“pure thought” in its externalization) and a Philosophy of Spirit (the “embodiment” of
“pure thought” within the concrete medium of human psychological, cultural, and
historical existence).”529 Likewise for Moltmann, there is a reason to practice a speculative
eschatology, the consideration of the Kingdom of God in all fullness – the completion of
God’s creative telos. This speculative enterprise cannot theologically stand alone, however,
but must be brought to the world in which God seeks to be made known.

Eschatology and Systemic (In)Breaking
In order to productively bring together speculative eschatology with political
theology, Moltmann had to overcome “a strongly entrenched ambiguity and ambivalence
in Hegel’s philosophy… [in] describing the End, or ‘completion’ of history.” 530 Even if
one accepts that Hegel explicitly did believe in the possibility of the logical end to history
(of the concept), there remains little explicit discussion of if/how empirical history itself

E.g., for an interesting discussion which explores Hegel’s thought through the interplay of Fukuyama and
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might come to an end.531 A Moltmannian theology is faced with the same conundrum.
Moltmann has repeatedly pointed to a particular theological telos as the end toward which
history approaches into the present. This telos is anything but static, but as future breaks
into every present and re-shapes that present in terms of the future toward which it hopes.
“In effective hope man does not flee from the unbearable pressure of the present into a
consoling, better future, but draws the other, human future into his present, and lives
already by it.”532 Thus, while holding a dialectical understanding of the transformative
transience of the present, Moltmann understood that this movement was not merely
evolutionary, but was characterized by the inbreaking of genuine novelty. Here, Moltmann
broke from Hegel, for within Hegel’s system there can explicitly be no place for an
inbreaking from without. So long as the system of logic is or can be brought to a close,
further novelty could only be an appearance.533 The finality of logic does not preclude
further development of Geist in its immanence, but finally sets the definition of the telos
toward which Geist reaches. Julian Young described that, in Hegel’s thought, “One must

Although she approaches the question differently, asking about ‘the future of Hegel’ rather than ‘the
history of Hegel’, Catherine Malabou offered a fascinating insight into how one might conceive of the
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think of oneself as swimming in an inexorable, ‘dialectical’ current in which something
like perfect ‘rationality’ and unity is slowly coming into being.” 534 The unity of a perfect
‘rationality’ would seem to be the end of the dialectical process through which it came to
be. Even while celebrating this sort of progressive dialecticism as a driving force of history,
Moltmann has not wholesale accepted that there is a direct connection between dialectical
becoming and the novelty of creatio nova.535
On this point Moltmann well understands that this represents a break from Hegel.
Even if one rejects, as described previously, that Hegel claimed a definitive ‘end of
history’, there is an unmistakable element of completion to Hegel’s thought. Hegel
believed, at least, that philosophy makes sense from the Absolute looking backward. What
might once have appeared as chaos, in looking backward can be shown to be structured
and meaningful development. Moltmann’s break, here, appears to be subtle. Moltmann
agreed that the end (understood as telos rather than in chronological terms) sheds light on
the negativities of the present, but then took it one step further to say that even the
negativities of the present are formed by the teleological end. Moltmann retained
something of Hegel’s processual thinking, but rejected that this process was unidirectional.
For Moltmann, the end flows into the present just as the present flows into the end. “This
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future of God among men and the whole creation becomes present in the mode in which
the future gains power over the present in promise and experienced hope and decides what
will become of the given actuality.”536
The Owl of Minerva may spread her wings at night, but she is not temporally bound
to remain there. For Moltmann, this is the Christian hope. “[Hope] does not remain in the
suspension of indecisiveness… it recognizes the beginning in the end.” 537 Despite this
subtle shift away from Hegel’s completion, Moltmann still sees Hegel’s thought at play.
Referring to Ernst Bloch’s ‘Marxist Humanism’ (also described by Moltmann as ‘Esoteric
Marxism’),538 Moltmann described the possibility of hope even within Hegel’s seemingly
closed system,
[The dialectical process allows for] real possibility and hope…It grasps the
negative in the counter move of being… In this dialectical process,
nothingness itself – ‘the enormous power of the negative’ (Hegel) – is
ontologized into ‘not-yet.’ Only as not-yet-being can it be informed with
future new being. In not-yet-being, active hope can attain to something
productive.539
Even so, this remains the point of Moltmann’s shift, for he recognizes that neither Hegel
nor Bloch can allow for something like a revelatory inbreaking of God’s promised future.
This power is not identical with the power of present reality or of the
future’s open possibility. It is believed and hoped in at that precise point
where people come face to face with the negative. The gravity of the
536
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negative and the deadliness of death need not be made harmless in order to
activate the world-transforming power of Christian hope.540
Moltmann’s eschatology, demonstrating both an Hegelian influence and a subtle
shift away from Hegel, demonstrates the ‘strongly entrenched ambiguity’ cited previously.
Such ambiguity is evident even as early as Theology of Hope where Moltmann declared,
“The theologian is not concerned merely to supply a different interpretation of the world,
of history and of human nature, but to transform them in expectation of a divine
transformation.”541 One sees ambiguity in the political concern for transformation as
expectation, not as a primary concern in its own right. For this reason, Moltmann’s works
which are intended to be distinctive practices of theological ethics have been criticized for
“a high level of abstraction” which “offer few concrete suggestions” regarding how
theology can be informative to the larger world. 542 Put more bluntly, “There is not any
correspondence between the statements of eschatology and the present reality.” 543 Yet,
Moltmann was adamant,
In the medium of hope our theological concepts become not judgments
which nail reality down to what it is, but anticipations which show reality
its prospects and its future possibilities… They do not limp after reality and
gaze on it with the night eyes of Minerva’s owl, but they illuminate reality
by displaying its future.544
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This is the ambiguity in Moltmann’s eschatology: Eschatological concepts show the world
what it could be, or perhaps will be, but they point only towards God’s final consummation
of such possibilities, with no requirement that they themselves affect such
consummation.545
To move forward with Moltmann’s conception of history, two interlocking
concepts must be first explored: future and history. One reason for the, at least, seeming
ambiguity in Moltmann’s eschatology is that he distinguishes between two distinct
conceptualities of future. The first, futurum, which he described as linear time “develops
out of the past and present, inasmuch as these hold within themselves the potentiality of
becoming and are ‘pregnant with future’. Only that can become which is already implicit
or dormant in being, and is heralded in the trends and latencies of the historical process.”546
This conception of history, as a linear movement into the future, is consistent with the
Hegelian notion that in the dialectical process sublation occurs reflexively from within that
which is being sublated.547 Sublation is not an inbreaking from without, but a development
from within.548 Moltmann described of futurum, “If future is her eternal process of

Sarah Morice-Brubaker sees a parallel ambiguity in Moltmann’s eschatology. “It seems clear that
Moltmann has deliberately included hedges against his conclusion: the ‘overspill’ that points to God’s
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becoming, past is her eternal process of dying… In the process of the ever-recurring ‘die
and become’, the times are equal.”549 Such a conception of history, for Moltmann, cannot
be eschatologically complete, for, so long as future is tied to the past, there can be no
possibility of novelty.550
The second conceptuality of the future, adventus, makes philosophically possible
the inbreaking of novelty into the extant, law-like regularities of the world. One of the
primary ways by which Moltmann differentiates futurum and adventus is in terms of
directionality. “Futurum, or its equivalents, is used for what will be; adventus, or its
cognates, for that which is coming.”551 Adventus, then, describes a novelty which is
coming, not strictly a telos toward which history is moving. This shift of directionality
thereby discounts the possibility of understanding time as decidedly linear. Yet, rather than
entirely do away with the apparent linearity of time, Moltmann describes adventus in terms
of two different concepts of the future: the phenomenal and the transcendental. The
phenomenal level, simply, is linear time. We experience time in a linear fashion, as past,
present, and future. “But on the transcendental level we then presuppose the future as the
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necessary condition if time is to be a possibility at all. The future as God’s power in time
must then be understood as the source of time.”552 Moltmann shows a decided preference
for conceiving of the future in terms of adventus because it represents the possibility of
novum, something entirely new breaking into the world. Of novum, Moltmann described,
It is not simply the old in new form. It is also a new creation. This is why
barah is used – the word employed exclusively for the divine creation.
Creatio ex vetere – creation out of the old – stands in analogy to creatio ex
nihilo – creation out of nothing; for it is creatio nova, a new creation.553
Here, I agree with Bracken’s criticism that,
What appears to be missing from Moltmann’s presentation is a deeper
philosophical understanding of the relationship between time and eternity
whereby God can ‘come’ to human beings out of the future and offer them
hope for something new and different in their lives.554
Eschatological ambiguity becomes more evident when the linearity of time is shown to, at
best, be momentary, and, at worst, an illusion made possible by the future which is to come.
When Moltmann ties the future as adventus to the idea of creatio originalis, but does so
without the complex understanding of the inherent negativity (i.e. God’s zimsum) of that
creation, creatio nova turns out to be different in kind from the creatio originalis to which
it is supposed to equate. Indeed, even the notion of God’s movement is distinctly opposite
in Moltmann’s own descriptions. In the zimsum of creatio originalis, God withdraws
internally, an act of self-negation. In the novum of creatio nova, God enters, or perhaps re-
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enters, the space of God-forsakenness, a negation of the negation seen in creatio originalis.
While such a philosophical move might make dialectical sense, Moltmann explicitly breaks
from a notion of a Hegelian dialectic on just this point. He said unequivocally, “God’s
being is in his coming, not in his becoming.”555 Yet, he also described God in terms that
sound very much like ‘becoming’, “God’s future is not that he will be as he was and is, but
that he is on the move… The coming of God means the coming of a being that no longer
dies.”556 This again looks very much like the negation of a negation, or dialectical
becoming.557
By transforming the language of ‘becoming’ to ‘coming’ Moltmann changes the
directionality of divine movement, but also loses the Hegelian grounding upon which much
of his philosophy of history has been built. This reversed eschatology, of the future making
possible the present, does not correspond to God’s self-restriction in creatio originalis if
the novum of creatio nova is going to be imposed onto the world without the possibility of
rejection. The pathetic God of creatio originalis would simply choose an ahistorical life of
apathy, contrary to the earlier description of how God’s intertrinitarian love serves as a
model for God’s inherent relationality with that which has been created. By describing
creation through zimsum Moltmann made clear that God’s coexistence within the world
was one of perichoresis: a mutuality of indwelling that stands opposed to forceful
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‘relationality’.558 When God’s (re)entry into created history appears to be forceful
penetration rather than the mutual embrace of love, then eschatology immediately breaks
from the doctrine of creation. Human history becomes illusory, merely the phenomenal
level of a grander transcendental reality, and thus creation is entirely separated from the
possibility of having any participatory relation to God’s eschatological novum.559
Bauckham understood that this is because creation “has no immanent possibility of
transcending its own tendency towards nothingness.”560 As Moltmann describes this
impossibility, “It is impossible to anticipate the end of history under the conditions of
history… It is impossible under the conditions of estrangement and as one who himself is
estranged to anticipate the home of true humanity…”561 Yet, he likewise argued that
eschatological hope should provide “not existential interpretation, but revolutionary
realization of freedom within present situation.”562

“The concept of perichoresis asserts that two or more entities can occupy the same ‘space’ at the same
time without domination, subordination, or displacement. In perichoresis, God relates to creation gently from
inside, not harshly and externally… The doctrine of perichoresis assures us that God can indwell creation
without destroying, dominating, or displacing it.” Highfield, 61.
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The bifurcation of future as adventus into phenomenal and transcendental also
thereby bifurcates Moltmann’s eschatological project. As political theology, Moltmann has
often claimed the importance of revolutionary protest against the ‘phenomenal’ status quo,
yet, he also seems to be arguing that irrespective of these actions of phenomenal
protestation the transcendental reality of God’s eschatological perfecting action will come
to the world. Thus, even if one can argue for the value of Moltmann’s political theology
apart from eschatology, which I believe one can, that these politics no longer derive from
eschatology runs contrary to Moltmann’s stated intentions. Even within this ambiguity,
Moltmann still points toward Hegel even while playing loosely with the terms. “It is not
permissible for faith to develop society’s future in an evolutionary way. It must develop it
dialectically and in representation for those who have become, and are going to become,
the victims of previous and present evolution.”563
At this point, where Moltmann’s eschatological future stands at odds with Hegel’s
dialectic of history, the ethical possibilities which he envisions are much weaker than in
the bulk of his political theology which is only implicitly eschatological. So long as
Moltmann separates in practice creatio nova from dialectical history,564 “It is not that a
progressive development issues in the kingdom of God’s glory. Rather the kingdom is
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anticipated within this world from which evil, suffering and death have not yet
disappeared.”565 As anticipation, this in-breaking of the new is ahistorical. No longer can
Moltmann speak of the future which is always already potential in the development of the
present, for whatever the future actually is, it remains external to the world of the present.566
This move for Moltmann is entirely understandable insofar as he has remained
intentionally bound to a confessional Christian community that has historically
demonstrated a great deal of unease any time the ultimate omnipotence of God is
questioned. In this way, Moltmann remains decidedly reformed.567 Moltmann’s reading list
holds so much breadth that it is often easy to gloss over this heritage and its continuing
influence. His doctoral dissertation, published as Prädestination und Perseveranz:
Geschicte und Bedeutung der reformierten Lehre “de perseverantia sanctorum,” shows
this heritage clearly. Very few public intellectuals would want their earliest work to be
definitive of the movements of a long career. Certainly this is true for Moltmann, as this
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work has never been translated into English. Yet, a scholar’s early work can give a sense
of the place from which their thought has originated.
For Moltmann, that the transcendence of God – and therefore the accompanying
eschatology from without – serves a pivotal place, even while still proclaiming the
importance of God’s immanence, is clear.
Die perseveranz des Glaubens ist ganz und gar angewiesen auf die
transzendente Treue Gottes, die als transzendenter Ursprung aller
Ereignisse auch geschichtliche Kontinuität der Ereigniße untereinander
schafft auf ein bestimmtes telos hin, denn es ist Gottes Treue, die den
geschichtlichen Zusammengang von Verheissung und Erfullung, von
Vorsatz und Vollendung schafft.568
That God’s faithfulness is here described primarily by the term ‘transcendent’ is interesting
given the later focus that Moltmann would put on the idea of promise. If faithfulness is,
indeed, transcendent, then one might rightly ask what ramifications such promise could
have for the physical world. At least at this early point in his career, Moltmann seems to
have argued that the root of faith in God’s promises is the transcendent omnipotence of
God, rather than God’s demonstrable faithfulness in empirical Christian history.569
An added layer of difficulty is seen in the fact that this sort of faith in the
transcendence of God cannot easily be incorporated in a theology which takes seriously the

Jürgen Moltmann, Prädestination und Perseveranz: Geschicte und Bedeutung der reformierten Lehre “de
perseverantia sanctorum” (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1961), 182. The perseverance of faith is entirely
dependent on the transcendent faithfulness of God, which, as the transcendental origin of all history, also
creates the historical continuity of the events among a particular telos, for it is God 's faithfulness to the
historical interrelatedness of promise and fulfillment, of intent and perfection. Even this early Moltmann had
already made the connection of adventus as ‘the transcendental origin of all history’
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Yet, through his more mature theology, Moltmann has been critiqued for failing to maintain an adequate
conception of God’s transcendence. E.g., “Inevitably, [Moltmann’s] view of divine transcendence is less than
adequate. In overemphasizing divine immanence, Moltmann fails to maintain a creative balance between
divine transcendence and immanence.” Chan Ho Park, Transcendence and Spatiality of the Triune Creator
(New York: Peter Lang, 2005), 108.
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social nature of God’s trinitarian be(com)ing. Moreover, placing faith intentionally in the
transcendence of God, rather than in the history of God’s relationship with creation and/or
with God’s people specifically, seems at odds with the strong emphasis that Moltmann has
given to the pathos of God’s self-limitation in the act of creation. If faith is found in God’s
transcendence, why ought theology to use ideas like zimsum to try to describe God’s loving
refusal to dominate that which has been created? The difficulty in thinking through
Moltmann’s advent eschatology, particularly insofar as he relates it directly to the doctrine
of creation more generally, is that there exists an apparent ambiguity in the space between
where Moltmann’s doctrine of creation seems to be leading and where he feels constrained
by the orthodoxies of historical Christian theology.570 Yet, insofar as eschatology
represents something like ‘the end of history’,571 by allowing that an eschaton of ultimate
redemption, as foretold by faith in the promises of a transcendent God, is guaranteed,
Moltmann allows a complete break with the progression of theological history which
strives to enact redemption in the world.572 There simply can be no eschatological stakes
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Kurt Anders Richardson helpfully described Moltmann within the trajectory of Christian theologians,
“Moltmann has been, from the beginning of his career, what for our purposes here is a ‘modern orthodox’
theologian.” Continuing in footnote, Richardson defined ‘modern orthodoxy’, “‘Modern orthodoxy seeks to
avoid all reductionism of doctrine and to restate classic accounts of the epistemology of revelation.” Kurt
Anders Richardson, “Moltmann’s Communitarian Trinity,” in Jürgen Moltmann and Evangelical Theology,
18. Although an over-simplified description, this seems to be a fair categorization of Moltmann’s traditional
rootedness.
Moltmann was careful to distance his own thought from what he described as “modern post-historic
philosophers [who are] secular heirs to the theology of salvation-history.” Of these philosophers he claimed,
“[They] expect too much of their ‘end of history’. It is illogical to assume that the institutions, organizations,
and bureaucracies which historical people create are not themselves historical.” Coming of God, 224, 226.
Yet, because Moltmann conceives of time as created, he also claimed, “The eschatological moment itself
must be thought of, beyond the end and consummation of history, as the consummation of creation-in-thebeginning and therefore as the exit from time into eternity.” Ibid., 294.
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Michael Burdett, referring specifically to Theology of Hope, asked this question of Moltmann, “The
looming question here, then, is how Christ’s future is also our future. Or, better, does our striving and
creativity in history have any lasting value in Christ’s future?” Michael S. Burdett, Eschatology and the
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so long as universal redemption is guaranteed.573 Yet, even while struggling to describe
God’s inbreaking into history as something entirely novel, Moltmann has also laid claim
to an eschatological openness. “The trinitarian history of the kingdom of God is an
eschatologically open history now.”574
Moltmann is a careful enough thinker that he must be fully aware of the difficulties
that are here encountered. He has tried to equally hold both that, “God’s future acts stand
in complete discontinuity to previous history,”575 and that, “This world is no ‘waiting room
for the kingdom of God’, Though this world is not yet the kingdom of God itself, it is the
battleground and the construction site for the kingdom.”576 In both cases, Moltmann
argued, “God will remain faithful to his creative resolve even if the world he has created
founders on its own wickedness. God’s will for life is greater than his will for judgment.”577
The Noahic flood notwithstanding, this is the hope upon which Moltmann’s eschatology
lives.

Technological Future (New York: Routledge, 2015), 230. Eric Trozzo described this in terms of a ‘creep’
rather than a ‘break’. “The promise is made by the God who will be all in all at the end of time, and so a logic
of fulfillment creeps into the open-endedness through his eschatological doctrine of God.” Eric J. Trozzo,
Rupturing Eschatology: Divine Glory and the Silence of the Cross (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 104.
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public misery of society and struggle against this misery.” The Experiment Hope, 101.
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Moving forward, this is a difficulty which needs to be addressed. Because of the
ambiguity in Moltmann’s eschatology, and the potential break which it represents from the
Hegelian system from which he so often looses his theological arrows,578 the disjointing
movement reverberates beyond just eschatology in se back into the entirety of the theology
from which this eschatology breaks. If one were to simply ignore this eschatological break,
Moltmann’s work still stands as a valuable political theology. There is much to be gleaned
from Moltmann, and a great many theological insights that are unique and worthwhile. Yet,
because of the emphasis that Moltmann has consistently placed on the eschatological
aspects of theology, there remains substantial room upon which to continue the work that
Moltmann has initiated. One might even see that this is a dialectical negation which
Moltmann himself has initiated. It is this task to which the final chapter of this dissertation
will be dedicated.
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Although, it is worth remembering that there also exists ambiguity in Hegel’s own notions of ‘the end’.
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CHAPTER 5: A CREATIVE COMMUNITY OF HOPE
“So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.”579 – Nick
Carraway

For many years Moltmann’s theology has struck me as unendingly practical:
political, but approachable to the sorts of evangelical Christianity in which my own story
has for so long been written.580 More than just approachable, Moltmann’s work has seemed
important.581 It speaks wisdom into a community that desperately needs wisdom, and
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F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby (New York: Scribner, 2004), 180.

The term ‘evangelical’ is notoriously difficult to nail down. The National Association of Evangelicals,
even, does not have a concise definition, but rather general lines of belief that tend to identify Evangelicals.
Writing for The Atlantic, Jonathan Merritt described Evangelicalism this way, “To the pollster, it is a
sociological term. To the pastor it is a denominational or doctrinal term. And to the politician it is a synonym
for a white Christian Republican.” Jonathan Merritt, “Defining ‘Evangelical’,” in The Atlantic, December 7,
2015, accessed August 1, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/evangelicalchristian/418236/. The term ‘Evangelical’ can be all these things and more. Yet, no single set of political
ideals, cultural indicators, or doctrinal beliefs could adequately incorporate the term. Rather, for our purposes,
I use the term ‘Evangelical’ primarily to describe, not to define, those who would self-identify as such. This
term is intentionally broad in order to capture a wide swath of American Christianity who find some historical
or present identity therein. Even within this self-identified group, however, one can find a wide variety of
theologies from those expounded by Robert Jeffress and Tony Perkins to others by Shane Claiborne and Jim
Wallis. My ecclesial heritage lies in the Church of the Nazarene, a methodist adjacent (I often use the term
‘methodish’) denomination founded at the turn of the 20 th century. The Church of the Nazarene is a proudly
international denomination, but within its membership in the United States is overwhelmingly white and
heavily politically conservative. See, Pew Research Center, “Members of the Church of the Nazarene,”
accessed
August
1,
2017,
http://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/religiousdenomination/church-of-the-nazarene/. Although not exclusively so, it is this, my ‘family’, about whom I
think when I hear the term ‘evangelical’ in its common usage. Of course, I do recognize that there are many
evangelicals and evangelical groups that demonstrate different demographics and political leanings. E.g., an
excellent history of progressive evangelicalism can be found in David R. Swartz, The Moral Minority: The
Evangelical Left in an Age of Conservatism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). For a
detailed study of the varieties of evangelicalism see Lydia Bean, The Politics of Evangelical Identity: Local
Churches and Partisan Divides in the United States and Canada (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2014).
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I see in Moltmann’s work tools that can be helpful guides to those all across the theological spectrum.
One of the major values that Moltmann continues to add to theological conversation is a broad and critical
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comes to that community in a form that feels familiar enough to be let in. This familiarity
is a double-edged sword. There are undoubtedly times in which familiarity borders on
complicity. Mary Daly called out Moltmann in particular when she said, “Irrelevance is
conspicuous in the major works of ‘theologians of hope’.”582 Daly was not opposed to hope
theology in general, but decried the sort of theologies which were written “without any
specific acknowledgement of or application to the problem of sexism or other specific
forms of injustice.”583 Yet, Daly was not entirely critical of Moltmann or his project, and
indeed in this very same work cited him positively several times.584 This is the doubleedged sword. Moltmann can, for some, seem harmless. This allows him a privileged place
of authority in which to speak truth to power. Yet, simultaneously, he is given this
privileged position because he is presented as less ‘radical’ than somebody like Mary
Daly.585

engagement with the thinkers of modernity who have deeply shaped the nature of the conversation that
continues to the present. The importance of this continued engagement was described by Ted Vial, “Fullblown modern concepts of religion and race,” among others, I would add, “rest on post-Enlightenment ideas
about culture, history, and human nature. All of the basic modern conceptual categories of identity rest on a
fundamental shift in theological anthropology (a shift in the sense of what it means to be human). Our modern
sense of what it means to be fully human is based on a specific concept of agency – the ability to effect
actions in history.” Theodore Vial, Modern Religion, Modern Race (New York: Oxford University, 2016),
12. Although Vial’s historical study focuses primarily on Schleiermacher, Herder, and Müller, I would also
include Hegel’s intentionally post-Kantian philosophy as an important harbinger of the categories that
continue to structure evangelical theological thought.
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Erskine described the difficulty of dedicating so much time to a theologian like Moltmann. Looking
directly at an essay in which Moltmann made a plea to white Christians “to surrender their racist identity…
and to dismantle racism [through] a ‘redistribution of power’ from the powerful to the powerless,” Erskine
said, “Moltmann would benefit greatly from a rereading of black and womanist theologies as he seeks to
posit ways to dismantle racism in the White world. His analysis, while helpful, is a little naïve as he has not
talked about the way in which the racism embedded in institutions provides structures for the practice of
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Despite being married to an accomplished feminist theologian, Moltmann was at
times slow to acknowledge the ways in which he could utilize his privileged position in
positive ways. Yet, neither was he entirely oblivious. Particularly as he has aged Moltmann
has been more likely to offer the sort of explicit critique that Daly wanted from the start.
With specific reference to theological sexism Moltmann said, “Masculine sexism is more
than just a group phenomenon. It is also a means of psychological warfare, a war waged
by dominant men against the women who have to be dominated.”586 This sort of explicit
denunciation has a place throughout Moltmann’s history, but has rarely been his primary
mode of address.587
Yet, when one digs beneath the gloss, Moltmann also exists as a figure on the brink
of revolution. My community needs to be influenced by other theologians of Moltmann’s
generation – e.g. Leonardo Boff, James Cone, and Mary Daly, among a multitude of others
– each of which deserves to have the same level of influence as even a great thinker like
Moltmann.588 Yet, because of accidents of birth and lineage, each of these thinkers is

racism. It is difficult to travel on one set of tracks…” Noel Leo Erskine, Black Theology and Pedagogy (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 128.
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Jürgen Moltmann, Experiences in Theology: Ways and Forms of Christian Theology, trans. Margaret Kohl
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 277.
Yet, Catherine Keller looked to Moltmann as an important voice to elevate feminist theology. “It goes
without saying, I hope, that this relationist move [of Moltmann’s] in theology, especially with its panentheist
depth, resonates profoundly with feminist theology. Rosemary Ruether, Elizabeth Johnson, Sallie McFague,
Carter Heyward, Rita Nakashima Brock – in short, a critical mass of those Christian feminists who are willing
to construct metaphors of the divine do so out of their analysis of subjectivity as co-constituted by its
relations: for good or ill, I become part of you as you become part of me.” Catherine Keller, “The Theology
of Moltmann, Feminism, and the Future,” in The Future of Theology: Essays in Honor of Jürgen Moltmann,
eds. Miroslav Volf, Carmen Krieg, Thomas Kucharz (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1996), 147.
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This points, again, to the fragile relationship between ecclesial/’personal’ theology and academic
theology. Generally speaking, I would not expect the common parishioner to have read or have any interest
in reading much from Moltmann or Rosemay Radford Ruether. Yet, I also see a role of academic theology
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disrespected in ways that Moltmann is not. I would never recommend Moltmann in
exclusivity of other such thinkers, but because he already has such an audience, his work
remains valuable. The simmering revolution beneath the surface of Moltmann’s work
should be embraced as a way to incorporate many other voices into the grand theological
dialogue.589
Moltmann’s work demonstrates that throughout his career he has intended to
incorporate an incredibly wide array of voices. It is also clear, however, that even a writer
as prolific as Moltmann could never hope to incorporate all of the voices deserving of
attention. Whether this exhibits a particular failure of or deficiency in Moltmann’s
theology, or whether it is merely the result of the inevitable editing of a wide-ranging
writer, is really up to the eye of the beholder. The aim of this project is neither to defend
nor criticize Moltmann’s work as a static whole. At face-value, Moltmann, like any other
theologian, has obvious strengths and weaknesses. Yet, Moltmann has nevertheless been
an incredibly formative figure for the last half-century of western Christian theology. His
work continues to be influential for many theologians, and so also influential for the church
and for Christian culture.
At the beginning of this work, it was argued that there is a troubling trend in
Christian theology that was given the name, ‘insular universalism’. Insular universalism

as the training of a clergy who creatively and intentionally helps to form communities that can be influenced
by theologians that they may never read.
E.g. Robert Beckford has described Moltmann as offering “central ideas” of “the theological
underpinnings for a political theology,” alongside Jon Sobrino. Robert Beckford, Dread and Pentecostal: A
Political Theology for the Black Church in Britain (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2011). Thus, I would hope
that Moltmann’s work could serve as an introduction to somebody like Beckford for whom it has been
valuable.
589

185

describes a selfish theology which places notions of comfort and safety before biblical
commands for justice, mercy, and righteousness. That Christians feel comfortable using
their faith to justify fear, hatred, and complacency is out of sync with the sort of theology
which Moltmann has sought to describe, and is fundamentally contrary to the way the
church ought to situate itself within the world. Bigotry and prejudice, violence and hatredthese are simply not what Moltmann has called ‘the way of Jesus Christ’. While one can
and should look deeply at Moltmann’s theology, as we have already begun to do,
Moltmann is not the savior of creation, nor even the savior of theology. The work of
theology can never be entirely retrospective.
Alongside a theology which seeks to be forward-looking, philosophy can serve to
both undergird and productively undermine the theological task. While both politics and
theology had a different starting point from philosophy – indeed, in both cases Hegel
believed that the starting point actually was the completed philosophical system – the goals
of each practice was fundamentally the same.590 “Religion and philosophy coincide in one.
In fact philosophy is itself | the service of God, as is religion.” 591 It is not the case that
religion and philosophy are one, but rather that they coincide in their intention to
understand God and that which God has created. “Each of them, religion as well as
philosophy, is the service of God in a way peculiar to it.”592 Religion, for Hegel, is neither
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Thom Brooks noted that Hegel understood the Philosophy of Right to be read as a continuation of the
completed system as described in the Encyclopedia. “Hegel never intended his Philosophy of Right to stand
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politics, and religion.” Thom Brooks, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy
of Right (Edinburgh: University Press, 2013), 13.
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the queen of the sciences nor speculative spiritualism. Rather, building off his own
theological formation, Hegel looked to Martin Luther as an example of the proper role that
specifically Christian theology could play in the world.593 “What Luther initiated as faith
in feeling and in the witness of the spirit, is precisely what spirit, since become more
mature, has striven to apprehend in the concept in order to free and so to find itself in the
world as it exists to-day.”594 This, for Hegel, disallows theology to embrace an emotive
free-reign, detached from reason, as the basis for either thought or action. Meaningful
theology cannot be built upon “the play of fancy.”595 Philosophy, as a guiding hand to
religious practice, ties theology specifically to the life of the world. 596 Theology cannot
merely be speculation about the nature of God, but, in-line with Volf’s earlier description,
must seek to bring about redemption. “What matters is the relationship of religion in human
beings to everything else in their world view, consciousness, cognition, purposes, and
interests.”597
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For a discussion of the varieties of Christian theology that were influential for Hegel see Cyril O’Regan,
The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 15-16. O’Regan argued that one must take seriously
Hegel’s claims of his own Lutheranism, but that such a self-understanding must be highly qualified. E.g.,
“The plethora of passages extolling the pneumaticism of Lutheran Protestantism are not easy to ignore, even
if it is admitted that Hegel makes claims of knowledge of the divine that go far beyond what Luther thinks
possible within the ordinance of Christian faith and places the doctrine of the Trinity at the center of an
explication of Christianity in a way Luther’s own texts do not countenance.”
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John Ehrenberg understood this move as a direct response to Kant’s ethical understanding, “Hegel was
not willing to leave truth to chance by accepting Kant’s implication that all authentic convictions have equal
moral weight. He proposed to develop a metaphysics of absolute knowledge that fused essence and
appearance. Freedom is not given by a ‘natural’ structure of the self as Kant had claimed, but is created only
in interaction with other individuals.” John Ehrenberg, Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea (New
York: New York University Press, 1999), 123.
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Moltmann, throughout his career has demonstrated a thorough familiarity with
Hegel. Moltmann’s work has likewise demonstrated a strong Hegelian foundation, even
while evidencing influence from theological peers such as Barth and Pannenberg, from
later Hegelians, particularly through the Marxist line, such as Ernst Bloch, and even from
philosophical/cultural figures like Goethe, Dostoyevsky, and Camus. To say that
Moltmann’s theology is Hegelian is accurate but incomplete. As discussed previously,
Hegel is not only a background influence to Moltmann’s theology, but even more so a tool
to utilized. Hegel’s own religiosity, as it was, and Hegel’s conception of religion more
generally, are areas in which Moltmann tried to utilize Hegel in creative ways.
In the previous chapter, it was argued that Moltmann accepted too freely that
dialectical history could have a definitive end. For Moltmann, eschatology is often
conceived as an imposition of novelty from without rather than a development from within.
This novelty, at least in Moltmann’s conception, represents a finality that differs from the
limited finality put forth by Hegel.598 Whereas Hegel claimed a finality of ‘the concept’,
Moltmann’s eschatology is universal, an actual end of (temporal) history.599 So, while it is
true that Moltmann is a careful reader of Hegel, it is not the case that Moltmann’s entire
project is the theologization of Hegel’s system. Moltmann has, at times, evidenced a close
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For further reading on the dialectical complexity of Hegel’s limits, an excellent introduction can be found
in G.R.G. Mure, “Hegel, Luther, and the Owl of Minerva,” Philosophy, vol. 41, no. 156 (April 1966): 127139. Mure makes the interesting argument that “finalism would never have snared him had it not been for
the solidity of his Lutheran faith,” Ibid., 139. Although less explicitly Lutheran, one might make a similar
argument regarding Moltmann’s reformed Christian heritage.
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But, of course, as end, also therefore a new beginning. As Chan Ho Park described, “Moltmann asserts
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temple is the indwelling of his unmediated and direct glory. This indwelling presence makes heaven and
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reading of particular Hegelian movements, but, at other times, has also generalized Hegel’s
system to make it function as a utilitarian descriptor of Moltmann’s own developing
thought. This generalization has opened Moltmann to critiques such as that “Moltmann
distinguishes in too facile a fashion between Hegel’s understanding of absolute Spirit and
Moltmann’s own concerns.”600 Such a critique is informative and warranted if one is
looking at Hegel on Hegel’s own terms, or if one is looking at Moltmann specifically as an
interpreter of Hegel. In either case, Moltmann has clearly taken liberties in his reading of
Hegel. Without rejecting the spirit in which such critiques are offered, though, when one
understands that Hegel remains one of a large group of arrows in Moltmann’s theological
quiver, it is perhaps not surprising that Hegel is sent in a direction which he would not have
intended. This tactic is, of course, not at all unique to Moltmann. Deleuze celebrated just
this sort of philosophical utilitarianism as the proper becoming of thought. “[Nietzsche]
compares the thinker to an arrow shot by nature that another thinker picks up where it has
fallen so that he can shoot it somewhere else.”601
Maintaining this Deleuzian/Nietzschean metaphor, even while Moltmann has
picked up and shot his own Hegelian arrow, what next happens with that arrow is ultimately
out of his control. And so, a dissertation such as this would be incomplete without moving
away from interpretation into the practice of constructive theology. To fail to make this
move would run counter to Moltmann’s own example, and would also demonstrate a
failure to understand the theological importance of context and situatedness. Yet, the
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practice of constructive theology never develops ex nihilo. Every theological speech-act
arrives mid-conversation, arising from the pause in which other conversants inhale before
continuing. Theology is, therefore, an interruption. It is also a disruption. It is both an
outbreaking and an inbreaking. Theology is speech embodied – an historical communal
march.
This particular practice of theology is undertaken intentionally within the lineage
of both Moltmann and Hegel. In this way, it is neither unique nor entirely creative. As
constructive, the preceding discussions were offered as a propaedeutic – not exhaustive,
but a guidepost pointing toward that which is to come. The following theology will build
particularly upon the notion of sublation as a powerful historical and theological force.602
It will be built upon the doctrine of creation described in the previous chapter, maintaining
a deep connection between the doctrines of creation and eschatology, without accepting
Moltmann’s premise that ultimately creatio nova describes a rejection of the continued
development of a sublative system. This theology will be developed as an antidote, at least
ideally, to the sorts of dogmatic rigidness that allow and celebrate violence, prejudice, and
the subjugation of persons.603 The cornerstone of such theology is the sort of epistemic
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An interesting theological approach to the idea of sublation, or, perhaps more accurately, a sublationary
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humility described and evidenced by both Moltmann and Hegel at various points, although
certainly not entirely throughout, their writings.604

Tragic Creation
The Christian doctrine of creation, looking to the early stories of Genesis as
inspiration, often understands the world to be, in some sense, tragic. The story often called,
“The Fall,” is read as a story of the inbreaking of tragedy into an otherwise perfect world.
Sin and death enter into God’s good creation when the forbidden fruit passes the lips of
Adam and/or Eve. To the point at which this event occurred, ostensibly, there was neither
evil nor pain, only life abundant. Harmony and peace were spread across the land as all of
creation lived in perfect symbiosis. In trying to bring together the world as described and
the world as encountered, “The Fall” becomes an easy way to gloss over the differences
encountered. “The Fall” describes why a world which was created as perfect is now filled
with death and pain.605 Adam and Eve are convenient scapegoats for explaining the
difficulties of the world.606 Yet, while convenient, such a reading can also become very
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problematic. For those Christians who reject so-called biblical literalism, and therefore
have no theological need to cling to young-earth creationism, the notion of “The Fall”
simply does not make easy sense.607 If there was, indeed, a “Fall,” at which point in
evolutionary history did it take place? It was not at the outset of the formation of the planet,
as it appears to be in the Genesis narratives, for billions of years passed before the advent
of cognition. While there might be theologically justifiable times and ways to speak about
sin and sinfulness outside of a direct connection to cognition, it would demonstrate poor
execution on God’s part if non-cognitive beings could so disrupt God’s creation as to
render it unrecognizable from God’s initial plan.
Moltmann’s version of the creation story does not conceive of first humans in a
way that would allow mimetic blame for the problems of the world. Rather, the tragedy
evidenced in the present world is not a substantial change from God’s pre-temporal
perfection of creation. Nowhere in Christian scriptures is it claimed that God’s creation
was ‘perfect’, merely that God looked at it and saw that it was ‘good’. While there might
remain solid theological reasons, pertaining to the traditional attributes of God, to consider
the possibility of speaking about a primordial creative perfection, there also remain very
good reasons to reject this possibility. Even within the traditional Christian stories of
creation, one could make a strong argument against primordial perfection.

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972). Girard’s work is essential reading in exploring the
doctrine of creation as it relates to hamartiology.
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this present study are essays by Celia Deane-Drummond, “In Adam All Die? Questions at the Boundary of
Niche Construction, Community Evolution, and Original Sin,” and James K.A. Smith, “What Stands on the
Fall? A Philosophical Exploration.”

192

The first biblical creation story seems to posit something other than a traditional
understanding of creatio ex nihilo.608 God’s creative activity is not described in terms of
construction, but in terms of organization. Creation, in this story, is characterized primarily
as a practice of differentiation, not one of unification. As the narrative progresses, the
overwhelming oneness of chaos, is differentiated to the point that it ceases to have any
significant role in the new world. Walter Brueggemann has described this creative
movement in these terms, “Chaos has been tamed and subdued so that God now toys with
the raging waters that are no longer a threat to creation.”609 As the story progresses from
the initial movement of the separation of the waters above from the waters below, the
process of separation continues. God separated the light from the dark. God separated the
waters further so that land could appear. Separation and division, necessary attributes for
organization, for that which is not divided requires no organization, are replete throughout
this narrative. Within the creative world there exists a great multiplicity which itself is
profoundly differentiated from God in the act of creation.610
That this story need not be read literally is irrelevant to this conversation. Theology
does not concern itself with creation because it is of fundamental importance to understand
‘the beginning of time’. Rather, creation holds a special place within the theological task
because it describes, for the first time, something about the nature of God and of God’s
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relationship with that which has been created. Theological topics/doctrines such as Trinity,
Christology, hamartiology, and even atonement theory ought to be conceived from within
a particular understanding of creation. If one were to begin with, say, atonement, as entirely
removed from creation, the focus of such a theology would be anthropocentric in an
unhelpful way.611 In any theological study, creation grounds humanity within a larger
organismic reality.
When the act of creation is conceived as a movement of differentiation, it can be
that the world is ‘good’ in-line with the first Genesis narrative, while simultaneously being
understood as tragic.612 Through the divine self-contraction, by allowing the possibility of
an Other, God’s original creative activity demonstrates a great wager. This is, in many
ways, the opposite of Pascal’s wager. By participating in what Jonas described as, “The
continued holding-himself-in,”613 God is continually and creatively demonstrating an
action of hope. God’s hope, and therefore God’s wager, is for the continuance of life in/for
the created world. Seemingly contrary to what has just been stated, Moltmann did say
explicitly that “God does not throw dice.”614 Moltmann’s primary concern, though, was to
explain that God’s act of creatio originalis is not a capricious act. Rather, Moltmann

Indeed, I would argue that feminist critiques of Moltmann’s theology of the cross, like those of Dorothee
Sӧlle and Wohnee Anne Joh cited earlier, point to the ways in which Moltmann’s doctrine of creation serves
to sublate Moltmann’s early theologia crucis.
611

612

One of the most profound expositors of the interplay between theology and tragedy was Donald
MacKinnon. An introductory essay in which he described the importance of linking theology and tragedy
can be found in, D.M. MacKinnon, “Theology and Tragedy,” Religious Studies, vol. 2, no. 2 (April, 1967):
163-169. A more detailed account can be found in Donald MacKinnon, The Problem of Metaphysics (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1974). Here, MacKinnon claimed, “Christianity can provide men with a
faith through which they are enabled to hold steadfastly to the significance of the tragic.” Ibid., 134.
613

614

Mortality and Morality, 142.
“Is the World Unfinished?,” 406.

194

wanted his readers to understand that “God in his freedom brings into being a creation
which corresponds to him.”615 God’s creative activities are volitional through and through,
and they are characterized by the hope for community in spite of difference. Moltmann
made it quite clear that the activity of creation is driven by divine love rather than
ontological compulsion. So, even while Moltmann claimed that God does not throw dice,
he also believed, at least at some level, that creation holds its very existence within its own
hands.
Moltmann claimed that theology and science “have become companions in
tribulation, under the pressure of the ecological crisis and the search for the new direction
which both must work for, if human beings and nature are to survive at all on this earth.”616
It is this ‘if’ that seems to be so foundationally important for Moltmann’s thought, but also
that which seems to make him so uncomfortable - “If nature is to survive at all.” There are
many instances throughout Moltmann’s writings in which he seems adamant that creation,
particularly the human part of creation, has an inner capacity to utterly destroy itself.
Moltmann, for decades, has spoken out against nuclear proliferation because he sees in this
technology the possibility of the ultimate destruction of creation.617
The question, therefore, should be asked of Moltmann, who is to say that God
doesn’t roll dice?618 Moltmann is in a difficult position. On the one hand, he argued for a
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world which is created through God-forsakenness.619 On the other hand, he desires to
theologically begin with the end. He sees eschatology not as a self-sufficient branch of the
theological task, but as the lens through which all of theology is viewed. This would, of
course, necessitate some sort of understanding of what ‘the end’ entails. This seems to be
the crux of Moltmann’s discomfort, and he has a difficult time explaining eschatological
hope in such a way that it does not turn into an eschatological certainty. Hope, by its very
nature, can only exist in the face of the unknown. And, Moltmann’s own doctrine of creatio
originalis is a doctrine of the unknown, one might even say a doctrine of thrown-dice.
By God’s self-withdrawal, by allowing the space for an Other, God has created a
world in which life and death, living and dying, lie in the hands of the created. Moreover,
so long as Christian theology speaks of God as the source of life this theology must also,
alongside Hegel’s discussion of Hamlet, understand that death has lurked from the
beginning. Death is not an unnatural happening stemming from the poor decision making
of one (or two) people. Indeed, according to the first creation narrative, the absence of life,
the primordial tohu va bohu is primary to the existence of life extra Deus. That which lies
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outside of the source of life is always already looking into the face of death. One might
even argue that everything which lies outside of the source of life is always already in a
process of perpetual perishing.620 God’s wager, and the hope of creation, is that the
melancholy and disgust experienced by Hamlet will not consume creation from the inside,
as it did with Hamlet. On the contrary, in the face of the grief and nausea, God’s wager is
that creation hopes to truly experience life in the midst of the ubiquity of death. As such,
in the divine gamble of creation God has guaranteed continual suffering. However, this
suffering is not evidence of a removed and apathetic God. On the contrary, this suffering,
the suffering guaranteed by zimsum, is a suffering of mutuality. The act of creation not only
guarantees the suffering of creation, but likewise that of Creator. As Jonas said, “God’s
own destiny, his doing or undoing, is at stake in this universe to whose unknowing dealings
he committed his substance, and man has become the eminent repository of this supreme
and ever betrayable trust.”621 Just as with the Hebrew conception of the shekinah, in which
God committed God’s presence to a particular time, space, and people, so too, in the
zimsum, has God committed Godself to the world created through zimsum.622 If God’s

The phrase ‘perpetual perishing’ comes from Locke through A.N. Whitehead. “The ultimate evil in the
temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a ‘perpetual
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nature is to be all-in-all, by allowing the existence of an Other, God has wagered on God’s
own destiny, tying it to the creation which God freely created, and endowed with creative
freedom of its own. God is related to creation essentially, not just erotically.623 If God is so
understood, as essentially related to creation, then the tragedy inherent in creation comes
more clearly into focus.624
To speak of a tragic creation is not to claim that God made a mistake. Tragedy does
not represent a failure on behalf of the Creator. Rather, creation is tragic purposively and
necessarily. Tragedy, within the Hegelian understanding described previously, is the
understanding that life is not at all “a mere satisfaction gained without struggle, but on the
contrary [thrives] only when a deeper breach has rent the subject’s inner life and his whole
existence.”625 Tragedy is not that death is a possibility; nor even that death is an
inevitability. The tragedy of creation is that both life and death must be fully embraced.

Fiddes described the relationship between shekinah and zimsum for Moltmann. “While creation is ‘in’
God, God is not ‘in’ creation but remains ‘over against it’ until the moment of future new creation when the
universe will be filled with the presence of God… However, Moltmann finds that he cannot deny indwellings
of God in the world during the course of history altogether; he thus describes them as ‘special presences’…
He conceives of them as transient hidden presences in which the Shekinah Glory of God is ‘homeless’ in the
world, awaiting redemption.” Paul S. Fiddes, Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew Wisdom and
Christian Doctrine in a Late-Modern Context (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 253.
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Even as apparently opposite poles, one clearly preferable to the other from the mind’s
point-of-view, life itself can only be fully embraced when one equally embraces death. Just
as God embraced the possibility of relationship through the practice of separation, so too
must the possibility of life be embraced through the reality of death. By embracing death,
the very negation of life, one acts with intentionality to bring about life more fully. “There
is no genuine affirmation of life in this world without the struggle against life’s
negations.”626 Life, as it turns out, is the negation of a negation. Citing Hegel affirmatively,
Moltmann pointed to the sublative movements of life, “Says Hegel rightly, ‘[The Christian
life] is not one that shuns death and keeps clear of destruction. It endures its death and in
death maintains its being’.”627
A doctrine of creation that begins with the notion of the tragic situates the
theological task differently than a doctrine of creation that begins with the notion of a
utopic nothingness. A tragic creation, in contrast to the utopian creation, is inherently
organic and evolutionary. The present existence of creation is not in any way different in
kind from the original creation which God intended. The doctrine of a tragic creation does
not inherently reject any traditionally ‘orthodox’ doctrines of the Christian church. If so
chosen, one can see creatio originalis to be a tragic act while still affirming concepts with
strong resonance in Moltmann’s own reformed tradition like original sin, human depravity,
sola fide, and sola gratia. Yet, by recognizing the tragic as inherent to creation, rather than
an accident related to one person’s free will, the orientation of theology shifts from one’s
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own need for atonement to the need for the redemption of all things.628 The inherent
movement of creation is not from sin to salvation but from brokenness to wholeness. Just
as Hegel described the triad of Being-Nothing-Becoming, the Christian story is one of Life
(in which God is all in all), Brokenness (both as God-forsakenness and as volitional
rebellion against the Creator God), and Living (the eschatological future become the
eschatological present in which God again dwells among creation in mutually
interpenetrative relationship).
Such tragedy is not of the ‘woe is me’ variety. Following Hegel’s methodology, the
concept of tragedy is primarily structural, not, as with a thinker like Aristotle, primarily the
results of a certain action.629 The crux of tragedy, for Hegel, is that the tragic hero, when
faced with two choices – in this case life and death – must wholeheartedly choose one
choice – life – even while the other – death – is inherent to the very nature of the hero.
Tragedy is a quixotic struggle to bring about that which could be in contradistinction to
that which is and/or is not. Tragedy is not an excuse for despair. Tragic creation cries out
for redemption. Clyde Woods well described this kind of tragedy, equating it with the
historical practice of singing the blues. The blues do not represent the oppressed wailing in

Moltmann’s own work demonstrates a transition along these lines. Looking at Moltmann’s early theology
of the cross, Adam Kotsko saw Moltmann pointing toward something which he could not yet reach.
“Moltmann’s social analysis is not closely integrated into his theological project in The Crucified God… The
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priori non-relational kernel thus seems to keep Moltmann from developing a new theology that truly escapes
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self-pity, but rather “are the cries of a new world being born.”630 By pointing to creation as
inherently tragic, which is something very different than to point to creation as inherently
fallen, the role of theology is much the same as singing the blues.
Theology cannot stop at the point of saying, ‘The world is not as it should be’, but
must speak life into existence within a world of death. The church should look at the world
as broken. The church should sense the tragedy of God’s intentional absence – be reminded
again of the cry of dereliction. Yet, the proper response is not Hamlet’s melancholy or
disgust, much less the despair of hopelessness. Rather, life in all of its forms must be
embraced and celebrated. Theology should not be misconstrued as personal and as
primarily concerned with the invisible. Rather, like singers of the blues, an essential task
of theologians is, “[To] critique oppressive and uneven social conditions and [to charge]
communities to make them better.”631 In order to move toward such a blues practice, a
theology which is grounded in an understanding of tragic creation, might also reconsider
what it means to speak about humanity, in particular, as having been created in the image
of God, for this is an important element of the first creation account in Genesis.632
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Creation for the Imago Dei
The understanding of creation as tragic has primarily been influenced by the first
Genesis creation story, along with, of course, the Luria/Jonas/Moltmann variations on
God’s internalized self-restrictive movement. The idea of tragedy is rooted in the chaostheology of Genesis 1. Yet, there is also another biblical theme by which the doctrine of
creation is often conceived: the imago Dei – humankind being created in the “image of
God.”633
The Christian theological tradition has a long history of reference to the concept of
the imago Dei.634 The concept has its root in Genesis’ second story of creation in which
God proclaimed, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness.” 635 A
popular interpretation of this verse speaks of the imago Dei as both a model by which to
understand human nature, and also as a distinctive human attribute that was either lost or
tainted, in whole or in part, through the sin of Adam.636 Yet, when read together with a
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doctrine of tragic creation Christian theology might be presented with a different
understanding of what it means to speak of the imago Dei, not as a characteristic to be lost,
but as an intentionally relational practice.637
Previously, the notion of God’s essential relationship to creation was introduced as
a way to describe that God’s love is not merely emotive but inherent. If this is the case,
then the general trend in Christian theology of speaking of humankind as having been
created in the image of God is incomplete. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, it
becomes necessary to speak of humankind as having been created for the image of God.
The distinction is subtle, but important. To say that humankind is created in the image of
God is, at least, to say that humanity shares a likeness with God.638 Such an understanding
of being created in the image of God based on shared characteristics lacks a robust
understanding of creation being related to, and insofar as possible, in relationship with,
God. To speak of creation through zimsum demonstrates both an interiorizing and an
exteriorizing moment in the life of God. The withdrawn God of the zimsum, in the act of

confused and often in error… The political image, likewise, was greatly obscured by the fall… To be sure,
instead of humanity constituting a blessing to the rest of creation – through the mediation of graces and
benefits from God – it was now a curse… Since Wesley maintains that the moral image is the principal image
of God in that it is a reflection of the very righteousness and holiness of the Supreme Being, the greatest
disruption [is] encountered here… Having lost the moral image of God, Adam sunk partly into ‘the image of
the devil’ in pride, malice, and in other evil dispositions.” Kenneth J. Collins, The Scripture Way of Salvation:
The Heart of John Wesley’s Theology (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997),29-30.
637

Fretheim described well the complexities in biblical accounts of creation, both within the stories of
Genesis as well as throughout the rest of Christian scripture. As does Moltmann, Fretheim describes three
interrelated “points of reference” for a doctrine of creation, ‘Originating’, ‘Continuing’, and ‘Completing’.
Fretheim’s language of ‘completing’ actually fits better with my conception of tragic creation than
Moltmann’s ‘creatio nova’. See, especially God and World in the Old Testament, 1-12.
Grenz described this view as such, “Perhaps the best-known and historically the most widely held
understanding of the imago dei views it as referring to certain characteristics or capacities inherent in the
structure of human nature. Because they resemble the corresponding qualities in God, their possession makes
humans like God.” The Social God and the Relational Self, 142.
638

203

creating, has in a very real way filled the space exterior to God with Godself once again. It
is not merely that God has created an other with which God desires to be in relationship.
Rather, in creating an other, God has simultaneously shown Godself to be a “God of…”
God is not merely God, but a God of creation. God’s very nature has been determined
through the act of creation.639 This is what it means to say that God is related to creation
essentially, and this is why the language of creation ‘in the image of God’ is incomplete: It
neglects the fact that God is also formed in the image of creation.640 Thus, creation is not
only ‘in the image of God’, but also, and equally importantly, ‘for the image of God’.
Creation is made ‘for the image of God’ because, in the mutual inter-relatedness, the ‘God
of’ has tied Godself to the ebbs and flows of creation-history. God, the living and dying
God, the ‘God of’ now exists as essentially related to creation. This essential relation goes
beyond relationship to relatedness.641
Harvie noted, “One potential problem with Moltmann’s conception of zimsum is the possibility that such
considerations introduce history into the being of God, thereby limiting God to the vicissitudes of the created
history.” Harvie, 66. Although I would disagree that this is problematic, rather seeing it as a strength in
Moltmann’s political theology, Harvie is correct to see this as an implication of Moltmann’s doctrine of
creation.
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Moving beyond the concept of relationship means simultaneously rethinking what
it means to speak of God. God is not only the God of love, or the God who loves, but just
as deeply the God who suffers. However, God does not merely suffer vicariously through
the suffering of God’s creation. On the contrary, taken to the extremes, every single life
extinguished, every evil act committed against God’s creation, serves to extinguish the
image of God. The ‘God of’, in each moment, simultaneously becomes the ‘God who was’.
The God who is related essentially to creation, suffers at the hand of the free will with
which creation has been bestowed. Likewise, as God suffers at the hand of creation, so too
does creation suffer at its own hand. The Creator God, the ‘God of’, cannot be disinterested
in the face of evil, nor does God remain unaffected. The God of zimsum, the God who has
revealed Godself to be a ‘God of’, is threatened by the potential self-destruction of creation
because this God would simply become a God of nothing. God would be nothing more
than an unaddressed subject, the ‘God of’ would cease to be. This is what is at stake with
the conception of God as essentially related to creation. This is the reality of a tragic world.
Death has lurked from the beginning.
Beyond even the narratives of creation, this is also the essence of the distinctly
Christian message. Mortality is the cornerstone of the incarnation. Christ is only truly
human insofar as his own death has lurked from the beginning.642 Aside from discussions
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of atonement, or the notion of a sacrificial death, Jesus’ own life, just like creatio originalis,
is an act of divine creativity.643 Moltmann said,
Jesus' life is inspired not just by the wish for a life after death, but by the
will for life before death, yes, even against death… Freed life, redeemed
life, divine life is there, in this world, in our time, in the midst of us… The
basic characteristic of the life of Jesus is not the consolation of the beyond,
not even the hope in the future, but his becoming human, becoming
flesh…644
Immortality, then, insofar as the Christian faith has often found hope in the concept, might
be said to be found in the ways in which creation both creates and uncreates the divine.
Our concern for immortality, according to Jonas, should be played out intentionally in our
lives, “When in our brief span we serve our threatened mortal affairs and help the suffering
immortal God.”645 Moreover, it is not only the human lot in a tragic world to live on behalf
of the suffering immortal God, but also to live on behalf of the dead of their own kind. In
the words of Wendell Berry, “The living must protect the dead. Their lives made the
meaning of their deaths, and that is the meaning that their deaths ought to have.”646 The
immortality of the dead needs to be celebrated by remembering rightly the lives led, and
by re-membering, putting to flesh, the legacies left by the departed. Our immediate
theological concern should not be for our own immortality, but for immortality itself, for
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the ongoingness of creation in the face of self-destruction. Eschatology, as rooted in
creation, seeks not a prescribed future, but recognizes that the present is the becoming of
the future, already past.
To understand, and perhaps even to celebrate, a doctrine of tragic creation, requires
that the empirical world be addressed in a very particular way. If tragedy is inherent to the
world, rather than brokenness being an accidental and temporary way of being, the fragility
of the global ecosystem must become a point of profound discomfort. Hegel described this
as the difference between ‘modern’ tragedy and ancient tragedy. Ancient tragedy
demonstrated that the tragic hero was primarily concerned with her own end, whereas in
modern tragedy the tragic hero must recognize a much more broadly interconnected world
and the necessity to choose in the face of seemingly genuine contingency. 647 Whereas the
Greeks might point toward the gods as their victimizers, the modern hero instead must look
at the historical march of the past as both the victimizer and potential savior of the
present.648
To theologically embrace the inherent tragedy of creation is to make just such a
move. One cannot look at the planet, through either a scientific/ecological or a moral lens,
and argue that the continued well-being of the planet and its inhabitants is a matter left up
to the fates. Rather, to be ‘the hero’ of this particular tragedy, which must be the position
in which the church envisages herself, one must take the bold step of choosing the

Houlgate described Hegel’s ‘modern’ tragic hero as “rooted in character. Individuals act out of character;
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647

“They possess the character and passions given to them by nature and society… but nevertheless they are
ultimately the ones who take the decision to act.” Ibid.
648

207

simultaneous embrace of life and death, of living and dying, in order that life can be made
manifest throughout. We can and should decry the violent taking of life in all forms, but
we must simultaneously embrace the notion of death more generally. According to
Moltmann, “The relationships at the end and death of man’s life are similar, I believe, to
those at the beginning and origin of human life. If at the beginning it is a question of the
human acceptance of life, here it is a question of the human surrendering of life.”649
The example of Jesus ought to be paramount for the ethical development of the
Christian church. That Jesus died is not in itself exemplary. If the church is to embrace the
notion that Jesus was the Deus-Homo,650 fully God and fully human, then death is a simple
necessity of the human experience. That Jesus died “for the sins of the whole world”651 is
also beside this particular point. According to Moltmann,
The crucifixion of Jesus either refuted his preaching in view of his person,
or his person in view of his preaching, and so refuted both together; or else
his preaching was drawn into his person to the very point of his death, so
that on the basis of his resurrection from the dead it had to continue to be
preached as ‘the word of the cross’.652
To make Jesus’ death, and therefore also his life, merely about personal atonement, as
Christian theology is often wont to do, is to entirely miss the point. The resurrection, the
negation of death’s negation, is not evidence of God’s forgiveness of ‘sins’, but a promise
for, and an invitation to participate in, the redemptive acts of God’s continuing creation.
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What the embrace of a doctrine of tragic creation for the image of God cannot offer
is a definitive ethical guideline for ‘proper’ Christian behavior or ecclesial polity. However,
at the very least, what such a doctrine provides is the direct connection between the present
state of humanity and whatever it is that is meant by ‘original creation’. The goal of the
Christian faith, then, cannot be merely to return to a state of primordial perfection as such
never existed. Rather, the role of theology is to embrace the continued becoming of creation
in the face of its possible existential demise. The eschatology engendered by such a
theological cornerstone can never be solely about ‘me’, for my own life is but a minute
moment of God’s creative history.653 This reorientation of bringing together individual
salvation with the need for communal redemption represents a significant shift for much
of Christian theology, particularly for the ‘Evangelicalism’ which puts so much weight on
the individual’s private choice.654 Such a change impacts how we live, how we worship,
even, as Moltmann claimed, how the Bible is read.655 “If we read the Bible with the eyes
of the suffering we shall see in it the hopes of God. Then we shall realize that the Bible is
a most revolutionary and even subversive book… because it points even beyond our
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present time into the future of God.”656 The tragic doctrine of creation is here presented as
a narrative, a competing narrative to a story of creation which describes The Fall of
humanity, as having possessed and lost the totality of the image of God. This competing
narrative is intended, at least initially, to re-orient the theological endeavor from concerns
for personal salvation to the quest for universal redemption. Moving in this direction, it
will continue to be argued, requires a cultural-linguistic community of faith by which and
in which this narrative is cultivated. Christianly, this community is best described in the
church, and the church is best described in terms of God’s trinitarian love. It is to this
description that we now turn.

A Trinitarian Church
The reorientation made manifest by the embrace of a doctrine of tragic creation
encourages a move away from a theology of personal atonement to a theology of universal
redemption. Yet, it is definitively the role of the Christian to participate in God’s creative
redemptive activities in and for the world. This reorientation changes the way traditional
doctrines like atonement and salvation can be conceived. As no longer a primary focal
point for a redemptive theology, both atonement and salvation become inherently
communal desires. The role of the church thus becomes an incredibly formative theological
force.657
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Stanley Hauerwas has claimed, “The truthfulness of Christian convictions can only
be tested by recognizing that they involve the claim that the character of the world is such
that it requires the formation of a people.”658 Hauerwas places a strong emphasis on the
development of a people, the church, whose role is to practice redemptive activity in the
world. Leonardo Boff, without discounting the explicit role of the church, offered an
important reminder that there exists something much larger than the human community of
the church. “We are not confronted merely with the one earth, but with the one cosmos
with all its bodies, particles, and energies forming a unique interdependent community.”659
The community of the church yet holds a particular place of importance, because, “We
become aware of the uniqueness of those particular components of nature known as man
and woman… Only human beings are responsible for making a response (hence
responsibility!) to the proposition advanced by creation.”660
The introduction to this dissertation described a theological moment in time, or,
perhaps more accurately, a theological movement through time, that is beset by naïve
selfishness and the propensity for violent “self-care.” Boff’s reminder of the
interconnectedness of the cosmos should not be overlooked, but neither should the special
place of responsibility held by humanity. It is noteworthy that Boff brought together the
ideas of response and responsibility. That creation advances a proposition in need of a
response is reminiscent of Romans 8. While this passage is often interpreted as
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disembodied, as a rejection of the physicality of the ‘present world’, Boff seems to offer a
different interpretive opportunity for this text.
The creation waits with eager longing for the revealing of the children of
God; for the creation was subjected to futility, not of its own will but by the
will of the one who subjected it, in hope that the creation itself will be set
free from its bondage to decay and will obtain the freedom of the glory of
the children of God. We know that the whole creation has been groaning in
labour pains until now; and not only the creation but we ourselves.661
Within the larger context of this passage there is an intentional juxtaposition of
‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’. Without discounting that distinction, one can still read this passage
terrestrially and holistically as a discussion of embodied faith. That labor pains elicit more
than simple groans is well-established. The ‘groans’ of creation described here, are the
deep and guttural cries from the place in which death and life intersect. Creation, existing
in ‘bondage to decay’ hopes for life while simultaneously experiencing the pain which
seems like dying.662 In the midst of the pain of decay, a slow but decisive experience of
dying, creation retains hope for the birth of something new – ‘the revealing of the children
of God’.663 If creation is to be redeemed, it will be through the birthing of the children of
God. The cries of creation demand a response not from the individual but from the
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community that hopes for “the redemption of our bodies.”664 The hope for redemption and
the responsibility for the cries of creation come together in the community of the church.
Both Moltmann and Moltmann’s Hegel have together provided a sound foundation
upon which a political ecclesiology can be built. That such an ecclesiology should be
political gets to the heart of the theological world that Moltmann has spent his career
building. “A consistent theological doctrine of the church is by its very nature an eminently
political and social doctrine of the church as well.”665 For Moltmann, ‘politics’ is not
something that the church does, but is a necessary reality of who the church is. The church
is inherently political because it is an embodied reality within the world.666 “If the church
were to ignore its social and political Sitz im Leben – its situation in the life of mankind –
then it would be forsaking the cross of its Lord.”667 Ecclesiology takes place within a
particular Sitz im Leben. Even as a doctrinal commitment of sorts, ecclesiology has to be
tied to empirical realities - it is both an intensely personal and interpersonal idea. Taken
from the punctiliar moment, each of these traditions is also incorporated into a much
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grander historical movement of individuals who all had differing hopes, goals, and
expectations.668
So, even while the best ecclesiology is always oriented by a particular set of social
and political circumstances, there are yet larger-scale issues of an interpersonal coming
together that can be informative in a wide variety of particular circumstances. Moltmann
can be informative in the development of a political ecclesiology in particular because of
his well-developed trinitarian theology. The internal self-relatedness of a trinitarian God,
described by Moltmann using the term perichoresis, demonstrates that God is better
characterized with the term ‘becoming’ than the term ‘being’. Perichoresis is a term that
relies heavily on notions of movement. It is not, in any way, static. Whatever it is that is
meant by the term ‘Trinity’ cannot simply be a fixed relationship of divine persons.669
From the outset, perichoresis problematizes personhood language without thereby
rejecting it in its entirety. That perichoresis disallows static interpretation forces us to
reconsider our understanding of non-trinitarian personhood alongside trinitarian
personhood. Advances in the quantum sciences have already begun to ask incredibly
difficult questions about the nature of reality. From speculation that all of empirical reality
is merely an illusion670 to similar speculation that empirical reality is a complex computer
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simulation,671 even the apparent reality of nature has been called into question. Moving
back further, atomic physics had already begun to understand the changing nature of reality
based upon individual perception.
Albert Einstein, describing the early debate as to whether light was best
characterized as a wave or as a particle, said,
It seems as though we must use sometimes the one theory and sometimes
the other, while at times we may use either. We are faced with a new kind
of difficulty. We have two contradictory pictures of reality; separately
neither of them fully explains the phenomena of light, but together they
do!672
This description by Einstein almost seems to be a one-to-one parallel to Hegel’s thought:
two contradictory propositions which, only when brought together and held in tension form
a productive way forward. Einstein went on, “One of the fundamental questions raised by
recent advance in science is how to reconcile the two contradictory views of matter and
wave. It is one of those fundamental difficulties which, once formulated, must lead, in the
long run, to scientific progress.”673 The famed physicist Niels Bohr agreed, “An essential
element of ambiguity is involved in ascribing physical attributes to atomic objects.”674
This ambiguity is exactly what Hegel was trying to describe in his dialectical
movement. At any given moment two opposing forces, ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’ are creating
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something new, ‘Becoming’, through the tension of their mutual interpenetration. The
ambiguity evident in the debate over wave/particle dualism can be helpful in describing
what is meant by the term ‘person’ with reference both to persons in the world and the
trinitarian persons of God. Personhood is a dynamic reality, never any one thing, and never
capable of being defined from within a single perceptual reality. Remember again Hegel’s
statement about ‘Being’ and ‘Nothing’, “The one does not sublate the other externally—
but each sublates itself in itself and is in its own self the opposite of itself.” 675 This would
seem to be a linguistic way by which one might describe the continuous becoming of
personhood. Without becoming bogged down in the debates of the physicists, it is a fair
generalization to say that, whatever reality is represented by the term ‘person’, it need not
to be conceived as either static or substance.
The trinitarian perichoresis demonstrates at least two characteristics which can be
useful in the description and creation of ecclesiology: vulnerability and the embrace of
otherness. The vulnerability of God is made strongly evident in God’s initial creative selfwithdrawal. Vulnerability is a direct requirement of love. Yet, such vulnerability is not
only extrinsic to God, but also intrinsic to the very nature of God.676 In order to speak of a
Trinity, one can see both a unity and a diversity as simultaneous. In order to avoid the
classical trinitarian language of substance, Moltmann argued, “The unity of the Trinity
cannot be a monadic unity. The unity of the divine tri-unity… lies in their fellowship, not
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in the identity of a single subject.”677 Here, Moltmann’s description of trinitarian unity can
be illustrative of the proper functioning of the church. The church is not built upon
commonality. Nor is the church strengthened by the gathering together of similarity. The
unity of the church is built upon the fellowship of persons, upon the coming-together in
common purpose. Moltmann described God as, “Open to man, open to the world and open
to time… The Trinity does not only manifest what it is in itself; it also opens itself for
history and experience of history.”678 This openness of self is the same vulnerability to
which the church is called. The church is not the cornerstone of history, nor the driving
force behind history, but must be intentionally open to the movements of extra-ecclesial
becoming. Just as God has made Godself open to humanity, to the world, and to time, so
too must the church allow itself to become open to the possibility of being substantially
impacted from without.679 The church must refuse to be the sort of insular community that
fails to see how its own socio-cultural situatedness impacts its development and its
doctrine. Moreover, the church must reject the notion that it stands outside of or above

677

The Trinity and the Kingdom, 95.

678

The Church in the Power of the Spirit, 56.

679

At this juncture, it seems necessary to be reminded that this, as with any, practice of theology is strongly
autobiographical and self-referential. While I am not defined by the church, and the church is certainly not
defined by me, I have a particularly limited vantage point from which to make theological proclamations.
Thus, even this discussion of ecclesiology presupposes something like my own ecclesial reference-point.
Kwok Pui-lan, among numerous others, has pointed out how “religious language when spiritualized can be
used to camouflage oppressive reality and sacralize the pain of debased servanthood.” Kwok Pui-lan,
Postcolonial Imagination and Feminist Theology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005) 184. Likewise,
James Cone has demonstrated that use of the language of servanthood was used by white missionaries to
“[Persuade] most black religious people that life on earth was insignificant.” James H. Cone, Black Theology
and Black Power (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1999), 121. Both of these cases demonstrate how religious language
can and is used by those in the majority to maintain the status quo of power and authority. Thus, it is essential
for a majority scholar, like myself, to clarify the self-referential nature of this kind of discourse. It is not
intended to be prescriptive in every time and place, and I do not claim any special authority outside of my
own limited point-of-view. The language of vulnerability is and ought to be a challenge to the majority, but
might be, at best, irrelevant to those who are forced into vulnerable states without regard to volition.

217

culture writ large.680 Even as a sanctified community, a community which has been ‘called
out’, the church must recognize how deeply responsible it is to shape and to be shaped by
its community. If the church is to model trinitarian love, relationship can never be
unidirectional.
Moltmann’s rejection of a strictly hierarchical trinitarianism is informative for the
church which conceives of itself and has been created in-and-for the image of God.
Moltmann recognized that the interpersonal relationships of the Trinity demonstrate a
“logical priority of the Father,” but that the complexities of genuine trinitarian theology are
only evident in their empirical outworkings. 681 Likewise, the church can see in itself a
‘logical priority’, which is to say, that the church recognizes a particular moral authority
inherent in its being. But, this priority, however it is conceived in its concretion, is anything
but absolute. This priority is not unidirectional nor is it immune to itself being affected.
Such a conception of the church demands not only existential openness, but also a
deep and genuine humility. For Moltmann,
The Trinity corresponds to a community in which people are defined
through their relations with one another and in their significance for one
another… The doctrine of the Trinity constitutes the church as ‘a
community free of dominion.’... Authority and obedience are replaced by
dialogue and harmony.682
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This openness and this humility are far too often lacking in the present realities of the
church; the church continues to see itself at the top of a hierarchical ladder of influence.683
The church rightly believes in its mission(s), and, often, seeks to be a force for positive
change in the world. Yet, so long as the church fails to learn, grow, and be changed by ‘the
world’, so long as the church sees itself solely at the top of the ladder, its influence will
continue to be scattered.684 A theology built upon epistemic hubris is essentially nontrinitarian, and therefore neither representative nor constructive of the image of God.685
Epistemic hubris is particularly dangerous because it lives most of its life as invisible. Its
initial effects are varied and difficult to pin down. The quest for epistemic humility, at least
as described here, would represent a drastic change of course for much of the worldwide
and historical Christian church. Likewise, it would represent a drastic change of course for
many particular embodied communities of the church. Such a drastic change, if it is to
happen at all, will never be quick and it will never be easy. The call for humility points a
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finger directly to beliefs and feelings that many Christians cling to with tremendous
passion.686 Yet, for a theology that is rooted in a doctrine of tragic creation, for a theology
that seeks to build a church that exists in-and-for the image of God, it becomes necessary
to reconsider questions of ecclesiology in light of these questions. One way that this change
can be instigated is to begin by calling into question long-held notions of identity and
otherness, of what it means to be, to belong, and to differentiate.

Identities of Otherness
Here, as is so frequently the case, Moltmann has taken Hegel’s thought as a starting
point for conversation. In particular, Moltmann looked to Hegel’s famous ‘Master-Slave
Dialectic’ to give a theological account of identity and alienation in the world.687
Moltmann’s discussion of the master-slave dialectic is helpful to this conversation less
because it represents a thorough and thoughtful interpretation of the complexities of
Hegel’s thought than because it demonstrates the ease with which Moltmann moves in and
out of the broader Hegelian world.
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embodiment, and story provide powerful ways into the truth of the knowledge of God, while also moving
back towards faith and humility and away from facts alone and overconfidence. Therefore, we must move
beyond an exclusively textual referent with respect to the knowledge of God.” Steven B. Sherman,
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In Hegel scholarship, the terms ‘master’ and ‘slave’ are synonymous with ‘lordship’ and ‘bondage’.
Although less directly referential to this package from Hegel, the terminology of ‘lordship and bondage’
occurs frequently in Moltmann’s work tracing back to the biblical writings of Paul. Moltmann was also
clearly influenced by a Barthian line made manifest in the German Confessing Church. He described
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Moltmann used the language of the master-slave dialectic in two key locations.
Both of these references point to a similar goal, but they represent the situation in very
different ways. The first primary usage of the master-slave dialectic can be found early in
Moltmann’s career. Rather than coming out of Moltmann’s explicitly and intentionally
written work, the first reference is found in a book which contains transcripts from lectures
that were given at Duke University in the late 1960s. One such lecture, entitled, “God in
Revolution,” demonstrates how different these and similar lectures can be from the sorts
of written theology that Moltmann has produced for mass consumption. In a bizarre turnof-phrase, Moltmann described that these lectures were not intended to be “a masterful
theological soup which you should consume with relish.”688 Rather, the lectures were
meant as an “aperitif to whet the appetite.”689 As such, these lectures represented a practice
of preparation as much as a determined theological stance.
In this instance, Moltmann came to a discussion of the master-slave dialectic
through Martin Luther King, Jr., Karl Marx, and Albert Camus. Each of these thinkers
offered a specific interpretation of masters and slaves that were influential for Moltmann.
The continuing thread that Moltmann saw weaving through each of these men was the idea
that the relationship of master and slave demonstrated a two-way enslavement of both
master and slave. He saw through King that the perpetrators of white racism were
“unredeemed and enslaved by their pride and anxiety.”690 Marx, likewise, “spoke not only
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of the alienation of the exploited proletariat but also of that of the capitalist exploiter.”691
Camus was less explicit about the idea of enslavement or alienation, but saw that, “As
master and slave, neither is a true man and neither can relate to the other in a humane
way.”692
By pointing to the dual-sided enslavement/alienation/dehumanization Moltmann
was engaging directly with Hegel’s own description of the master-slave relationship. In
Chapter 2, the master-slave dialectic was discussed as a systemic rupture of Hegel’s
philosophy. When read in terms of the internal development of the self, the master-slave
dialectic represents something other than the progressive telos-oriented philosophy of
history for which Hegel is known. Of course, as discussed in Chapter 3, even Hegel’s
philosophy of history is not quite so simple. Nevertheless, it was argued that in Hegel’s
own work the master-slave dialectic demonstrates a dialectical difficulty. Rather than
moving forward through the dialectical process, the master-slave dialectic describes a
situation in which the -in itself and the -for itself might never move forward to become the
-in-and-for itself. Rather, the third movement of the master-slave dialectic might be
described as the interminable conflict of -in itself and -for itself. This conflict does not
move toward resolution, but exists in se as the ultimate end of the individual.693
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Jon Stewart described this complex situation in terms of the need for an ethics beyond the system. “The
‘goal’ of our dialectical movement is to reach this level of universal mutual recognition… but the
philosophical actor is as yet unaware of his identification with a larger social whole and of this dialectical
goal…. The ability to identify oneself and one’s truth-claims with the social whole can only take place in the
forum of what Hegel calls ‘ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit)… Ethics is not merely acting in accordance with abstract
ethical principles (as with Kant), but rather it primarily involves the realm of custom and concrete ethical
situations.” The Unity of Hegel’s “Phenomenology,” 236-237. Although Stewart was writing more directly
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Moltmann’s interest in the master-slave dialectic is something different than the
ontological thought-exercise that Hegel intended it to be. For Moltmann, any such thoughtexercise is secondary to the existence of actual master-slave relationships and mindsets in
the world. As such, Moltmann did not use this dialectic to think through the development
of an individual person, but rather to think through the development of a community of
persons.694 In the essay cited previously, “God in Revolution,” Moltmann took the notion
of revolution as the key point for understanding the relationship between master and slave.
Citing Marx and King, Moltmann demonstrated that the terms ‘master’ and ‘slave’ are
emblematic of a wide array of relational actualities that are evident in the world. For King,
enslavement was seen through the lens of white supremacy. For Marx, enslavement was
seen in the exploitation of the working class. Moltmann wanted the present reality of each
of these types of enslavement to be well-understood. Yet, by pointing also to Camus,
Moltmann was saying that enslavement can be an internalized psycho-existential reality
just as it can also be an inter-personal reality.
Reading through this lecture, it is fascinating that even in explicitly calling for
revolution, Moltmann has continued to be regarded as ‘safe’ in ways which many others
are not. The accidents of birth are no doubt primary contributing factors. Even so, the
revolution that Moltmann called for was not merely intellectual. Rather, Moltmann was
clear that there were dire real-world consequences to the sort of revolution that was

about Philosophy of Right in this instance, he noted that the language of ‘identification’ is not incidentally
related to the Master-Slave dialectic.
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A similar line of argumentation can be found in Kain, 52-57. Here, Kain approached the Master-Slave
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necessary. “The problem of violence and nonviolence is an illusory problem. There is only
the question of the justified and unjustified use of force and the question of whether the
means are proportionate to the ends.”695 Those who are only familiar with Moltmann’s
major works might be surprised to hear this line of argumentation. Particularly in the
United States, to speak freely in a way that could be construed as ‘Marxist’ is unusual for
a theologian like Moltmann. To be able to do so without being roundly condemned and
rejected by the powers that be is yet more remarkable. Moltmann was clear that the
continued existence of oppressive relationships was a reality in need of drastic change. To
enter redemptively into a situation of enslavement, one cannot simply point to oppressive
structures or hate-filled language and expect a sudden change in the relationship. While, at
least to public knowledge, Moltmann never participated in or directly encouraged violent
uprising, that he initiated a theological argument for it tells of the depth to which he
believed in the necessity of revolutionary action in the face of enslavement. “In the present
struggles for freedom and justice, Christians must side with the humanity of the
oppressed.”696
Moltmann’s second primary reference to the master-slave dialectic is far less
politically revolutionary. Though, within the context of Moltmann’s Christianity, it retains
the possibility of being theologically revolutionary. Moltmann again described the
existence of ‘the master’, and the master’s subsequent oppression of the slave, broadly. “It
can take the form of political oppression, economic exploitation, social exclusion, cultural
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estrangement and sexist humiliation. It takes other forms too. But it is always a crime
against life.”697 Moltmann here looked at the realities of enslavement in communal terms.
“Human life is life in community and communication.”698 In this second discussion of the
Master-Slave dialectic, Moltmann seemed less comfortable dwelling with what was earlier
termed ‘the interminable conflict’ that exists between master and slave. Rather, as with his
eschatological framework, Moltmann’s hope for resolution took a stronger place of
importance than his quest for revolution. In seeking eschatological resolution, Moltmann
said, “Oppression always has two sides. On the one side stands the master, on the other
side stands the slave… Oppression destroys humanity on both sides.”699 Even from this
vantage point, Moltmann still believed that the properly Christian role will always be to
side with the oppressed. Moltmann pointed to several differently oriented liberation
theologies and celebrated that they were ‘one-sided’ in their pursuit of liberation.700 Yet,
he also believed:
It is a deplorable fact that after more than thirty years of liberation theology
among the poor in the countries of the Third World, there should still be no
comprehensive theology for the liberation of the oppressors among the
ruling classes in the countries of the industrial West…That theologians in
the West should do no more than shrink back from black theology, Latin
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An Yountae made a similar point when she critiqued Hegel’s lack of focus on the negative within the
discussion of lordship and bondage. “Hegel, ironically, skips or glosses over the painful process of regressing
into the dark depth of the negative, the night of the abyss lurking at the bottom surface of the dialectical selfreflection. As Butler comments, following Kierkegaard, the infinitely self-replenishing subject of the
Hegelian dialectic does not seem wholly engulfed by the negative.” An Yountae, “Breaking from Within:
The Dialectic of Labor and the Death of God,” in Common Goods: Economy, Ecology, and Political
Theology, eds. Melanie Johnson-DeBaufre, Catherine Keller, and Elias Ortega-Aponte (New York: Fordham
University Press, 2015), 257.
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American theology, Korean minjung theology, and feminist theology, or
allow themselves to be entertained by them, without having the faintest
perception of the changes in themselves which are required, is a reflection
of ‘hardness of heart’ in the biblical sense of the phrase.701
Without blaming the victim, Moltmann problematized the relationship of master
and slave by demonstrating that the master’s oppressive structures and behaviors also serve
to enact the master’s own oppression. In the same way that the liberation theology of Latin
America, coming from the mouths of the oppressed, sought to enact their own liberation,
Moltmann here decried that the oppressors are not likewise seeking their liberation from
the role of oppressor.702 “The liberation of the oppressed from their suffering must lead to
the liberation of the oppressors from the evil they commit; otherwise there can be no
liberation for a new community in justice and freedom.”703
Moltmann’s discussion about the relationship between master and slave, while
intentionally stemming from Hegelian language, privileges the ethical and the political
over the ontological. Yet, it is also not entirely removed from the ontological. Moltmann’s
intention was to transition pure ontology into an ontology of community. Moltmann’s
argument was that being must always be understood as being-in-community. This is not
only true anthropologically but to a universal scale. There can be no true be(com)ing, for
Moltmann, in utter isolation. This is as true for the master as it is for the slave. Thus, even
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beginning with a different intentionality, Moltmann was, in some ways, following Hegel
in trying to describe the movement toward selfhood through a violent quest for survival.
Yet, by turning the notion of selfhood from individual to communal, Moltmann has
demonstrated a distinctly theological transition. The notion of life in community of which
Moltmann speaks is most closely demonstrated in the life of the church.704 Moltmann
described the church in this way, “The goal of these reciprocal liberations cannot be
anything less than a community of men and women, free of fear, in which there are no
longer any oppressors, and no longer any oppressed.”705
This, ultimately, is the goal of Moltmann’s entire theological project. This
community serves as representative of the eschatological Kingdom of God for which
Moltmann hopes. Moltmann’s theology offers a means by which the church can at least
conceive of itself as other than it is. What Moltmann, through Hegel, offers to the church
is a reconception of its very being, a new foundational narrative whereby even individual
identity is conceived from within a liberating community. 706 In Hegel’s rendition of the
master-slave

dialectic,

there

is

an

“awareness

that

the

master/slave

or

Given Moltmann’s early interest in Bonhoeffer, one might see this transition in terms similar to
Bonhoeffer’s analogia relationis, by which Bonhoeffer described inter-personal relationships in terms of the
individual’s relationship to God. Moltmann described, “It was in Communion of Saints that Bonhoeffer first
saw and describe the I-Thou relationship between man in analogy to the Thou relationship of man to God. It
is only in connection with his effect on his neighbor that man can be called the image of God.” Two Studies
in the Theology of Bonhoeffer, 53.
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dominance/submission relationship is not only unstable but also premised on modes of
false consciousness.”707 It is to this same mode of false consciousness that Moltmann has
pointed. Moltmann described this false consciousness as, “A situation of paralyzing apathy
and the creeping recession of the will to live.”708 When the church turns only inward,
concerned only with its own safety and well-being, it functionally rejects the theology of
hope. The church must first and foremost exist as a community of differentiation – not
celebrating commonality but embracing the possibility for change and growth. 709 The
identity of the church, as the identity of the ‘master’, is not set, but is determined in its
ongoing relationship with the identity of the ‘slave’. As Hegel described,
The object in which the lord has achieved his lordship has in reality turned
out to be something quite different from an independent consciousness…
Just as lordship showed that its essential nature is the reverse of what it
wants to be, so too servitude in its consummation will really turn into the
opposite of what it immediately is.710
The role of the church, thus, is a dual role of master and slave. The language of
servitude is already plentiful in the Christian tradition, but here requires a nuanced
understanding. The servitude of the church is not merely servitude toward God, or even
servitude toward the world which is understood as God’s good creation. Rather, in order
to understand the servitude which is required the church must first understand the
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difficulties of its own lordship. As Moltmann has interpreted the master-slave dialectic,
one is not a master by chance or by birth, but by the dehumanizing oppression of an other.
Until the church recognizes its complicity in this role it can never understand either its own
lordship or the servitude to which it is called.711 The church, in this sense, is not called to
be a servant of God, for in the internalization of God’s zimsum God has demonstrated an
unwillingness to take on God’s apparently rightful role as master. God has rejected the
potential for oppression that would come with a creation absent something like free-will.
God’s creative activity, as here described, is thus representative of the way in which the
identity of the church can come to be through the embrace of otherness. Thus, as a
community existing in-and-for the image of God, what Moltmann rightly calls for is the
redemption of one’s own position as master – the rejection of that by which the church
manipulates and celebrates power relations at the expense of God’s relational image. In
Hegelian terms, this represents the sublation of oppression’s sublation.
To this point, the theological proposal under construction is in appearance and
actuality deeply negative. Stemming from an Hegelian background this negativity is not
surprising, and one should be careful not to immediately equate ‘negative’ with ‘bad’. For,
Hegel described the mechanism for productivity of negativity. Nevertheless, a theology

Rebecca Chopp described, while critically reading Moltmann’s ecclesiology, the difficulties encountered
at the parish level of pointing toward ecclesial complicity. “Caught between individualism on the one side,
and bureaucracy on the other, many seek community, a commonness, a meeting, a recognition of the
intersubjectivity of life… Yet, the modern congregation must form its community by trying to appease
individual differences, promoting, at most, a common belief or common perspective held by all individuals.
This places a tremendous burden on the congregation (and its ‘official’ minister) to be pleasing to all people,
to mold itself into a homogenous whole, to find its fellowship in a group of people that, at least on the surface,
are similar, and value each other for their shared opinions, beliefs, and interests. This results, as Moltmann
suggests, in a community that exists like a Noah’s Ark, a fragile ark in the flood of hopelessness.” Rebecca
S. Chopp, The Power to Speak: Feminism, Language, God (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1991), 81.
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that holds a notion of tragedy at its core, could very quickly incorporate pessimism and
insincerity into its practices. Such an incorporation would be deeply problematic for
Moltmann, who has built his career on theologically considering hope. As such, in
conclusion, it is important to be reminded that even a tragic theology is not a hopeless
theology, but contains within itself a kernel of deepest hope for redemption.

Hope For the Future
In the introduction to this dissertation it was claimed that Christian theology, in
particular though not exclusively in the form of American evangelical theologies, is often
made manifest in problematic and dangerous ways. The primary bedrock of this
problematic theology was described as ‘insular universalism’, or the theological tendency
to reject any interpretation of one’s own experience as anything but universally valid.
Throughout the course of the last two hundred pages, it has been further argued that Jürgen
Moltmann offers an encouraging way forward. Even though Moltmann’s theology has
achieved a high degree of popularity, insofar as ‘popular’ is an apt descriptor for academic
theology, one interpretive lens that has been surprisingly absent in the secondary literature
is an understanding of the deep influence of Hegelian philosophy on Moltmann’s theology.
Moltmann’s theology, often regarded in its entirety as a ‘theology of hope’ or a
‘hopeful theology’ speaks a profound message into a world that seems to be drowning in
the despair of its own self-destruction. This might sound hyperbolic, but is not meant to be
so. The world, at least this world, is inching ever closer to the possibility of its own
ecological demise. Troublingly, evangelical American Christians seem to be less
concerned about this scientific reality than almost any other religiously-defined group. That
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this pattern is notably religious leads to the conclusion that there must be something about
evangelical religious beliefs that assuages any notion of danger or culpability. Moltmann
has made ecological survival a hallmark of his political theology, and, as such, can offer a
revitalized understanding of the doctrine of creation which would disallow a laissez-faire
attitude toward the possibility of ecological catastrophe.
Moltmann has offered an understanding of creation as taking place in the opening
of ‘god-forsakenness’. Through having been created in this god-forsakenness, the telos of
creation is seen to be something more than the individual concern for salvation. Rather,
creation is called to move, together, back to the God who is Creator. The eschatological
end of creation is redemption, or God once again being allowed to be all-in-all. Moving
beyond Moltmann, it has been argued that within the world described by Moltmann, God
must be essentially related to creation, and that humanity in particular has been created
both in-and-for the Image of God. The ecological realities of the world become yet more
pressing when God’s own well-being is at stake in the celebration and preservation of
God’s creation.
Despair is not merely evident in the ever-increasing possibility of ecological
catastrophe, but equally in the terrible brokenness of interpersonal relationships. There is
a parallel between the interpersonal relationships and the relationship of a community
within the created world. In both cases, the theological calling is to enact redemption in
moments of brokenness. Using Moltmann as a guide, a trinitarian theology has been
constructed, at least in miniature, that requires an inter-personal humility. Using the notion
of perichoresis, it has been argued that the inter-trinitarian life of God can serve as
emblematic of the relationship that humans are called to have with creation and with each
231

other. For Moltmann, the perichoretic love of God is demonstrated in deep vulnerability
and pathos. Such a trinitarian discussion cannot be helpful in every circumstance, and
certainly should not be utilized to maintain or encourage continued unequal distributions
of power in the world. It should not, for instance, be used to reify gender or racial
imbalances in the church and in the outreach of the church. Yet, for those who embody
theological or social power, the trinitarian call to vulnerability offers a powerful tool in reforming the world in its brokenness.
Theology holds no magic power to change the minds of those who refuse to accept
it in whatever form it is offered. Yet, theological belief has a tremendous capacity to, even
unconsciously, change the way an individual sees and approaches the world. Viewing God
in trinitarian vulnerability rather than in hierarchical dominance offers the proposition that
one’s life should demonstrate the same sort of loving openness. To be created in the image
of God no longer means existing above ‘creation’, but places humanity on equal footing
with all of creation. This, in turn, might also demonstrate a change in interpersonal
relationality, for the rejection of dominance in one form can be transformative of other
forms as well.
Bringing together a tragic doctrine of creation with a deeply trinitarian conception
of God, a Moltmannian theology can also address an ecclesial community that is built on
fear rather than love. As individual persons find themselves being transformed in-and-for
the image of God into an inter-connected organism fighting for survival, the role of the
church must likewise move away from a focus on exclusion for the sake of ‘holiness’, and
into a focus on inclusion for the sake of wholeness. As Moltmann demonstrated, such a
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church would not be passive, nor perhaps even pacifist, but would find common allegiance
in the need for redemption rather than in the accidents of birth.
In the end, and from the beginning, nothing is guaranteed. Neither Hegel nor
Moltmann brought to a close the studies of philosophy or theology. Both exist as open and
transgressive, always becoming something other than what they are, and accessible for
what they could be. That a theology, such as that offered here, could be transformative in
a/the church, is no guarantee that it will be.712 Yet, what this sort of theological proposal
offers is an Hegelian reassurance that the theological endeavor is always in the process of
being sublated – of being simultaneously preserved and transformed. This promise of
sublation should give hope that, even at its darkest, even in the brokenness of the church
and of the world, redemption is always on the horizon. This, ultimately, is the essence of a
theology of hope: what is can become what will be because God’s love has been made
manifest in what already was. Ernst Bloch said of hope, “Hope has projected itself precisely
at the place of death, as one towards light and life, as one which does not allow failure the
last word… Danger and faith are the truth of hope, in such a way that both are gathered in
it, and danger contains no fear, faith no lazy quietism.”713 Or, in Moltmann’s own words,
“The hope of resurrection is belief in creation that gazes forward to what is ahead.”714

“Hope does not guarantee that one will have only the wished-for experiences. Life in hope entails risk
and leads one into danger and confirmation, disappointment and surprise. We must therefore speak of the
experiment of hope.” The Experiment Hope, 188.
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